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“Occupational licensure as an interference in free markets gets less attention 
than its importance for both good and ill warrants. Morris Kleiner is our fore-
most expert on this important topic, and this book shares what he has learned. 
Whatever your policy instincts, this book provides important new insights. It 
is a great and valuable accomplishment.”
—Lawrence Summers, Charles W. Eliot University Professor at Harvard 
University
“Morris Kleiner is the leading expert in the nation, and perhaps the world, on 
the causes and effects of occupational licensing. His book Stages of Occupa-
tional Regulation presents fi ve case studies of occupations—interior designers, 
mortgage brokers, preschool teachers, electricians and plumbers, and dentists 
and hygienists—that are at different stages of government regulation, and then 
uses these case studies to provide new insights as to how regulation affects 
practitioners, consumers, and the public at large. His focus throughout is on the 
effi ciency and equity impacts of regulation, and this very interesting, carefully 
researched, and well-written book will provide readers with a new appreciation 
of the importance of occupational regulation in American society.”
—Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor 
Relations and Economics, Cornell University
“Stages of Occupational Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies makes a great 
companion to Kleiner's previous book, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring 
Quality or Restricting Competition? In addition to providing an excellent sum-
mary of the literature, the book presents original research examining a broad 
range of effects of occupational licensing regulations—effects on wages, entry 
into the occupation, and adverse outcomes both for consumers and for licensed 
professionals. The book delves into how these effects differ among occupa-
tions that are licensed in only a handful of states, those that are universally 
licensed, and those with licensing regimes lying somewhere in between, de-
scribing the details of the economics and public policy issues at play. Stages of 
Occupational Regulation also contains a wealth of ideas for future research.”
—Bradley Larsen, Department of Economics, Stanford University
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“Stages of Occupational Regulation blends detailed institutional knowledge, 
historical perspective, and economic analysis to present the costs and benefi ts 
of the growing rate of occupational licensing in the U.S. economy. Kleiner is 
a clear and engaging narrator, using occupations at various stages of licens-
ing requirements, from mortgage brokers to dental hygienists, to illustrate the 
political economy of heightened regulation and to clarify who wins and who 
loses from the process. This book, with its wealth of real-world detail, is a 
welcome companion to Kleiner’s earlier statistical studies on occupational li-
censing and cements his place as the foremost expert on this important labor 
market institution.”
—Leah Boustan, Department of Economics, University of California at Los 
Angeles
“Stages of Occupational Regulation asks searching questions concerning the 
use of occupational regulation as a policy lever. Where it is necessary, we are 
invited to consider the appropriate form that should be employed, and Pro-
fessor Kleiner helpfully continues an important conversation about this oft-
neglected topic.”
—Adam Parfi tt, Executive Director, Council on Licensure, Enforcement, and 
Regulation (CLEAR)
“Supported by cogent and persuasive historical, institutional, and quantitative 
analyses, Stages of Occupational Regulation: Analysis of Case Studies pro-
vides new insights into the evolution and impacts of occupational regulation 
on the U.S. economy.”
—Adriana D. Kugler, Vice-Provost for Faculty and Professor of Public Policy, 
Georgetown University
“To paraphrase Tolstoy, all unlicensed professions are alike; each licensed pro-
fession is licensed in its own way. Morris Kleiner has shined a light on this 
increasingly pervasive labor market regulation with a variety of informative 
case studies, each of which helps us understand why professions are licensed, 
who is affected, and why it matters.”
—Charles Wheelan, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago
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Preface
I was left wanting more . . . I liken it to the cliffhanger in a work of 
fi ction; it has made me eager for the next installment. 
—Alice Ramey (2010), Bureau of Labor Statistics economist, in her 
review of Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting 
Competition?
 
As this epigraph attests, I am reasonably certain that at least one reader 
was on the edge of her seat while turning the pages of my last book, Licensing 
Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?, published by the 
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in 2006. Occupational licens-
ing is not a topic that often gets mentioned with the same sense of anticipation 
as a Robert Ludlum spellbinder or a Sherlock Holmes mystery, but I will take 
modest praise wherever I can fi nd it. Therefore, to satisfy the wishes of Alice 
Ramey and any other readers for a follow-up work, I have written this current 
book. 
The goal of this book is to provide new insights into how occupational reg-
ulation infl uences practitioners, consumers, and the public. To accomplish this 
goal, I provide detailed case studies of occupations at various stages of gov-
ernmental regulation. The occupations selected are those of interior designers, 
mortgage brokers, preschool teachers, electricians and plumbers, and dentists 
and hygienists. Although the groups examined were not randomly selected, 
they refl ect large occupational groups that have important economic and labor 
market effects. 
Each chapter presents the evolution and anatomy of each profession. It 
asks why the occupation sought licensing or other forms of governmental regu-
lation. Furthermore, it seeks to explain to what extent regulation has changed 
over time and whether there is a convergence of state regulations to a national 
standard. What qualitative changes have occurred within the occupation? Have 
individuals that have attained an occupational license gained higher wages as 
a consequence? Have other nonmonetary outcomes within the occupation 
been infl uenced by regulation? Have consumers been affected by regulations 
through changes in prices and the quality of the service? To what extent do the 
duration and intensity of governmental regulations infl uence the members of 
the profession? 
By analyzing these questions, I have attempted to focus on the relevance 
of each issue with as much economic and statistical rigor as possible. Further-
more, I have attempted to examine the equity and effi ciency trade-offs as these 
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occupations become more highly regulated over time. Specifi cally, to what 
extent is access to the regulated service reduced for those whose incomes are 
low? In contrast, do higher-income individuals gain by having more good-
quality service providers with higher levels of training and experience? George 
Shultz, the astute academic and later premier statesman, opined that lags occur 
with general public policy issues, but that politicians are impatient (Shultz 
1995). Occupational licensing generally fi ts this model, since it is an institu-
tion whose effects are not immediately apparent, but rather reveal their effi cacy 
over some time. Specifi cally, occupational licensing usually does not regulate 
current practitioners, implements new exams, and develops educational and 
location-specifi c requirements so that implementing these policies takes many 
years. Consequently, the labor market or consumer outcomes are not immedi-
ately apparent. Understanding this institution requires a longer-run perspective 
before wage, price, quality, and distributional effects can be fully realized. An 
approach that evaluates the various stages of occupational regulation can help 
capture and illuminate the role that this institution has in labor and service 
markets.
To correspond with my initial lengthy examination of the topic, readers 
should bring some knowledge of economics and statistics to this work in order 
to fully understand the material. General readers without this background, 
however, should have little diffi culty comprehending the major portions of the 
book and will be able to understand its key elements. Even when the material 
becomes more specialized, readers without a technical background may judi-
ciously push on, since the essential arguments and evidence explained in the 
book are easily understood. 
      —Morris M. Kleiner
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11
Introduction and Overview
A dominant perspective on the development of policies for the 
regulation of occupational labor markets is that these workers should 
be regulated to ensure quality providers and high levels of service. In 
only some narrow areas should competitive labor markets alone be 
dominant. Others argue that occupational labor markets should be free 
of government regulation because they have little need for licensing 
through government rules, except in those cases where the health and 
safety of society are seriously threatened. Since World War II, the mar-
ket for occupational oversight by government has grown to such an 
extent that by 2008 almost 40 percent of the U.S. labor market had, 
or was required to eventually obtain, either a license or certifi cation 
from some form of local, state, or federal government (Kleiner and 
Krueger 2013).1 Since governmental occupational regulation varies 
greatly depending on the occupation that is licensed, the purpose of this 
book is to examine a variety of occupations that are at different stages 
of regulation and determine to what extent regulation has infl uenced 
the individuals in the occupation, consumers, or other closely related 
occupational practitioners. Since governments at the local, state, and 
national levels are confronted with the interests of the members of the 
occupations—and in rare cases with the interests of consumers of the 
services seeking more regulation—the goal of this book is to provide 
new analysis and evidence on how these labor markets work in the face 
of new and continuing government regulations.
The book adds further background and new analysis to the issue 
in the law-versus-economics debate, which asks whether litigation or 
regulation is better for society (Kessler 2011). If regulation is effi cient, 
then ubiquitous regulation, which is found in most advanced nations, 
adds greater impetus for economic development (Shleifer 2011). On 
the other hand, the general theme of law-and-economics research sug-
gests that contracts and the courts are a substitute for regulation (Coase 
1960). They argue that if potential externalities can be contracted 
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around, no regulation is necessary. However, the growth of regulation 
through occupational licensing suggests that some manner of effi cient 
regulation may be gaining as the dominant form of public policy. An 
additional issue that emerges with more regulation is that as occupa-
tional licensing becomes more prevalent, there is more room for litiga-
tion. This is because licensing develops more rules, which require legal 
interpretation. That results in further complaints adjudicated through 
the courts. The implications for economic growth are therefore unclear.
The common threads throughout the book include showing the 
growth of regulation and its variations over time. Each subsequent 
chapter shows an occupation that has a higher level of regulation. In 
this way, the successive chapters demonstrate the infl uence of increased 
regulation on the wages of the occupations and, where data were avail-
able, its effects on employment. A unique aspect of the book is that 
it portrays outcomes both for consumers in the case of regulation of 
mortgage brokers and for young children’s educational attainment in 
the case of licensing of preschool teachers and their assistants. Another 
unique aspect of the analysis is the examination of occupations such as 
those of dentists and hygienists, who battle with regulators over who is 
permitted to do what type of work in dental offi ces. A further innova-
tion is the examination of how regulations may infl uence the number of 
workplace injuries and deaths suffered by plumbers and electricians in 
the construction industry, which is the most hazardous industry, based 
on total numbers of workplace accidents in the United States. Overall, 
there are common aspects of the volume, yet each chapter delves into 
the unique historical or institutional aspects of a particular occupation 
and how it is regulated by government using data and analysis.
The evolution of occupational regulation has a long and distin-
guished intellectual history. Adam Smith, in his 1776 work The Wealth 
of Nations, notes that trades conspired to reduce the availability of 
“skilled craftsmen” in order to raise wages. Smith goes on to say that 
“to hinder him from employing this strength and dexterity in what man-
ner he thinks proper without injury to his neighbor, is a plain violation 
of this most sacred property. It is a manifest encroachment upon the 
just liberty both of the workman, and of those who might be imposed to 
employ him” (Smith 1937). 
In the United States, a structural shift in the economy has developed. 
The country has moved from a manufacturing-based economy, where 
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unions and collective bargaining contracts previously were prominent, 
toward a service-oriented economy; the transformation has created a 
demand for a “web of rules” governing the workplace that has made 
licensing part of this evolution (Dunlop 1958). Although the number of 
union members has declined, occupational licensing has grown over the 
past 50 years (Kleiner 2006). 
Occupational regulation in the United States generally takes three 
forms. The least restrictive form is registration, in which individuals fi le 
their names, addresses, and qualifi cations with a government agency 
before practicing their occupation. The registration process may include 
posting the equivalent of a surety bond or fi ling a fee. In contrast, cer-
tifi cation permits any person to perform the relevant tasks, but the gov-
ernment—or sometimes a private, nonprofi t agency—administers an 
examination and certifi es those who have achieved the level of skill and 
knowledge for certifi cation. For example, chartered fi nancial analysts 
and car mechanics are generally certifi ed but not licensed. The toughest 
form of regulation is licensure; this form of regulation is often referred 
to as “the right to practice.” Under licensure laws, working in an occu-
pation for compensation without fi rst meeting government standards is 
illegal. In 2003, the Council of State Governments estimated that more 
than 800 occupations were licensed in at least one state, and more than 
1,100 occupations were licensed, certifi ed, or registered (Council on 
Licensure, Enforcement, and Regulation [CLEAR] 2004). 
A simple view, or the perspective of a bureaucratic functionary, 
on occupational licensing by government suggests that administrative 
procedures regulate the supply of labor in the market. The regulators 
screen entrants to the profession and bar those whose skills or charac-
ter traits suggest a tendency toward low-quality output. The regulators 
further monitor incumbents and discipline those whose performance is 
below the standards, with punishments that may include revocation of 
the license needed to practice. Assuming that entry and ongoing per-
formance are controlled in these ways, one would expect the quality of 
service in the profession to be raised by occupational licensing but the 
supply to diminish. 
In contrast, Milton Friedman questioned the assumption of un-
biased gatekeepers and enforcers. Instead, he viewed licensing’s entry 
restrictions as creating undesirable monopoly rents or incomes. Mem-
bers of the occupation worked in their own self-interest to restrict sup-
Kleiner2013.indb   3 9/18/2013   10:10:17 AM
4   Kleiner
ply, increase demand, and maximize “profi ts” for the members of the 
occupation. Friedman (1962) gives an example of doctors who expect 
to make a certain income or they will diagnose bogus ailments for 
which they will prescribe unnecessary treatments in order to achieve 
their expected income.
An expanded and segmented way of thinking about the issue of who 
gains from regulation was suggested by Carl Shapiro, who stated that 
both the average quality and the average prices or earnings from the 
services within the regulated occupation will rise as licensing require-
ments are implemented or tightened. The consequences are benefi ts for 
those who want higher quality, but at a cost to those who are in lower-
quality service markets. Demand for the services of licensed workers 
could increase because of higher perceived quality and lower risk, but 
demand might also decrease for some segments of the occupation if 
some consumers demand lower-quality services that are precluded by 
the licensing procedures. An outward shift in demand could accentuate 
the increase in the price of services resulting from diminished supply 
and further boost provider incomes. Models of licensing assume that 
consumers can choose among three markets: 1) a market for mature 
producers known to sell high-quality services, 2) a market for mature 
producers known to produce low-quality services, and 3) a market for 
young producers whose quality of service (low or high) is not known 
by the consumer at the time of purchase (Shapiro 1986). The result 
is that seekers of high-quality services gain by regulation, and those 
who seek low-quality services are worse off because prices are higher 
and choices more limited. There is somewhat of a reverse Robin Hood 
effect, with the lower-income individuals losing and those with higher 
incomes gaining from occupational regulation. 
Consumers and citizens often value the reduction in downside risk 
more than they value the benefi ts of a positive outcome. This prefer-
ence by consumers for the status quo or for reducing the risk of a highly 
negative outcome has been called “loss aversion” by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979). If the perception of licensing is that it leads to a reduc-
tion in the most serious losses, such as the spread of disease or the 
lack of structural integrity of a building, then this form of regulation 
can have public backing and support. These are the potential benefi ts 
against which the costs—which are most often the subject of analysis—
are measured.
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Unlike unions, which can engage in concerted activities such as 
strikes or work slowdowns, licensed workers neither sign collective 
agreements with their employers nor engage in strikes against employ-
ers to raise wages. Nonunion workers, who are covered by collec-
tive bargaining agreements but are not dues-paying members, usually 
receive most of the benefi ts of workers who are in the union. Occu-
pational licensing can affect pay and employment through three main 
channels. First, licensing may increase perceived quality by imposing 
initial education, testing, continuing training requirements, internship 
requirements, or fees. These requirements are likely to diminish the 
number of less qualifi ed or unmotivated individuals who could enter 
the occupation, and thereby they serve to drive up the average quality 
of human capital in workers in an occupation, as typically measured. 
A consequence is higher-quality outcomes for those who are able to 
obtain the service, but fewer practitioners and less access to the service.
Second, by using the state to monitor and prevent the potential work 
effort of unlicensed workers, competition by unlicensed individuals is 
virtually eliminated through the use of the state’s enforcement powers. 
For example, the work of hair braiders, which is unlicensed, could be 
brought under the control of the cosmetology board and limited to only 
licensed cosmetologists or barbers (Anderson v. Minnesota Board of 
Barber and Cosmetology Examiners 2005). Furthermore, when demand 
fl uctuates for traditional tasks, the board has the ability to expand the 
regulated work through establishing administrative rules and limiting 
the work of unregulated workers. 
Third, the regulatory board, through its administrative procedures 
of establishing large entry barriers and moral suasion, can reduce the 
number of openings in schools that prepare individuals for licensed 
positions. In addition, by adjusting the pass rate on the licensing exam, 
the board can change the number of new entrants from in-state or the 
number of migrants from other states or nations (Tenn 2001; Pagliero 
2010). 
Some evidence suggests that licensing does restrict the supply of 
workers in regulated occupations. One application focuses on the com-
parison of occupations that are licensed in some states and not in others. 
The occupations examined were librarians (licensed in 19 states), respi-
ratory therapists (licensed in 35 states), and dietitians and nutritionists 
(licensed in 36 states) from 1990 to 2000 using census data (Kleiner 
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2006). Using controls for state characteristics, the multivariate esti-
mates show that in the states where the occupations were unlicensed, 
the growth rate in employment was 20 percent faster than in states that 
did license these occupations. Another study fi nds that the imposition of 
greater licensing requirements by a state, such as requiring all students 
studying to become funeral directors to take embalming classes, is asso-
ciated with fewer women holding jobs as funeral directors relative to 
men, by a range of between 18 and 24 percent (Cathles, Harrington, and 
Krynski 2010).2 
Studies of the effects of licensing on wages have, in many ways, 
paralleled the research methods used to study the effects of unions on 
wages (Lewis 1986). These approaches include cross-section estimates, 
switchers from regulated to unregulated and vice versa over time, and 
cross-sectional results from within-occupation comparisons (Gittleman 
and Kleiner 2013). The general estimates of cross-sectional studies 
using census data of state licensing’s infl uence on wages with standard 
labor market controls show a range from 10 to 18 percent for wage 
increase associated with being covered or attaining an occupational 
license. However, within-occupation wage variations, both for service 
occupations and for individuals in jobs that repair things, suggest a wide 
range of wage changes, from 0 to 40 percent, associated with regulation 
within an occupation.
Although these results suggest that licensing—the toughest form 
of regulation—matters for wage determination, the results do not use 
national estimates, do not examine the levels of government that may 
matter, and do not consider the infl uence of the requirements to become 
licensed, such as education, testing, or internships, which may further 
enhance wages. When these national estimates are developed, they 
show that occupational licensing can raise earnings of individuals in 
the occupations between 15 and 18 percent (Kleiner and Krueger 2010, 
2013). I plan to examine in detail several occupations to learn when 
these national trends apply to specifi c cases as occupations achieve 
varying levels of regulation over time.
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FURTHER COMPARISONS OF UNIONS AND 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
As I point out in an ealier volume (Licensing Occupations: Ensur-
ing Quality or Restricting Competition?, Kleiner 2006), unions and 
licensing membership are moving in different directions (Kleiner and 
Krueger 2013). To update my earlier results to 2008, Figure 1.1 shows 
the trends in unionization and licensing over time from 1950 to 2008 
(Council of State Governments 1952).3 Licensing data for earlier peri-
ods are available only at the state/occupational level; the data gathered 
through the Gallup and Westat surveys for 2006 and 2008 are denoted 
with a dashed line in the fi gure. Despite possible problems in both 
data series, occupational licensing clearly is rising and unionization 
is declining. By 2008, approximately 29 percent of workers polled in 
the Westat survey said they were required to have a government-issued 
license to do their job, compared with about 12.4 percent who said they 
were union members in the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the 
same year. An overview of the data used in this volume is presented in 
Appendix E.
An interesting anomaly involves the potential substitution between 
occupational licensing and unionization. For example, in the United 
Kingdom about 13.5 percent of the workforce must have a license 
to work, but about 22 percent of the workforce belongs to a union 
(Humphris, Kleiner, and Koumenta 2011). In contrast, in the United 
States about 29 percent of the workforce must have a license to work, 
but only 12.4 percent belongs to a union. In the United States, 41 per-
cent of the workforce either is in a union or is licensed, and in the 
United Kingdom about 35.5 percent of the workforce is in a union or 
is licensed. Other nations, such as China, have found the general wage 
gaps for licensing relative to unregulated workers to be about 13 per-
cent (Chi, Kleiner, and Qian 2013). 
For these two countries, the United States and the United King-
dom, there may be substitution of some form of a “web of rules” at the 
workplace through the institution of either unionization or governmen-
tal licensure. However, there may also be complements, since in the 
United States, as Table 1.1 shows, 45 percent of union members are also 
licensed, but only about 26 percent of nonunion members are licensed.
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Figure 1.1  Percentage of Union and Licensed Workers, 1950–2008, 
Trends in Two Labor Market Institutions
NOTE: Dashed line shows the value of estimates from state-level data of licensing from 
the Gallup and Westat survey results, including licensing by local, state, or federal 
governments. More than 800 occupations are licensed on at least one level, according 
to the Council of State Governments.
SOURCE: Licensing data are estimated from the author’s surveys, Department of 
Labor estimates, a Gallup survey, and a Westat survey; union data are from the Cur-
rent Population Survey (CPS).
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Table 1.1  Percentage of Union and Nonunion Workers Who Are 
Licensed and Certifi ed
Licensed Certifi ed
Union status No Yes No Yes
Union 55.4 44.6 95.0 5.0
Nonunion 74.3 25.7 94.0 6.0
Total 71.4 28.6 94.2 5.8
SOURCE: Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (2008).
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 DEVELOPING STAGES OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION
Business enterprises are rarely formed as unionized fi rms. Simi-
larly, even though occupations develop similar tasks and common pro-
cedures for doing a job, they are not begun as licensed occupations. 
Occupations evolve, organize, and often select licensing as a method to 
obtain professionalism, quality, and status, as well as to limit the sup-
ply of practitioners. They tax their members through dues and engage 
in political activities that lead to registration, certifi cation, and eventu-
ally licensing. The process of regulation across political jurisdictions 
often takes years or decades to achieve full licensure. Consequently, 
new occupations are often in varying stages of the regulatory process as 
they seek to become regulated by units of government. Since regulation 
mainly infl uences new entrants, it would take some time before the full 
effect of licensing would infl uence either the wages and employment of 
the individuals in the occupation or the consumers of their services. It 
usually takes some time for individuals who are grandfathered into the 
occupation, and have less measured human capital than newly regulated 
practitioners, to retire or leave the job. Occupations at a more mature 
stage of regulation would be more likely to have the benefi ts or advan-
tages of the various stages of licensing than those that have recently 
sought or obtained regulation at different levels of government.4
The occupations that I plan to examine have been selected because 
they are at varying stages of regulation across states. In addition, they 
were chosen because they have unique characteristics, such as a poten-
tial confl ict with another occupation, an example being dentists and 
hygienists. In other cases, I used an outcome factor, such as health and 
safety, to evaluate the infl uence of licensing within the construction 
industry.
Consequently, the overarching framework used to examine each 
of the occupations is adapted from the models of economic growth in 
Walter Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist 
Manifesto (1960). Rostow’s model illustrates fi ve stages of growth, 
from traditional to highly developed, and places nations within these 
groups. Usually there are events or institutional changes in nations that 
trigger movement to higher stages of economic growth and develop-
ment. The stages of occupational regulation are an arbitrary and in 
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many ways a limited way of looking at the sequence of regulation. The 
stages approach utilizes not merely the uniformities in the sequence of 
regulation but also—and equally—the uniqueness of each occupation’s 
experience. The trigger to starkly infl uence the impact of regulation 
within an occupation is occupational licensing. There is an important 
time-series element to the stages of occupational regulation. Further-
more, there is the importance of the restrictiveness of entry and the 
signifi cance of occupation members remaining in good standing, both 
of which infl uence the ability of the members of the occupation to 
infl uence wages, employment, and other outcomes that are affected by 
regulation. Occupational licensing, like the economic growth models 
described by Rostow, does not operate in a linear manner. Rather, time 
and stages of regulation are key elements in the issues faced by the 
members of the occupation, consumers, and society. 
In this book, I modify the Rostow model to show that the various 
stages of occupational regulation can be represented by several occupa-
tions that are at various levels of regulation by different jurisdictions of 
government. I also examine the tension that exists between the occupa-
tions over the “span of control” of job tasks that are regulated by the 
state. Each stage of the infl uence of occupational regulation has its own 
set of outcome criteria such as wages, housing foreclosures, or health 
and safety levels. Policies may differ based on the stage of occupational 
regulation and the tasks that the occupation performs. Furthermore, the 
length of time an occupation has been licensed matters for labor market 
outcomes. Generally, the longer an occupation is licensed, the larger 
the economic gain for being a member of the licensed occupation. I 
will analyze these occupations to establish whether there is a consis-
tent model of stages of growth or whether there are local occupation-
specifi c conditions for each occupation—in which case the model 
would not apply to those circumstances or for that time period. The 
model development, the gathering of new data on regulatory institu-
tions, and the empirical testing all have a common goal: to inform the 
public and policymakers of the costs and benefi ts of being at each stage 
of occupational regulation.
Figure 1.2 shows the seven occupations that I plan to examine in the 
book, ordered by the number of states requiring practitioners to have a 
license in 2007. Practitioners of these seven occupations include, on 
one end of the spectrum, interior designers, who are fully licensed in 
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only three states, and, on the other end, dental hygienists and dentists, 
for whom licensing is mandatory in all states. To the extent that there 
is much variation in the number of states that require full licensing, the 
examination of these occupations is likely to show how different stages 
of regulation may infl uence workers in these fi elds and consumers of 
their services.
FOCUS OF THE BOOK
A goal of this book is to examine a broad variety of occupations that 
includes blue- and white-collar occupations at different stages of occu-
pational regulation by government. In subsequent chapters, I examine 
occupations that include ones that are regulated in only a few states 
Figure 1.2  Number of States Requiring Licensing for Seven 
Occupations, 2007
SOURCE: Author’s tabulation.
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(e.g., interior designers), moderately regulated ones where from one-
third to one-half of the states license the members of the occupation but 
entry is relatively easy (mortgage brokers and preschool teachers, for 
example, are at this stage of regulation), highly regulated workers (e.g., 
plumbers and electricians in the construction trades), and universally 
regulated occupations (e.g., dentists and dental hygienists). One unify-
ing theme of the book is an exploration of the evolution of licensing for 
each occupation at the state level. For this, I utilize a box-and-whisker 
plot that shows the average level of regulation for certain key factors 
in the regulatory process, as well as the variation across states and over 
time, to give the reader a broad picture of the evolution and anatomy of 
regulation. I also present estimates of the infl uence of licensing or other 
forms of regulation on wages for each occupation. 
Since occupations differ widely in what they do, I will examine a 
variety of criteria in order to evaluate whether regulation is achieving 
its publicly stated goals. For example, for the newly emerging occupa-
tion of mortgage brokers, does more intense regulation result in fewer 
home foreclosures or lower-priced home loans? Does requiring pre-
school teachers to have a baccalaureate degree raise their wages, and 
does it assist in the educational attainment of their students? Has more 
stringent licensing of plumbers and electricians reduced the number 
of severe injuries and deaths for workers in the construction industry, 
where such casualties have a higher occurrence than in other indus-
tries? When two universally licensed occupations such as dentists and 
hygienists perform several similar tasks for the patient, how do the 
regulations determine who gets to do the work, and what are the labor 
market outcomes for practitioners in both occupations? Should national 
standards be used in order to reduce any barriers to employment that 
may be imposed at the local or state level? These are some of the ques-
tions the rest of this book addresses. In the fi nal chapter, I summarize 
the major fi ndings on occupational mobility and examine the role that 
different stages of occupational regulation over time play in the lives 
of licensed workers and other constituents. I also examine the implica-
tions of occupational regulation for federal, state, and local government 
in making policies that regulate occupational tasks and entry barriers. 
Overall, the volume’s chapters have commonalities, yet each chapter 
delves into the unique aspects of a particular occupation and how it is 
regulated, then looks at the economic consequences. 
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Notes
  1. Unfortunately, no more recent national data are available than the data from 2008, 
since the federal government does not keep regular data on the number or percent-
age of workers that are licensed. In contrast, annual data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics tabulate the number and the percentage of union workers and union cov-
erage. Unions form a much smaller percentage of the workforce than licensed 
occupations (Kleiner 2006).
 2. In March 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Louisiana, in 
St. Joseph Abbey et al. v. Paul Wess Castille et al., Case No. 11-30756, ruled that 
the occupational licensing laws issued by the Louisiana Board of Funeral Direc-
tors granting funeral homes an exclusive right to sell caskets was unconstitutional 
because it stifl ed competition. 
 3. The method used to calculate the percentage of workers licensed prior to 2006 
fi rst involved gathering the listing of licensed occupations in each state by Labor 
Market Information Units under a grant from the U.S. Department of Labor—
see America’s Career InfoNet, http://www.acinet.org/acinet/licensedoccupations/
lois_occ.aspx?stfi ps=27&by=occ&keyword=&searchType=&. This was matched 
with occupations in the 2000 census. If no match was obtained, the occupation 
was dropped. From the census, the number of people working in the licensed 
occupation in each state was estimated and used to calculate a weighted average 
of the percentage of the workforce in the United States that works in a licensed 
occupation. For 2008 we deleted individuals who were certifi ed from our tally of 
licensed individuals who were either licensed or certifi ed in our survey conducted 
by Westat. 
 4. Modern econometric techniques such as regression discontinuity, fi eld experi-
ments, or difference-in-difference approaches may have diffi culty detecting the 
full infl uence of licensing on wage determination unless they have long time-
series databases.
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An Initial Stage of Regulation: 
Interior Designers 
A practice act allows individuals to become licensed with a state 
board in order to practice a scope of work previously not allowed 
to non-licensed individuals. These design services vary by state 
but typically include code affecting work. Most architecture and 
engineering laws have been written without regard to the capabili-
ties and training of interior designers. This is where legal recogni-
tion becomes necessary. 
—American Society of Interior Designers (2005)
 
An overarching goal of many occupations at an initial stage of regu-
lation is to obtain licensing by a governmental entity (Kleiner 2006). 
The goal of this chapter is to present and evaluate an occupation at 
an initial stage of regulation. The case study presented in this chapter 
looks at interior designers, whose profession will serve as a baseline for 
the other occupations that will be examined and evaluated later in the 
book.1 
According to this chapter’s epigraph, which comes from the Ameri-
can Society of Interior Designers (ASID), a goal of interior designers 
is to become regulated by the government. The rationale is that their 
occupation must become regulated in order to maintain its legitimacy 
relative to complementary and competitive occupations such as those 
of engineers and architects. Given the institutional environment of inte-
rior designers, where practitioners work with members of other regu-
lated occupations, regulation has become necessary in order to maintain 
job tasks. The goal of the major association of interior designers is to 
obtain occupational licensing status across states in order to secure the 
legitimacy and power to do work under the law—similar to other major 
occupations that are complementary to interior designers. 
Much growth in the regulation of interior designers has taken place 
during the recent past. In 1993 only 36 percent of interior designers were 
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subject to any type of state regulation, whereas in 2007 over 60 percent 
of interior designers were subject to occupational regulation.2 However, 
interior designers are fully licensed in only three states—Florida, Loui-
siana, and Nevada—plus the District of Columbia, the fewest number 
of states for any licensed occupation examined in this book. Alabama 
was the fi rst state to regulate interior designers, having done so in 1982. 
The so-called title act gave interior designers the exclusive right to use 
the term “interior designer” in advertising. Alabama’s former practice 
act resulted in full licensing in 2001, but the act was declared uncon-
stitutional in 2007 by the state supreme court. The court stated that the 
act “imposes restrictions that are unnecessary and unreasonable upon 
the pursuit of useful activities” and that those restrictions “do not bear 
some substantial relation to the public health, safety, or morals, or to the 
general welfare, the public convenience, or to the general prosperity.”3 
By 2009, 22 states and the District of Columbia imposed some level of 
regulation on interior designers. Two states have registration laws, the 
most basic type of regulation. States such as Minnesota, however, regu-
late the use of “certifi ed interior designer” as a title but allow anyone 
to do interior design work without certifi cation. The District of Colum-
bia and the three states that have full licensing regulations, however, 
restrict the ability to work in the profession by prohibiting practitioners 
from doing certain types of interior design work without a license from 
the government.
This chapter provides an overview of the occupation of interior 
designers, including regulatory requirements for entry and tasks rela-
tive to complementary occupations such as engineers and architects. 
The analysis then documents the various stages of regulation and shows 
the growth of the regulation of interior designers over time. Since rela-
tively few states license interior designers, the chapter documents other 
forms of regulation, such as certifi cation and registration, for workers 
in the occupation. The chapter also explores the rationale for why the 
occupation seeks to become fully licensed. Since there is a battle for 
work tasks in the construction and remodeling industries among civil 
engineers, architects, and interior designers, not having an equal voice 
within state licensing boards likely limits the ability of interior design-
ers to legally do certain tasks or take ownership of large projects, which 
may be the purview only of engineers and architects. Since the con-
struction industry is highly volatile, having experienced large growth 
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in the early 2000s and contraction following 2007, the ability to con-
trol supply is important. Furthermore, the ability to regulate specifi c 
tasks—either those legally assigned to the occupation or those permis-
sible—is an essential element of the “web of rules” for an occupation’s 
members. The chapter provides a state-specifi c example of the push to 
have interior designers fully licensed—in this case, in the state of Min-
nesota. Finally, it also supplies an empirical analysis of the labor market 
implications of various forms of regulation on the wage determination 
of interior designers. 
WHY LICENSE INTERIOR DESIGNERS?
The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Occupational Outlook Handbook 
provides a defi nition of the occupation of interior designers: 
Interior designers draw upon many disciplines to enhance the func-
tion, safety, and aesthetics of interior spaces. Their main concerns 
are with how different colors, textures, furniture, lighting, and 
space work together to meet the needs of a building’s occupants. 
Designers plan interior spaces of almost every type of building, 
including offi ces, airport terminals, theaters, shopping malls, res-
taurants, hotels, schools, hospitals, and private residences. (BLS 
2012d) 
In many respects, the work of interior designers overlaps and com-
petes with that of engineers, architects, and other construction workers. 
The fear that interior designers have of remaining unregulated among 
these other occupations which are governmentally regulated in all states 
is captured in the following statement by the ASID: “It is no secret that 
some other professional groups would like to limit, control, or even 
eliminate the practice of interior design as a unique profession. It would 
be naive to believe that they are not making their cases” (ASID 2005). 
Given that many unregulated occupations, such as perfusionists in health 
care or the current case of interior designers in construction, view their 
position as being precarious, the fear that other, similar occupations 
will achieve through regulatory boards the ability to limit or eliminate 
their jobs is a driving force behind much of the push toward additional 
government regulation. The argument has been made that the true mea-
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sure of a profession lies in the number of educational requirements and 
sophisticated tasks that determine whether the occupation is licensed 
(Martin 2008). Thus far, no detailed analytical studies show that licens-
ing signifi cantly reduces dangers to the health and safety of the public 
as a result of the work of interior designers, which is a major concern of 
public policymakers. These public health and safety concerns dominate 
the public debate regarding whether an occupation should be licensed. 
Recent analysis shows that giving interior designers the ability to pro-
vide a “sign and seal” service for drafting documents for fi nal approval 
of building architecture increases their earnings, and that higher earn-
ings are associated with more individuals entering the occupation. No 
such labor market effects are observed with regard to the earnings and 
employment of architects (Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012).
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE OCCUPATION OF 
INTERIOR DESIGN
The occupation of interior design is a relatively recent addition to 
the purview of governmental oversight. The professional association 
for the occupation, the American Institute of Interior Designers (AID), 
was founded in 1931, but it was not until the postwar boom of the 1950s 
that the organization had grown large enough that it sought to become 
regulated. In 1968, voluntary certifi cation began through AID, which 
was designed to pave the way for licensing. The professional organiza-
tion also began to work with interior design programs to strengthen cur-
riculums and develop continuing education programs for the members 
of the occupation. In the following decade, AID and another interior 
design organization merged to form the American Society of Interior 
Designers (ASID) and were immediately assigned the task of collect-
ing information on state regulations for the profession (ASID 2005). 
In the 1980s the association began encouraging state-by-state registra-
tion regulations, and it signed an accord with the architects’ profes-
sional association to support only certifi cation and not full licensing, or 
what became known within the occupation as title acts. The agreement 
allowed architects to register interior designers in states with these acts 
and establish joint regulatory boards. Within this context, the agreement 
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gave interior designers with expertise in the fi eld the ability to use this 
title, and those persons who did not fulfi ll the qualifi cations were for-
bidden from using the term “registered” or “certifi ed interior designer.” 
In 1999, however, the ASID board voted to withdraw from the accord 
and aggressively pursue full occupational licensing by the states. Such 
state licenses became known as practice acts.
When government regulation of engineers evolved to include civil, 
electrical, mechanical, and industrial engineering by the 1960s, the law 
stated that only engineers can sign off on initial and fi nal construction 
design and implementation of fi nal construction. As a result, interior 
designers were relegated to an inferior position within the construction 
industry. Moreover, architects were held responsible for the develop-
ment of the initial design of structures, which further diminished the 
role of interior designers in the eyes of the law. More generally, state 
and local governments have gradually assumed a more important role 
in determining how work is to be done in construction. The appropri-
ate types of labor inputs in construction are largely determined through 
governmental statutes or administrative procedures. Working within 
the constraints of this institutional environment, interior designers con-
cluded that the only way to obtain access to certain types of work in 
this growing fi eld was to take steps to become a regulated occupation. 
With this in mind, they proceeded to push for licensing in a number of 
states. Here, a case study is instructive. The state of Minnesota is used 
to illustrate the process of how interior design has evolved over time. 
This state was chosen because it has regulated the interior design occu-
pation since 1992 and full occupational licensing regulations have been 
proposed to the legislature in every biennium since 2003. 
REGULATION OF INTERIOR DESIGNERS IN MINNESOTA: 
A CASE STUDY 
A law to change interior designers from a certifi ed profession to 
a licensed one was fi rst introduced in the Minnesota Legislature in 
2003. As of 2011, the current law governing interior designers in Min-
nesota is a titling act that regulates the use of the title “registered inte-
rior designer.”4 The stated purpose of this statute is to “safeguard life, 
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health, and property, and to promote the public welfare.”5 Regulations 
restricting the work to persons meeting certain statutory requirements 
now affect professions such as architects, engineers, land surveyors, 
and landscape architects.6 The statutory amendments proposed in prior 
sessions of the Minnesota legislature have called for a requirement 
that interior designers be licensed (Alexander et al. 2009). The current 
defi nition of an interior designer under Minnesota law is the follow-
ing: “One who uses the title, and who designs public interior spaces, 
including preparation of documents relative to non-load-bearing inte-
rior construction, space planning, fi nish materials, and furnishings.”7 
Those without certifi cation cannot use the title in the preparation of 
plans, specifi cations, reports, plats, or other interior design projects.8 
They are also precluded from holding themselves up to the public as 
“certifi ed interior designers.” 
 The proposed law has been introduced in every biennium since 
2003. No major changes have been made to the content of the bill since 
it was originally introduced as a proposed licensing law in 2003. Table 
2.1 shows a brief history of the various attempts to obtain full licensing 
for interior designers in Minnesota.
The key provisions of the proposed legislation would limit the 
extent of the licensing provisions to larger buildings and construction 
sites. Specifi cally, exemptions to the proposed law read as follows: 
Nothing contained in sections . . . shall prevent persons from 
advertising and performing services such as consultation, investi-
gation, or evaluation in connection with, or from making plans and 
specifi cations for, or from supervising, the erection, enlargement, 
or alteration of any of the following buildings:
(a) dwellings for single families, and outbuildings in connection 
therewith, such as barns and private garages;
(b) two-family dwellings;
(c) any farm building or accessory thereto; or
(d) temporary buildings or sheds used exclusively for construction 
purposes, not exceeding two stories in height, and not used for liv-
ing quarters. (Minn. Stat. § 326.03, subd. 1)
The proposed bill would thus exempt single-family dwellings 
(which is intended to include homeowners) and farm buildings from 
being covered by the act, in spite of the general proposition that home-
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owners are the least likely to have detailed information about the safety 
of materials or the proper design of space for best use. A listing of the 
proposed exemptions to the proposed Minnesota statute is presented in 
Table 2.2. For example, the fl ammability of various building materi-
als or the appropriate distances for wheelchair accessibility or hand-
rail height may be unknown to a homeowner. For a large construction 
company, however, this information would be a routine part of the bid-
ding process. Large private-sector building contractors and governmen-
tal builders are more likely to be aware of current building codes and 
guidelines and be knowledgeable about the qualifi cations for skilled 
architects, engineers, and interior designers. Consequently, these occu-
pations would not need the protection of a licensing law. Much of the 
rhetoric during the discussion of licensing has focused on the compa-
rability of laws covering licensing provisions for other occupations 
that come under the auspices of the Minnesota Board of Architecture, 
Engineering, Land Surveying, Landscape Architecture, Geoscience, 
and Interior Design (AELSLAGID). The argument is that all the other 
occupations are fully licensed and able to capture work, especially for 
large buildings. The provisions and administrative procedures estab-
lished by the AELSLAGID board govern the allocation of work that 
can legally be done by each of the occupations within its jurisdiction. 
Therefore, architects, engineers, and land surveyors are able to serve as 
large-scale project contractors who can legally sign off on the quality of 
a building, factory, or hospital. In contrast, since interior designers are 
not licensed, they would not have such authority. This restriction dimin-
Table 2.1  Attempts to Pass Licensing Regulations for Interior Designers  
in Minnesota, 2003–2009
Year Proposed legislation Sponsoring legislators              Result
2003 SF 2868 / HF 3066 Sen. Higgins / Rep. Osterman Never heard
2005 SF 263 / HF 1277 Sen. Higgins / Rep. Thissen Never heard
2007 SF 788 / HF 991 Sen. Higgins / Rep. Thissen Never heard
2009 SF 349 / HF 416 Sen. Higgins / Rep. Thissen Hearing in Senate 
Committee on 
Commerce and 
Consumer Protection, 
2/17/09, failed on a 
voice vote
SOURCE: Alexander et al. (2009).
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Classifi cations Elements that must be met to be exempt
Assembly (as defi ned by the Minnesota State Building 
Code [MSBC] under Occupancy Group A2: dining and 
drinking, fewer than 50 persons)
Not greater than one story with no basement, seating for not more 
than 20 persons, and not greater than 1,000 gross square footage 
(GSF)
Business (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group B)
Not greater than two stories with a basement, and not greater than 
2,250 GSF
Factory (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group F2)
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than 
3,000 GSF
Mercantile (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group M)
Not greater than two stories with a basement, and not greater than 
1,500 GSF
Residential (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group R)
Apartment houses/condominiums (three units or less), dwellings, 
lodging houses, attached single-family dwellings/townhomes, and 
congregate residences (each accommodating 10 persons or fewer)
Storage (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group S1: aircraft hangars and helistops)
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than 
3,000 GSF
Storage (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group S2 except for parking garages, open or 
enclosed)
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than 
5,000 GSF
Utility (as defi ned by the MSBC under Occupancy 
Group U except for fences higher than 8 feet, tanks
and towers, and retaining walls with over 4 feet of 
vertical exposed face)
Not greater than one story with no basement, and not greater than 
1,000 GSF
SOURCE: Alexander et al. (2009).
Kleiner2013.indb   22
Kleiner2013.indb   22
9/18/2013   10:10:25 A
M
9/18/2013   10:10:25 A
M
An Initial Stage of Regulation: Interior Designers   23
ishes their responsibility for risk and perhaps their rate of pay within the 
construction industry. Therefore, it is in their best interest to tax their 
members for political contributions and lobby appropriate legislators 
and the governor for passage of legislation that would enhance their 
position within occupations that are governed by the board.
Unlike the case with many of the other occupations that are dis-
cussed in this book, opposition to the licensing of interior designers 
is organized. For example, AIA Minnesota, a Society of the American 
Institute of Architects, and the National Kitchen and Bath Association 
have both opposed the licensing of interior designers. The arguments 
put forth state that licensing is not necessary to protect the health, safety, 
and welfare of the public. Opponents have also argued that licensing 
is a danger to job growth in Minnesota because it limits the number 
of interior designers who could practice in the state. Furthermore, the 
argument goes, licensing would be detrimental to consumers because 
the limited supply of interior designers would both increase the prices 
charged for services and limit access to services. And, in testimony pro-
vided to the state legislature, witnesses made statements that licensing 
proponents had not provided any studies to back up their claim that 
unqualifi ed interior designers are a threat to health and safety. The 
groups opposing licensing argue that the exemptions in the bill prove 
that licensing is not about protecting public health and safety, because if 
unqualifi ed interior designers were a danger to the public in commercial 
spaces, they would also be a danger in residential spaces, and there-
fore no exemptions should exist. If any group needs protection from 
incompetent or unscrupulous vendors, they contend, it is homeowners. 
They also argue that additional exemptions are allowed for licensed 
interior designers under the proposed bill that are not allowed for other 
occupations. 
As mentioned earlier, architects also argue that the building code 
requires that interior designers work under the direction of an architect 
in most commercial projects. Problems with compliance would arise if 
some projects were required to be supervised by an architect and others 
required only a licensed interior designer.9 Architects have opposed the 
licensure of interior designers mainly in anticipation of potential battles 
among the occupations covered by the AELSLAGID for work tasks 
such as certifying drafts of fi nal drawings in the construction indus-
try (Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012). This issue is more likely to occur 
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in industries such as architectural, engineering, and related services 
(NAICS 5413) and specialized design services (NAICS 5414).
ISSUES OF HEALTH AND SAFETY 
A central argument for the proposed Minnesota statute has been 
the importance of licensing for the health and safety of the citizens of 
the state. The anecdotes that have been presented focus on legal cases 
involving interior designers, which are detailed in this section. In 1996, 
a restaurant employee in the title-act state of New York sued an interior 
designer for injuries related to a fall.10 The court stated that the inte-
rior designer’s services were completed prior to the plaintiff’s fall, so 
the court rejected the plaintiff’s claim.11 This determination was based 
neither on the existence of titling nor on any of the benefi ts of the act 
(Alexander et al. 2009).12 One important aspect of this case is the court’s 
fi nding that, because the plaintiff was not a party to a contract with the 
defendant—rather, she was an employee who worked in the facility—
the interior designer owed no duty of care to her after the completion of 
the discrete project for which he had been hired.13 The court stated that 
the interior designer was not at fault in the incident.
In another case study involving the state of New York, a building 
tenant brought an action against an interior designer, among others, 
for injuries sustained in a fall.14 The New York State Supreme Court 
dismissed this action against the interior designer because there was 
no evidence that the interior designer’s specifi cations were faulty.15 An 
additional anecdotal case related to interior design comes from the state 
of Mississippi, which has no interior design regulation. In Simoneaux 
v. BSL Inc., a plaintiff slipped and fell while attempting to exit a hotel 
Jacuzzi tub.16 The plaintiff in the case sued several parties, including 
the interior designer.17 The court in this case ruled that the issue should 
be decided by a jury and that interior designers were not necessarily 
responsible for the fall.
This case law suggests that not many legal cases offer clear evi-
dence that the actions of interior designers have caused substantial 
harm to the public. Even if these cases of injury had been attributed 
to interior designers, there is no evidence that having licensed interior 
Kleiner2013.indb   24 9/18/2013   10:10:26 AM
An Initial Stage of Regulation: Interior Designers   25
designers would have avoided the injuries. Moreover, the issues of the 
role of prices in seeking nonlicensed substitutes, the scrapping of mar-
ginal projects because of labor cost concerns, and the reduction in the 
ability to make private contractual arrangements are costs that should 
be weighed against the potential benefi ts of moving interior designers 
in Minnesota to a more rigorous regime of regulation.
Next I examine whether regulations for interior designers have 
affected either the wages or employment growth of the occupation.
ANALYZING INTERIOR DESIGNERS
A key element in the examination of interior designers is whether 
regulations at this stage of licensing have signifi cant labor market 
effects with respect to the wages or employment growth of the occu-
pation. In order to present evidence on the infl uence of regulations, I 
examine the American Community Survey (ACS) from 2007 through 
2009. The ACS does not include a specifi c category for interior design-
ers. However, an earlier analysis of the occupation by Harrington and 
Treber (2009) developed a template for examining the occupation. 
They created an interior design classifi cation from occupational and 
industry codes and used the following occupational codes to identify 
“designers”: 
260—Artists and related workers
263—Designers
775—Miscellaneous assemblers and fabricators
I begin with Harrington and Treber’s defi nition and expand it slightly 
to include individuals with the occupational codes working in architec-
tural services (the industry code for architectural services is NAICS 
5413 and for specialized design services is NAICS 5414). In my con-
versations with both architects and design professionals, I learned that 
many interior designers work in architecture fi rms. It is appropriate, 
then, to assume that individuals coded as “designers” working in the 
architecture industry are, in fact, interior designers. 
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DEVELOPING ESTIMATES ON THE INFLUENCE OF THE 
REGULATION OF INTERIOR DESIGNERS
In order to examine the infl uence of regulation for interior design-
ers, I initially develop an index of regulation for the occupation. The 
index includes the following three characteristics of the type of regula-
tion for the occupation: 1) whether the state had any form of regulation; 
2) whether it had a full licensing law or a practice act; and 3) whether 
it had certifi cation of the occupation, known as a title act. Forming the 
basis of our analysis of the role of regulation in the labor market for 
interior designers, Table 2.3 shows which states have passed these types 
of laws, the kind of regulation by state, and the year in which the law 
was passed. 
As the previous comments and examination of the evolution of reg-
ulation for this occupation have shown, growth in the regulation of inte-
rior designers has evolved over time. Figure 2.1 is a box-and-whisker 
plot that shows the growth of the mean and variance of the regulation 
of interior designers for all states from 1990 to 2009. Prior to 1980, no 
states regulated interior designers, but starting in the early 1990s the 
number of states regulating interior designers through either a practice 
act or a title act increased. The fi gure shows that growth has occurred 
over time in both the level and the variance of the regulations govern-
ing the occupation. Although the fi gure shows the statutory coverage 
of the occupation, it does not provide the level of enforcement of the 
provisions.
Detailed data are available for interior designers from two major 
data sources: the American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau and the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey 
from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The ACS is based on inter-
views with individuals, whereas the OES is based on a survey of employ-
ers. Both databases allow for an examination of wage and employment 
data by state. A major difference in the ACS is that it allows for many 
covariates (such as human capital and other types of characteristics of 
the individual) to be controlled for in estimation procedures. It also has 
information on income from nonlabor funds, and many of the interior 
designers were self-employed and reported profi ts on their enterprises. 
The OES, however, is a state-based program with few of the covari-
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State Type of statute Year passed
Alabama Title act 1982
Alaska None
Arizona None
Arkansas Title act 1993
California Title act 1990
Colorado Permitting statute 2001
Connecticut Title act 1983
Delaware None
District of Columbia Practice act 1999
Florida Practice act 1994
Georgia Title act 1992
Hawaii None
Idaho None
Illinois Title act 1990
Indiana Title act 1990
Iowa Title act 2005
Kansas None
Kentucky Title act 2002
Louisiana Practice act 1999
Maine Title act 1993
Maryland Title act 1991
Massachusetts None
Michigan None
Minnesota Title act 1992
Mississippi None
Missouri Title act 1998
Montana None
Nebraska None
Nevada Practice act 1995
New Hampshire None
New Jersey Title act 2002
New Mexico Title act 1989
New York Title act 1990
North Carolina None
North Dakota None
Ohio None
Table 2.3  State Regulations for Interior Designers
(continued)
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ates that are needed to fully examine the occupation, but it does allow 
the use of state-level covariates. Together, these data sources provide 
confi rmation or evidence of the role of statutory requirements in the 
regulation of interior designers.
Other Data
In order to take into account other characteristics of the economic 
environment that may infl uence the labor market for interior designers, 
the empirical models control for state per capita income and the growth 
in state employment. Since other factors may infl uence the wages and 
employment growth of interior designers beyond those captured by the 
statutory factors, additional controls are included for the state and year 
characteristics of the observations; these additional controls are called 
state and year fi xed effects. This approach provides estimates that are 
equivalent to difference-in-differences estimators for those states that 
changed their policies. This technique is useful because it avoids bias 
due to omitted variables that do not change over time in the use of a 
panel data set like the ones used in the analysis.
State Type of statute Year passed
Oklahoma Title act 2006
Oregon None
Pennsylvania None
Rhode Island None
South Carolina None
South Dakota None
Tennessee Title act 1991
Texas Title act 1991
Utah None
Vermont None
Virginia Title act 1990
Washington None
West Virginia None
Wisconsin Title act 1996
Wyoming None
SOURCE: Author’s compilation; American Society of Interior Designers (ASID).
Table 2.3  (continued)
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ESTIMATES OF THE INFLUENCE OF REGULATION ON 
WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT
In order to analyze the infl uence of state regulation on the labor 
market of interior designers, the analysis uses the data on the labor mar-
ket combined with the information on the regulatory regimes of each of 
the states. The ACS contains detailed economic data for an analysis of 
the economic characteristics of interior designers. In combination with 
the trends in the regulation of the occupation over time, the estimates 
should show to what extent the movement toward more regulation may 
Figure 2.1  Evolution of State Regulations for Interior Designers, 
1990–2009
NOTE: This fi gure shows the growth of the mean and the variance for the regulation 
requirement index of interior designers from 1990 to 2009. The requirement indexes 
for each state, which measure the restriction level of regulation, are produced based 
on a series of requirements to obtain a license or certifi cate, including minimum edu-
cation and experience, examination requirement, continuing education requirement, 
age requirement, and so on.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.
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have infl uenced the wages and employment of the individuals in the 
occupation. 
Table 2.4 shows the basic mean wage data on interior designers 
in the ACS, as well as the data broken down by whether they were 
licensed. The data show that interior designers earned an average of 
$41,412 annually in 2009; those individuals who were covered by 
licensing laws earned $38,324, whereas designers in unlicensed states 
earned $41,750. These values, however, fail to take into account other 
factors that may infl uence the earnings of interior designers. The rest 
of this section documents the wage and employment effects of various 
forms of occupational regulation of interior designers. 
The model used in the analysis is a basic fi xed-effects approach 
that can also be viewed as a generalization of the conventional two-
group, two-period difference-in-differences model. Table 2.5 shows the 
results for both a traditional panel estimate of the role of regulation in 
wage determination and a two-stage estimation procedure. For the two-
stage procedure, the fi rst stage is developed by estimating a model of 
individual-level outcomes on covariates and a full set of state × time 
fi xed effects. The coeffi cients on the state × time fi xed effects represent 
state × time mean outcomes that have been “purged” of the variation 
Nonlicensed states Licensed states All states
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Income ($) 41,750 29,890 38,324 26,501 41,412 29,590
Hourly wage ($) 26.26 167.76 22.64 33.49 25.91 159.6
Annual hours 1,872 747 1,912 743 1,876 746
Age 39.54 12.24 41.30 12.47 39.72 12.27
Female 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50
Hispanic 0.08 0.27 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.28
Black 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.19
Asian 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.27
Bachelor 0.50 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50
Master 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28
No. of observations 10,889 1,287 12,176
Table 2.4  Basic Data on Interior Designers from the American 
Community Survey (ACS), 2009
NOTE: sd = standard deviation.
SOURCE: ACS.
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associated with the within-cell variation in the covariates. In the sec-
ond stage, these “adjusted cell-level means” are estimates on the policy 
variables and fi xed effects. The two-step approach is a way of perform-
ing aggregation while still allowing for adjustment of individual-level 
covariates, which is a limitation of pure aggregation. The basic panel 
estimates, which are also shown in the table, include individual covari-
ates as well as state and year fi xed effects.18 
Using data from the ACS, Table 2.5 shows the infl uence of eco-
nomic variables on the logarithm of hourly earnings. The key variables 
from the ACS are as hypothesized, with key human capital factors such 
as education and age having a major infl uence on wage determination. 
In order to show the infl uence of regulation on wage determination, 
the model includes measures of regulation in the estimation equations. 
The basic economic variables such as age and gender show consistent 
results, and there seems to be little infl uence of the individual regulation 
variables on measures of hourly wage determination. However, using 
an F-test of the joint signifi cance of the variables on wage determina-
tion fi nds that they are positive and signifi cant using either the one- or 
the two-stage specifi cation of the earnings model. Perhaps at very low 
levels of state regulation, which is the case for the occupation, the infl u-
ence of regulation on earnings appears to have a small magnitude.
Licensing may behave in a manner similar to unionization, where 
initially the infl uence of regulation on wages may be small, but the 
infl uence is likely to grow over time (Freeman and Kleiner 1990). Anal-
ysis for interior designers and architects shows that this is the case for 
provisions such as sign-and-seal for these occupations as well (Kleiner 
and Vorotnikov 2012). Furthermore, since only three states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have a practice act, which is the most restrictive form 
of occupational regulation and the type of regulation that is most likely 
to limit competition, the result may be that neighboring or nearby states 
are able to provide these services. As with any form of regulation, a 
key issue is enforcement, and in building, remodeling, and construc-
tion, where architects, engineers, and interior designers work closely 
together, the issue of licensing may have a smaller role and less enforce-
ment than in occupations where the work tends to stand alone, as in the 
case of dentistry, detailed in a later chapter. 
Although these estimates on wage determination provide some evi-
dence of the overall effects of regulation on wage determination, a case 
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 Interior designer–logged hourly wages
One-stage model Two-stage model One-stage model Two-stage model One-stage model Two-stage model
Variables B SE t B SE t B SE t B SE t B SE t B SE t
Regulation 0.100 0.081 1.24 −0.189 0.203 −0.93
Practice act 0.311 0.083 3.74 0.176 0.210 0.84 0.212 0.017 12.57 0.359 0.121 2.97
Title act 0.100 0.081 1.24 −0.192 0.204 −0.95
State fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
F statistic for joint 
signifi cance 
78.91*** 4.53**
First stage N 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176
Second stage N n/a 454 n/a 454 n/a 454
NOTE: The covariates included in all models are indicators for gender, race, education, and a quadratic function in age. The one-stage 
models are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with state and year fi xed effects. The two-stage models adjust for covariates in 
a fi rst-stage regression of individual logged wages on covariates and a full set of state × year fi xed effects. In the second stage, the state × 
year fi xed effects (covariate-adjusted mean wages) are regressed on the regulation variables and state and year fi xed effects. The second-
stage regressions are weighted by the inverse of the state × year cell sample sizes. In all models, the standard errors are robust and allow 
for clustering at the state level. *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes; 
blank = not applicable; SE = standard error; t = t-score; B = coeffi cient.
SOURCE: ACS.
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study is particularly instructive, and the state of Alabama provides an 
interesting one. The state implemented a practice act in 2001, which 
was then ruled unconstitutional in 2007 by the state supreme court. If a 
practice act had increased wages for interior designers, we would then 
have expected to see a substantial increase in wages between 2002 and 
2007 in Alabama. For example, interior designers in Alabama saw a 
wage increase of 46 percent under a practice act (see Figure 2.2), along 
with wage changes in the occupation nationally. By comparison, the 
national mean wage increased by 17 percent over the same period of 
time (Alexander et al. 2009). This case study demonstrates the infl u-
ence of licensing on wage determination for the occupation in Alabama 
in comparison with other states. 
The BLS data provide the impetus for further analysis of wages in 
the interior design industry. Although these differences in means cer-
tainly provide substantial evidence in support of the hypothesis, they 
are not conclusive. Many possible explanations can account for wage 
Figure 2.2  Annual Interior Designer Wages, Alabama vs. National 
Average, 1999–2009
SOURCE: Occupational employment and wage estimates for various years, www.bls
.gov/oes/oes_data.htm, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
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differences between designers in one state and another. For example, a 
reasonable assumption is that interior designers in regulated states have 
attained a higher level of education, on average, than those in unreg-
ulated states because of the presence of educational requirements for 
licensure. In the subsequent section, statistical analysis is used with the 
data from the ACS in an attempt to isolate the effects of regulation on 
wages and explain the gap in earnings between regulated and unregu-
lated designers. 
One additional factor is the infl uence of regulation on the employ-
ment of interior designers. In order to determine this, the analysis pro-
vides two different data sets. In Table 2.6, the model is estimated using 
the ACS for the infl uence of regulation on annual hours of labor sup-
plied. The estimates in Table 2.6 show that having a practice act reduces 
annual hours worked by approximately 16 percent based on the signifi -
cant estimates in column three of the table. (This is the −330.3 coef-
fi cient value divided by the standard number of hours worked of 2,080 
per year.) More rigorous regulation may drive up earnings enough for 
practitioners to take some of those earnings in the form of leisure. More-
over, occupational regulation may restrict the supply of labor available 
within the occupation. 
In order to provide additional sensitivity estimates for the analysis, 
the OES is used because it provides more detailed and potentially reli-
able employment data by state for the occupation. The estimates from 
the statistical model are presented in Table 2.7. The basic model exam-
ines the infl uence of the three types of regulation of interior designers 
on employment and employment growth, controlling for the per capita 
income in the state. Similar to the wage estimates, none of the mea-
sures of regulation were statistically signifi cant in infl uencing either the 
level of or the growth in employment of interior designers. Independent 
examination of the infl uence of regulation on employment by Alexander 
and colleagues using the ACS found similar results (Alexander et al. 
2009). Based on these estimates, regulation at this stage of develop-
ment produces small employment effects as well as small wage effects. 
Occupational regulation seems to have minimal effects on labor market 
outcomes at the earliest stages of regulation.
Next we examine whether certain economic factors could affect 
whether regulations for interior designers are enacted into law.
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Table 2.6  Effects of Interior Designer Regulation on Annual Hours of Labor Supplied by Interior Designers Using 
ACS, 2001–2009
 Interior designer annual hours of labor supply
One-stage model Two-stage model One-stage model Two-stage model One-stage model Two-stage model
Variables B SE t B SE t B SE t B SE t B SE t B SE t
Regulation −138.3 227.5 −0.61 190.3 156.3 1.22
Practice act −330.3 231.1 −1.43 −228.3 174.2 −1.31 −193.2 20.63 −9.36 −413.9 146.9 −2.82
Title act −138.1 227.6 −0.61 194.5 157.1 1.24
State fi xed 
effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed 
effects
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y
F statistic for 
joint sig-
nifi cance 
44.61*** 4.08**
First stage N 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176 12,176
Second stage 
N
n/a 454 n/a 454 n/a 454
NOTE: The covariates included in all models are indicators for gender, race, education, and a quadratic function in age. The one-stage 
models are estimated using OLS with state and year fi xed effects. The two-stage models adjust for covariates in a fi rst-stage regression of 
labor supply on covariates and a full set of state × year fi xed effects. In the second stage, the state × year fi xed effects (covariate-adjusted 
mean hours of labor supply) are regressed on the regulation variables and state and year fi xed effects. The second-stage regressions are 
weighted by the inverse of the state × year cell sample sizes. In all models, the standard errors are robust and allow for clustering at the 
state level. *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes; blank = not applicable; 
SE = standard error; t = t-score; B = coeffi cient.
SOURCE: ACS.
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36  Table 2.7  Role of Occupational Regulation on Employment Levels and Growth of Interior Designers, 2001–2009
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables lnemp lnemp lnemp empgr empgr empgr
regulation 0.163 −0.0003
0.128 0.273
practice 0.427 0.274 0.352 0.357
0.278 0.250 0.505 0.430
title 0.160 −0.005
0.128 0.273
lnpcinc −2.769*** −2.738*** −2.648*** 1.291 1.323 1.320
0.768 0.768 0.766 1.450 1.452 1.437
State fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 369 369 369 328 328 328
R-squared 0.747 0.748 0.747 0.440 0.441 0.441
NOTE: * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) survey, from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
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DETERMINANTS OF THE PASSAGE OF LAWS 
REGULATING INTERIOR DESIGNERS
Could some economic factors affect whether regulations for inte-
rior designers are enacted into law? In order to determine whether the 
economic climate in a state matters, in Table 2.8 a hazard model is esti-
mated for the period 2001 through 2009 to examine whether a titling 
law was enacted during this period. This approach examines the time 
to the passage of a titling law based on the characteristics of the state. 
The results show that none of the three factors—1) the annual wage, 
2) the state per capita income, and 3) the employment growth rate—was 
statistically signifi cant in determining the passage of a titling law. In 
a similar manner, Panel A of the table provides estimates of a hazard 
model for the period 2001 through 2009 for the passage of a titling act, 
and Panel B shows the passage of a practice act, or a full licensing of 
interior designers. No additional licensing laws granting full licensing 
to the occupation have been passed since 2000. Again, the economic 
factors in the state are not related to the eventual passage of a licensing 
law. Perhaps political issues or a major event in a state may have led to 
the passage of a law either giving interior designers the right to exclu-
sive title and use of the term “interior designer” within the law or grant-
ing them the right to perform certain tasks. The results of the analysis in 
this area, however, were inconclusive.
Next I examine whether unlicensed interior designers pose any seri-
ous risks to public health and safety. 
PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE ON THE HEALTH 
AND SAFETY OF CONSUMERS
 If the licensing of interior designers does indeed protect public 
safety, then licensing would reduce the probability of negative out-
comes for consumers. In the case of interior designers, such negative 
outcomes could include whether a building collapses, the impact of inju-
ries caused by slippage on improperly coated fl oors, and the destruction 
of buildings by fi re. Alexander et al. (2009) examine results from insur-
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Table 2.8  Possible Economic Factors Leading to Passage of Legislation 
Regulating Interior Designers
Panel A: Hazard model estimates of time to adoption of titling law 
for interior designers’ regulation, 2001–2009
Variable Hazard ratio Coeffi cient
Average annual wage, 1999–2001 2.400 0.876
(9.786) (4.077)
Average state per capita income, 1999–2001 16.780 2.820
(89.803) (5.352)
Average state employment growth rate, 
1999–2001
0.356 
(0.410)
−1.032
(1.152)
Observations  28
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Panel B: Hazard model estimates of time to pass practice act 
for interior designers, 1990–2000
Variable Hazard ratio Coeffi cient
Average annual wage, 1990 42264.3 10.652
(291206.5) (6.890)
Average state per capita income, 1989–1992 4.867 1.583
(22.395) (4.601)
Average state employment growth rate, 
1989–1992
3.124** 1.139**
(1.828) (0.585)
Observations 45
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses. The wage is calculated from the 1990 cen-
sus Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS). The fi ve states (Alaska, Montana, North 
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming) with the fewest interior designers in the micro-
sample are excluded from the estimation. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant 
at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: Author’s calculations using PUMS.
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ance brokers who cover interior designers and the structures they nor-
mally work on. In addition, they performed an empirical analysis across 
states where fi rings might have been the result of shoddy work. Their 
analysis, in which they considered together insurance premiums and 
fi re death rates, indicated no clear effect of the quality of interior design 
licensing. They did not fi nd conclusive evidence to support the claim 
that interior design licensing will provide greater protection of public 
health and safety. Furthermore, Richard Carpenter of the Institute for 
Justice, using data on complaints to the Better Business Bureau in his 
research, found no difference in the number of consumer complaints 
fi led against interior designers in states that had just certifi cation (title 
acts) and those that had full licensing (Carpenter 2008). Carpenter cites 
testimony in Wisconsin that showed that offi cials in that state could not 
fi nd health and safety reasons for regulating interior designers (Cal-
lender 1995). 
Thus far, the ASID has not demonstrated that unlicensed interior 
designers have generated signifi cant harm or loss to society relative 
to those that are regulated (Harrington and Treber 2009). Proponents 
of interior design licensing have asserted that the interior fi nish and 
content of building materials are contributing factors to fi res and thus 
responsible for deaths, injuries, and costly property damage (Martin 
2008). But building occupants themselves may have been responsible 
for creating interior environments more conducive to the ignition and 
lethality of fi res. Thus far, no rigorous empirical evidence supports the 
assertion that failure to regulate interior designers would result in more 
fi res, deaths, or injuries to the consumers of interior design services. 
Overall, the preliminary empirical evidence contained in the current 
research does not support the public safety rationale for the licensing of 
interior designers (Harrington and Treber 2009). 
CONCLUSIONS
One could summarize the role that licensing plays in regulating inte-
rior designers in this statement by Glenn Wilson, former commissioner 
of the Minnesota Department of Commerce, regarding occupational 
licensing within his department: “What you think we do, we don’t do.” 
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Wilson explains that the ability to monitor or enforce regulatory provi-
sions on individuals who are licensed by his department is minimal. 
Consequently, he says, the general enforcement ability of government 
on licensing regulations is minimal.19 
For occupations at this initial stage of regulation, where certifi ca-
tion rather than licensing dominates, evidence that regulation raises 
wages or does much to improve quality is confl icting. The estimates 
by Harrington and Treber (2009) show some infl uence of regulation 
on wage determination. Similarly, Alabama interior designers’ wages 
grew much faster than the national growth rate after implementation of 
full-scale licensing in the state. More recent national data from the ACS 
analysis through 2009, however, show that the regulation and licensing 
of interior designers has a small and insignifi cant infl uence on wage 
determination. 
An examination of the employment growth of interior designers 
during the period 2000–2009 shows that regulation has a small infl u-
ence on employment growth once state economic characteristics are 
taken into account. Furthermore, the economic factors available for the 
analysis were not important in determining whether a law was passed. 
Perhaps the organizational or political skills of the leaders of the profes-
sion were the more important factors in determining whether interior 
designers were licensed. Another event in the state, such as a building 
collapse or other catastrophic event, may have galvanized support for 
the regulation of the occupation. However, in my research I was unable 
to fi nd such events that might have triggered the eventual licensing of 
interior designers.
An examination of the evidence shows that interior designers are 
seeking regulation in order to maintain the status of the organization 
in comparison to both engineers and architects. From their perspective, 
this goal is reasonable because these other licensed occupations have the 
ability to legislate work for their members, which comes at the expense 
of interior designers—especially when construction jobs decline, as 
they did from 2007 through 2010. Although this goal is an important 
one for the more than 72,000 interior designers in the United States and 
their families, it may not warrant additional regulation based on the cri-
teria of health and safety that are established in most states (BLS 2011). 
Moreover, the dominant criterion for regulation in state government is 
the quality of the practitioner; it does not take into account that limit-
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ing members of the occupation might affect consumers. Consequently, 
what may be good for the members of the interior design occupation 
relative to other competing occupations may drive up prices without 
any clear evidence of higher-quality buildings or improved consumer 
health and safety. 
An examination of the regulation of interior designers serves as a 
foundation from which to compare more intensely regulated occupa-
tions. The next several chapters examine occupations with longer and 
more intense experiences with licensing. These chapters evaluate the 
performance of the members as well as the infl uence of these regula-
tions on consumers. 
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The Rise, Fall, and 
Regulation of Mortgage Brokers
 People think they can make a quick buck, but they’re not in it for 
the long haul. We’ll see every shoe salesman and photocopier 
salesman will all of a sudden be a mortgage broker, but come next 
year they’ll all be gone.
 —Mary McGarity (2001, p. 41)
Mortgage brokers are intermediaries who both match potential 
mortgage borrowers with lenders and assist them in completing the 
loan origination process for the purpose of purchasing property.1 Bro-
kers have typically operated as independent service providers, not as 
agents or employees of either borrowers or lenders, and they are com-
pensated by fees paid by the borrower and sometimes the lender as 
well.2 They are generally small businesses. Approximately 83 percent 
of companies are licensed in only one state and employ from one to fi ve 
mortgage loan originators. Additionally, 87 percent of these companies 
have only a single location. Data for individual mortgage loan origi-
nators refl ect similar trends (Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System 
and Registry 2012). Their role in the U.S. mortgage market skyrock-
eted from an insignifi cant few in 1980 to a predominant position in 
the home purchasing market in 2007, just before the collapse of the 
housing market in the United States. In 2004, about 53,000 mortgage 
brokerage fi rms were operating in the United States and were directly 
or indirectly involved in the origination of as many as 68 percent of 
all mortgages that year (Wholesale Access 2005).3 As the mortgage 
broker business grew, so did questions about the industry’s role and 
its effects on consumer welfare. However, with the fi nancial crisis of 
2008 and the decline in the housing market, mortgage brokers declined 
dramatically, so that by 2009 there had been a 72 percent decline in the 
number of mortgage brokerage fi rms from its peak (Olson 2007). By 
2010, there were only half as many mortgage brokers, about 246,000, 
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as had been working in the occupation in 2006. In addition, by 2010 all 
states required state licensure of loan offi cers, except for those who had 
the title of independent brokers (Berry 2010). This decline and move 
to more regulations refl ects the opening quotation of this chapter. The 
goal of the chapter is to examine the role of the governmental regula-
tion of mortgage brokers on wage determination and on outcomes for 
consumers for this highly volatile occupation. Within this context, this 
occupation is one that has moderate levels of occupational regulation, 
judged by the fact that it takes relatively little specifi c education and 
few other job-specifi c requirements to become licensed. Nevertheless, 
the governmental requirements that practitioners must meet in order 
to do the work have been increasing over time, with clear implications 
for the members of the occupation and the consumers of their services. 
Workers in fi nancial services are much more regulated than interior 
designers, the focus of the previous chapter, but they still represent an 
occupation at an initial stage of occupational regulation in comparison 
with those that will be examined later in this volume.
This chapter examines the relationships between mortgage broker 
licensing and labor market and consumer outcomes, focusing on the 
period of growth of the services provided and the occupation. The chap-
ter gives some background on the occupation and reviews the ratio-
nale for how licensing can affect outcomes in both the labor market for 
mortgage brokers and the consumer product market for mortgages. The 
examination of the occupation then introduces and summarizes a com-
pilation of mortgage broker licensing requirements from the 50 states 
and the District of Columbia for the period 1996–2006, initially devel-
oped by Pahl (2007). The data are used to analyze whether mortgage 
broker licensing or any of its components have signifi cant relationships 
with labor or service market outcomes. Estimates are presented from 
an index of regulation that attempts to construct overall indices of the 
diffi culty of mortgage broker regulation, but the analysis fi nds that they 
are not signifi cantly related to labor market or consumer market out-
comes. The index examines many of the separate components of state 
mortgage broker regulation and fi nds that one component—the require-
ment in many states that mortgage brokers maintain a surety bond or 
maintain a minimum net worth—has a signifi cant and fairly consistent 
statistical association with fewer brokers, fewer subprime mortgages, 
higher foreclosure rates on subprime mortgages, and a higher percent-
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age of mortgages carrying high interest rates.4 These results are often 
viewed as a counterintuitive fi nding by those who suggest that occu-
pational regulation either does not matter or can have positive infl u-
ences on labor markets and consumer fi nancial well-being. The results 
developed in this chapter provide more evidence of the infl uence of 
regulation on the quality and prices of the services in this fi nancial sec-
tor (Ambrose and Conklin 2012; Shi 2012). 
UNDERSTANDING THE INDUSTRY AND OCCUPATION
The number of mortgage broker fi rms nationwide is expected to 
fall a staggering 72 percent from its peak back in 2005, according 
to Wholesale Access chief David Olson, who spoke with National 
Mortgage News. —Colin Robertson (2009)
From one perspective, the rise of mortgage brokering was just one 
part of a broader vertical disintegration of the lending business which is 
thought to have made mortgage credit more widely and cheaply avail-
able to many households following the savings and loan crisis of the 
1980s. Mortgage brokers have played a role in the evolution of the 
highly specialized and effi cient mortgage market. In particular, brokers 
can make the complicated task of shopping and applying for the increas-
ingly wide array of mortgage products more manageable and effi cient 
for borrowers and lenders alike. Millions of households, including 
many affl uent and sophisticated consumers, have frequently arranged 
mortgages through brokers. The brokers’ services seem to be operating 
in reasonably competitive markets, as evidenced by the repeat business 
and the recommendations of their services to others.
Critics of the members of the occupation have argued that too many 
mortgage brokers are not honest or, more broadly, that market failures 
prevent competition from effectively disciplining brokers’ profi ts and 
quality of service. These market failures, mainly through information 
asymmetries, allow mortgage brokers to profi t at the expense of mort-
gage borrowers as well as lenders. These issues are said to be especially 
problematic in the subprime mortgage market, where mortgage bro-
kers dominated originations from the late 1990s through the middle of 
the next decade (Schloemer et al. 2006). For example, data from New 
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Century Financial Corporation show that brokers earned an average of 
$5,300 per funded loan for all loans in New Century’s sample of the 
loans made through mortgage brokers (Berndt, Hollifi eld, and Sandås 
2010). 
In response to these concerns, a variety of policy measures have 
been discussed. One of the most common responses of policymakers 
has been to increase the regulatory practices to include occupational 
licensing standards for mortgage brokers. In a study for the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Pahl (2007) documents how state licens-
ing of mortgage brokers increased both in the number of states and 
the intensity of the statutes, as measured by more restrictions per state 
between 1996 and 2006. Since then, a surge in mortgage foreclosures 
has provided even greater political momentum for the enactment of 
further regulation. Policymakers seem to have concluded that a lack 
of market discipline and regulatory oversight allowed many mortgage 
brokers to originate expensive and risky mortgages. They tend to view 
a more comprehensive system of mortgage broker licensing as part of 
the solution in order to reduce consumer problems in these fi nancial 
markets. Yet little is known about how or even whether licensing infl u-
ences the labor market for brokers or their customers.
The evolution of mortgage brokering in the United States and 
the policy issues that arose with it have been well described in other 
sources; this chapter summarizes them to motivate and provide back-
ground for the analysis of mortgage broker occupational licensing.5 In 
particular, mortgage brokering has become an economically signifi cant 
industry surrounded by controversy about the extent of benefi ts it pro-
vides to consumers and lenders. This section describes some of the key 
pricing and quality issues that policymakers try to address with licens-
ing programs.
The National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) delineates 
the roles of the mortgage lender and the mortgage broker as follows:6
The wholesale lender underwrites and funds the home loan, may 
service the loan payments, and ensures the loan’s compliance with 
underwriting guidelines. The broker, on the other hand, originates 
the loan. A detailed application process, fi nancial and credit wor-
thiness investigation, and extensive disclosure requirements must 
be completed in order for a wholesale lender to evaluate a consum-
er’s home loan request. The broker simplifi es this process for the 
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borrower and the wholesale lender, by conducting this research, 
counseling consumers on their loan package choices, and enabling 
them to select the right loan for their home buying needs. 
The mortgage loan process can be arduous, costly, and seem-
ingly impossible to the consumer. The broker works as the liaison 
between the borrower and the lender to create a cost effective and 
effi cient loan process. 
As an independent contractor, the broker allows wholesaler lend-
ers to cut origination costs by providing such services as preparing 
the borrower’s loan package, loan application, funding process, 
and counseling the borrower. (NAMB 2013)
The services of mortgage brokers were virtually nonexistent 30 
years ago. At that time, the mortgage industry was made up almost 
entirely of banks and savings and loans that managed the entire process 
of bringing borrowers and investors together. They located depositors 
and borrowers and recommended from a small subset the appropriate 
type of mortgage, analyzed borrowers’ creditworthiness and the value 
of their collateral, closed the loans, serviced the loans, and made pay-
ments to the investors. The banks used simple criteria of 20 percent 
down payment—or higher fees for those with lower down payments—
and a fi xed-rate mortgage over the life of the mortgage.
By 2000, the mortgage market had changed radically (U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development [HUD] 2002; Jacobides 
2005). Technological change (fax machines, the Internet, and other tech-
nologies), fi nancial innovation (credit scoring, automated underwriting, 
securitization of mortgages, and so forth), and deregulation (e.g., repeal 
of state usury limits) abetted extensive specialization and vertical disin-
tegration in the industry, so that separate fi rms could focus on particular 
steps in the process, such as loan marketing and closing, underwrit-
ing, initial funding, servicing, pooling, and long-term funding. At the 
same time, the range of potential participants within each such niche 
broadened; for example, nondepository mortgage banks competed with 
depository institutions to originate and sometimes service, pool, or fund 
mortgages. In addition, new types of mortgages (e.g., adjustable rate 
mortgages [ARMs]) and differentiated products aimed at a wider array 
of consumers, and these new products captured signifi cant shares of the 
market.
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These developments both affected and were affected by the rapid 
growth of mortgage brokering. As the decision to grant credit became 
less based on subjective assessments of the loan applicant and more 
based on credit scores and other objective underwriting standards, 
underwriting moved to the back offi ce, and loan offi cers employed by 
depository institutions focused increasingly on sales and loan closing 
services. Improved communications technology—fax machines and 
later the Internet and PDF documents—fostered the physical separation 
of the sales function from the underwriting function, and this in turn 
made it possible to outsource either or both. 
Mortgage brokers take outsourcing one step further, in that they 
work for themselves, as independent contractors dealing with multiple 
lenders. As such, brokers allowed both established mortgage lenders 
(the depository institutions) and new competitors (nondepository mort-
gage banks) to specialize and to rapidly scale up or down their sales 
efforts and loan origination volumes in response to market cycles and 
competitive opportunities (HUD 2002; Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 
2007).
Low overheads and the resulting ability to effi ciently market them-
selves within residential neighborhoods helped brokers in the early 
2000s penetrate the emerging subprime market, which included many 
households that were somewhat unfamiliar with traditional mortgage 
lending institutions. Much of the growth of the mortgage broker indus-
try took place through the addition of new fi rms, as the average size of 
fi rms remained small, about 10 individuals, during most of the period 
of the analysis (Sichelman 2003).
Mortgage brokers, by consolidating information on multiple prod-
ucts from multiple lenders, offered consumers a convenient way to 
examine a variety of home loans for which they were fi nancially quali-
fi ed. The result was the creation of a viable intermediary role and rapid 
growth in the mortgage broker industry from the late 1990s to 2008.
The transformation of the U.S. mortgage market after 1980 created 
signifi cant benefi ts for U.S. consumers by increasing home ownership 
and improving the effi ciency of mortgage processing, and mortgage 
brokers claimed a share of the credit. Brokers served millions of cus-
tomers from all parts of society; their repeat business and the multiyear 
growth in their market share until the fi nancial crisis in 2008 suggest 
that many of their customers had been pleased with their services. Bro-
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kers helped to shorten the loan closing process and made it cheaper, 
and they enabled the mortgage industry to meet enormous variations in 
demand. However, the transformation of the mortgage industry created 
new problems, and mortgage brokers were blamed for many of these.
Critics of mortgage brokers generally focus on incentive problems 
stemming from the fact that the broker is an intermediary whose pay 
depends directly on the size and number of loans he or she originates 
and only indirectly on whether the borrower received appropriate rep-
resentation on the deal and whether the borrower makes payments as 
expected (Schloemer et al. 2006). The incentive issues arise because of 
informational asymmetries among the borrower, lender, and broker. It 
has been well documented that borrowers are confused by the language 
and terms of mortgage contracts and related documentation (Guttentag 
2000; Woodward 2003; Pappalardo and Lacko 2007). Borrowers fre-
quently fail to understand basic facts about the mortgages they signed 
and are even more confused about the other mortgage options avail-
able to them. Many have argued that the complexity created by hav-
ing so many legal documents to sign in a short period of time makes 
the fi nancial part of home purchases nearly impossible to understand. 
Many borrowers are willing to follow the advice of a professional, such 
as a mortgage broker, even though they may be unable to verify the 
quality of the advice even after the fact. This creates an opportunity for 
professionals, including mortgage brokers, to abuse that trust by, for 
example, recommending a mortgage that has a higher interest rate than 
the customer qualifi es for, in order to obtain a higher fee.7 The follow-
ing three points, taken from Guttentag, are among the most frequently 
cited consumer issues regarding mortgage brokers and other fi nancial 
intermediaries with similar incentives:
 1) Brokers steer borrowers “to mortgages that provide higher 
compensation to the broker but are not necessarily the lowest 
cost or most advantageous to the consumer,” and they do so 
deliberately and disproportionately with subprime, minority, 
elderly, or poorly informed customers.
 2) They market aggressively to maximize origination fees, in par-
ticular by persuading borrowers to take out loans they cannot 
afford or to refi nance too frequently based on their income and 
fi nancial status.
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 3) They receive fees from borrowers and lenders that are more 
than commensurate with services rendered, especially from 
minority or unsophisticated borrowers.
Asymmetrical information, or information that one side possesses 
but the other does not, also makes lenders concerned about the qual-
ity of mortgage brokers’ services. Brokers’ fees typically are paid only 
when loans are closed. Consequently, brokers’ immediate incentive is 
to earn their fees by getting lenders to approve and close loans, and 
they do not have a direct stake in subsequent loan performance. This 
incentive has been seen as raising the following major issues for lenders 
regarding brokers:
 1) Brokers may corrupt the information about the borrower that 
is submitted for underwriting in order to increase the chances 
that the lender will approve the loan, with the result that loans 
handled by brokers are more likely to default than loans pro-
cessed by the lender’s own loan offi cers (Alexander et al. 
2002). The incomplete or inaccurate information can arise 
from either carelessness or deliberate misrepresentation or 
fraud (Schloemer et al. 2006). For mortgage brokers there are, 
potentially, clear elements of either incompetence or unscru-
pulous behavior. 
 2) Contrary to contractual agreements with their lender clients, 
brokers encourage the clients’ existing borrowers to refi nance, 
so that prepayment rates on the lenders’ broker-originated 
mortgages are higher than on mortgages originated by the 
lenders’ own loan offi cers (LaCour-Little and Chun 1999).
One view is that the marketplace can mitigate these consumer and 
lender information and incentive problems and correct or alleviate the 
market failures that have been alleged in housing fi nance. For example, 
over time lenders can monitor the quality of the loans submitted by a 
given broker and either stop dealing with or pay lower fees to inferior 
brokers. Although some lenders began monitoring in this way, industry 
experts assert that, at least until recently, these efforts have not been 
suffi ciently strict or widespread to signifi cantly change aggregate out-
comes (Alexander et al. 2002; Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene 2007). 
Some lenders mitigated losses by pricing broker-originated loans dif-
ferently, using higher interest rates on these loans to offset default risk 
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or imposing prepayment penalties to offset higher prepayment risk. On 
the consumer side, confusion about mortgages contributed to enhanced 
efforts at home buyer fi nancial education, but with only limited results. 
Guttentag (2000) suggests a new contractual arrangement, the Upfront 
Mortgage Broker certifi cation, under which mortgage brokers would 
serve as the borrower’s agent in return for fi xed, fully disclosed fees. 
However, only a small fraction of brokers work under this arrangement. 
As of 2007 the market responses have not eliminated concerns about 
bad outcomes caused by asymmetric information and incentive con-
fl icts in the mortgage broker market. Partly as a result, many mortgage 
lenders have cut back on or ceased accepting broker-originated loans, 
exacerbating the steep decline in mortgage brokering since 2006. More 
importantly, the recession that was triggered by the fi nancial collapse 
in 2008 saw fi nancial institutions dramatically reduce their reliance on 
brokers because of the drop in demand for housing and because of the 
actual and potential abuses that were associated with brokers.
RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATION OF 
MORTGAGE BROKERS
With mainly market-based responses to fi nancial crises not elimi-
nating concerns about mortgage broker incentives and actions, public 
policymakers have entered the fray. The federal fi nancial regulatory 
agencies have promulgated new guidelines and requirements regarding 
mortgage information disclosures and subprime loan underwriting and 
pricing. Many states and local governments have enacted antipreda-
tory lending laws that restrict mortgage interest rates, fees, and contract 
terms. In addition, state legislators and regulators, often with the support 
and help of mortgage broker trade associations, have broadened and 
tightened the requirements for mortgage broker fi rms and individual 
loan offi cers to obtain the licenses that they need to operate legally. In 
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Congress established 
new minimum requirements for state mortgage broker registration and 
regulation. This section reviews the rationale for and previous empiri-
cal studies of occupational licensing. The following sections summa-
rize the specifi cs of mortgage broker licensing in the United States and 
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assess how state differences in mortgage broker licensing are associated 
with outcomes in the labor and mortgage markets.
Licensing requirements generally take the form of unspecifi ed fi xed 
costs controlled by the licensing authority, broadly similar to typical 
licensing requirements such as payment of an annual licensing fee or 
maintenance of a surety bond, which would be the case for mortgage 
brokers. Utilizing a commonly used perspective on the rationale for 
governmental regulation, skill affects the relative cost of producing 
high-quality services, and licensing takes the more specifi c form of 
a minimal human capital requirement, similar to actual requirements 
that entrants and sometimes incumbents take certain training programs 
or pass an exam (Shapiro 1986). Apart from these special fi xed costs, 
entry into and exit out of the occupation are unrestricted, which ensures 
that providers earn zero economic profi ts in equilibrium—or, in other 
words, no excess profi ts.
In applying any of this rationale to mortgage broker licensing, a 
worthwhile consideration is what would be observed in the credit mar-
ket if mortgage brokers provided higher-quality services. The nature of 
the service is to match a borrower and lender effi ciently, so that loans 
are made with a favorable combination of lower search-plus-processing 
costs than if a broker had not been involved. However, because credit 
markets are also subject to information asymmetries, the credit market 
results of high-quality brokering are potentially counterintuitive. For 
example, higher quality might include the consideration that the broker 
provides the lender with more complete and accurate information about 
the borrower, so that loans are underwritten and priced more accurately. 
If so, it is conceivable that better brokers could be associated with a 
greater proportion of high-priced loans in the credit market, because 
lenders would be more willing to price risk rather than ration credit 
if they had more trust in the information brokers were submitting. In 
other words, the quality of mortgage brokering can affect the breadth 
of the credit market and thus the range of creditworthiness among loan 
applicants and recipients, and this can complicate the impact of higher-
quality brokering on some credit market outcomes.
However, if we control for the creditworthiness of loan applicants, 
better brokering services would be associated with lower search- and 
processing-related costs, such as a lower percentage of loan applica-
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tions being denied, a lower rate of bad matches that lead to delinquency 
or foreclosure, and a shorter time between loan application and loan 
closing or denial. The effects of better services provided by the occu-
pation on interest rates, controlling for creditworthiness, are less clear. 
Borrowers might be willing to accept higher interest rates in a brokered 
transaction, compared with a nonbrokered transaction, if there were 
more-than-offsetting reductions in search costs, just as lenders might be 
willing to accept lower interest rates if there were more-than-offsetting 
reductions in marketing and processing costs. The role for public policy 
presumably is to ensure that borrowers obtain a higher-quality service 
by the members of the profession, and that outcomes such as foreclo-
sures are diminished by having brokers oversee the process. 
Table 3.1 shows the extent to which the individuals surveyed who 
were interested in these fi nancial services checked with the govern-
ment to see if the person who was providing the service was licensed. 
The results from the survey show that only 14 percent checked to learn 
whether the individual was licensed; 84 percent did not check on the 
licensing status of the individual, and 2 percent didn’t know whether 
they had checked. One conclusion from the survey is that licensing is 
not a major factor in the perceived quality of the service. On the other 
hand, the survey results could show that consumers assume that these 
services are already of high quality or that regulation is not essential for 
the service provider.
Table 3.1  Financial Consumer Monitoring of Licensing
Survey question Eligible respondents Answers Percentage
Have you ever checked 
with a state or federal 
regulator regarding the 
background, registration, 
or license of a fi nancial 
professional?
Respondents who 
have used a fi nancial 
professional (“Yes” 
to any of k_1 to k_5)
Yes 14
No 84
Don’t know 2
Prefer not to say 0
N 14,918
SOURCE: FINRA Investor Education Foundation (2013).
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MEASURING THE INFLUENCE OF OCCUPATIONAL 
REGULATION ON MORTGAGE BROKERS
In order to examine and analyze the role of the regulation of mort-
gage brokers both for the members of the occupation and for consumers 
of their services, a method needs to be devised to determine the level 
of regulation over time for each state. To associate mortgage broker 
licensing with market outcomes, a method was developed for the mea-
surement of the extent of mortgage broker licensing. Cindy Pahl, as part 
of her work at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, implemented 
a compilation of these regulations in the 50 states and the District of 
Columbia for the period 1996–2006, just prior to the dramatic decline 
in housing prices and the recession (Pahl 2007). Pahl shows that a wide 
variety of licensing provisions may apply specifi cally to mortgage bro-
kerage fi rms. The following are examples of such provisions:
• The entity’s controlling individual(s) may be required to be of 
minimum age; maintain in-state residency; meet minimums for 
professional prelicensing education, experience, or examination 
results; provide evidence of ethical fi tness and absence of crimi-
nal background; and complete required continuing education.
• The entity may be required to name an individual as manag-
ing principal, and the managing principal may be subject to re-
quirements similar to those for controlling individuals as well as 
requirements to maintain a minimum net worth or surety bond 
or to obtain a license as an individual mortgage broker or loan 
offi cer.
• The entity itself may be required to maintain a minimum net 
worth or a surety bond. Entities, sole proprietors, controlling in-
dividuals, and managing principals may be required to pay fees 
for licensing, application processing, application investigation, 
or license renewal.
• Entities and sole proprietors may be required to meet minimum 
physical offi ce requirements, such as maintaining a physical of-
fi ce in states where they operate. To open a branch offi ce, en-
tities and sole proprietors may be required to provide notifi ca-
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tion, obtain a license or certifi cate, pay various fees, maintain 
branch-specifi c amounts of net worth or surety bonds, or name a 
branch manager who may be required to meet provisions similar 
to those listed above for managing principals. In some states, the 
loan offi cers who work for mortgage brokerage fi rms may also 
be required to meet standards of the same type as those listed 
above for managing principals, but often at a lower level. Ad-
ditional provisions may specify that a loan offi cer can work for 
only one fi rm at a time. However, some states allow certain other 
professionals, such as real estate agents or attorneys, to engage 
in some aspects of mortgage brokering without obtaining a spe-
cifi c mortgage broker license; these exemptions may be subject 
to limits on the maximum number or volume of loans brokered.
For each state and the District of Columbia for each year from 1996 
through 2006, the index assigns an integer value for the intensity of 
each of 24 regulatory components. Most of the components deal with 
the regulation of human capital requirements. For example, regarding 
the controlling of individuals in mortgage brokerage fi rms, the codes 
separate intensities for prelicensing education, prelicensing experience, 
prelicensing examinations, and continuing education requirements. 
Pahl codes the same four variables for managing principals, branch 
managers, and the fi rms’ employees, for a total of 16 human capital 
components. Three components refl ect, respectively, the degree of indi-
vidual licensing required of managing principals, branch managers, and 
employees. At the fi rm level, the index is coded by intensity; in other 
words, entry requirements are more diffi cult for both net worth and 
surety bonding requirements, so the intensity of surety bonding required 
for branches is separately coded. Finally, the codes show whether an in-
state offi ce is required and the extent of exemptions that allow other 
professions to engage in mortgage brokering activities.
The analysis uses two overall indices of the intensity of mortgage 
broker regulation in a state: a simple sum of all 24 of Pahl’s individual 
intensity values (the summated rating scale) and a statistically weighted 
nonlinear index (the Rasch index).8 This combined index can capture 
the major regulatory provisions affecting the occupation using both lin-
ear (summated rating scale) and nonlinear (Rasch index) measures of 
the level of regulation.
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In addition to these composite indices, the analysis also examines 
subsets of the 24 regulatory components that were collected.9 Much of 
the analysis includes a dollar-valued measure of the bonding and net 
worth regulations, which were created by examining the details of each 
state’s requirements and selecting what was judged to be the smallest 
dollar option by which new entrants could meet either the bonding or 
the net worth requirement. These values were also examined by sub-
tracting the bonding and net worth indices from the composite indices. 
There was an examination of other subindices and individual compo-
nents, such as those for the provisions regarding training and examina-
tions, provisions that apply only to the management of brokerage fi rms, 
provisions that limit brokerage fi rm branches, and provisions that apply 
only to employees of brokerage fi rms. Some of these regulatory vari-
ables were signifi cant in regressions with one or more of our labor and 
mortgage market–dependent variables, and in a few cases their pres-
ence materially weakened the signifi cance of the bonding and net worth 
variable. The major focus was on the bonding and net worth provisions 
in order to show the broadest and most consistent pattern of signifi cant 
relationships with market outcomes.
Using the measures of regulatory restrictiveness, Table 3.2 shows 
the top seven and bottom fi ve states ranked by the restrictiveness of 
their summated scale of mortgage broker licensing. Florida has the 
most statutory provisions regulating mortgage brokers. The fi ve states 
with the least restrictive statutes in 2004, such as Alaska and Wyoming, 
are less populous. Montana and Texas had the greatest increase in the 
regulation of mortgage brokers during the period 1999–2004. In gen-
eral, larger industrial and urbanized states were more likely to impose 
broader and deeper regulatory provisions on mortgage brokers, Mon-
tana being an exception. 
Figure 3.1 shows the more general growth and variation of regula-
tion over time from 1996 to 2006, using a box-and-whisker plot. The 
mean value of the summated rating scale for all states was 3.2 in 1996 
and increased to almost 8.0 by 2005, using the index developed by Pahl 
(2007). The variations in state practices also rose. As the membership 
in the occupation expanded in response to growth in the demand for 
broker services, more states began regulating the members of the occu-
pation. This may have occurred because members in the occupation 
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sought regulation or because of public concern about brokers allegedly 
charging excessive fees or leading customers into overly risky loans. 
Because of their signifi cance for the subsequent analysis, it is 
important to understand the nature of bonding requirements.10 When 
brokers are required to have a bond of $50,000, for example, this typi-
cally means that they pay an annual premium, ranging from several 
hundred to a few thousand dollars, to a surety bond company. It does 
not mean that the broker must own and place in trust a fi xed-income 
security with a market value of $50,000. Under specifi ed conditions of 
broker nonperformance of duties spelled out in the governing laws and 
regulations, third parties, such as the broker’s customers, may collect 
up to the amount of the bond from the surety company. The role of the 
Rankings Regulation value
Top seven regulated states, 2004
Florida 16
Montana 14
New Jersey 13
Ohio 12
Texas 12
North Carolina 12
Nevada 12
Bottom fi ve regulated states, 2004
Colorado 0
Wyoming 0
Alaska 0
South Dakota 1
Maine 2
Top seven states by change in regulation, 1999–2004
Montana 14
Texas 12
North Carolina 11
Oklahoma 8
Connecticut 7
Nevada 7
Utah 7
Table 3.2  Regulation in the Most, Least, and Greatest Changer States
SOURCE: Developed from Pahl (2007).
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surety company is to ensure that a valid claim will be promptly paid.11 
If this occurs, the surety company will seek full compensation from 
the broker for the amount it paid out to the third party, plus expenses. 
The broker’s annual premium or the basis of his or her salary is thus a 
fee paid to guarantee a line of contingent credit up to a legally required 
amount. In setting the annual premium it charges a broker, a surety 
company considers both the expected value of claims against the broker 
and the probability of collecting from the broker for any amounts paid 
out. Consequently, the bond company may conduct detailed screening 
of applicants, similar to credit underwriting, before issuing the bond.
The basic hypothesis is that this type of screening could make bond-
ing one of the most signifi cant barriers to entry in states requiring bonds 
Figure 3.1  Growth and Variation of Occupational Regulation over Time
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NOTE: This box-and-whisker plot shows annual values of the median, interquartile 
range, and outliers of the summated rating scale derived from the catalogue of state 
(and District of Columbia) mortgage broker regulations. The line in the middle of 
the box represents the median. The bottom and top edges of the box are the fi rst and 
third quartiles, respectively. The whiskers extending from the box represent the most 
extreme point within the range of one and a half times the interquartile range (the dif-
ference between the third and fi rst quartiles). The remaining points represent outliers 
that do not fall within the range of the whiskers.
SOURCE: Pahl (2007).
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of $50,000 or more, especially given that the educational requirements 
for mortgage brokers do not usually require more than one year of 
classes or other tasks. Some support for this view comes from Barker’s 
(2008) fi nding that state bonding requirements mattered in a related 
occupation—real estate brokerage—where they were associated with 
higher-quality service, as measured by a lower rate of consumer com-
plaints. An industry expert, David Olson (2007), provides additional 
support. He notes that one factor that kept mortgage brokers from origi-
nating many Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages was 
the FHA’s requirement that originators provide a formal audit, costing 
about $5,000 each year. He suggests that more mortgage brokers would 
originate FHA loans if this audit requirement were dropped in favor of 
having brokers maintain a $75,000 surety bond. For established mort-
gage brokers with good credit, the cost of this bond would be about 
$750, but Olson notes that “brokers with low net worth and fewer years 
in the business will have a more diffi cult time getting a bond at all.” 
In such cases, the broker could seek a more costly bond from a surety 
company that specializes in serving higher-risk clients, but premiums 
from this type of company often reach 10 to 15 percent of the amount 
of the bond, compared with 1 to 2 percent for low-risk mortgage bro-
kers. Thus, on just a $50,000 bond, a high-risk premium could match 
or exceed the $5,000 audit cost that Olson judged to be prohibitive for 
most brokers. This requirement may serve to increase the quality of 
brokers but reduce their quantity. For some who need the services of a 
broker for negotiating price, picking an appropriately structured mort-
gage, or maintaining payments on an existing mortgage, having the 
fi nancial advice of a competent and honest broker may enhance their 
economic welfare.
ESTIMATING RELATIONSHIPS 
In order to calculate the infl uence of regulation of mortgage brokers 
and their labor market and consumer market outcomes, multivariate sta-
tistical models were developed of these relationships. These two types 
of relationships—1) labor markets and 2) consumer markets—are the 
key ones for evaluating the social costs and benefi ts of the institution 
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of licensing for this occupation. The model controls for other factors 
affecting these markets. The analysis takes two main forms: 1) panel 
data analyses using repeated annual cross sections of labor and mortgage 
market data, and 2) cross-sectional analyses of hundreds to thousands of 
individual mortgages issued in 2005. Most of the panel data regressions 
utilize state-level average data, but for mortgage broker earnings the 
observations are combined on individual mortgage professionals with 
state-averaged data. The panel data regressions allow for fi xed effects 
in each state as well as time trends. As a check on the results, a re-
estimation was developed of the cross-sectional regressions on a sam-
ple restricted to mortgages just in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) 
that cross state boundaries, so that MSA fi xed effects for the prices of 
mortgages could be included.
ESTIMATES FOR LABOR MARKET VARIABLES
Table 3.3 provides descriptive statistics for key labor market vari-
ables as well as other mortgage market and regulatory variables used 
in the analysis. The table shows the growth in occupational regulation 
and a measure of hourly wages and earnings from the annual Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS) of mortgage brokers and related lending 
professionals.12 The ACS is conducted annually by the Census Bureau 
and replicates the formerly used long form on the decennial census. It 
provides large samples of individuals even for relatively detailed occu-
pational classifi cations such as loan offi cers and brokers. 
To take advantage of the variation across both space and time to 
analyze relationships between the intensity of licensing and key labor 
market variables such as mortgage brokers’ employment (relative to 
that of the population) and earnings, a panel data set is created. These 
relationships could be either positive or negative, based on the hypoth-
eses discussed above. An additional complication, not refl ected in the 
theoretical models, is that brokers may accelerate entry into the occupa-
tion before the standards become fully effective, leading to a spurious 
positive relationship between subsequent regulation and the number of 
practitioners in the short run. This was the case in accounting, where 
anticipated new regulations resulted in a surge of applications just 
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Table 3.3  Summary Statistics for the Labor Market, Service Market, 
and Legal and Bonding Provisions
State-level and individual variables
2000
mean
(sd)
2005
mean      
(sd)
Broker/loan offi cer hourly wage ($) 20.12 25.15
(12.74) (16.87)
Annual broker/loan offi cer earnings ($) 40,973.43 52,748.68
(26,177.80) (41,526.24)
Employment (loan offi cers and 
brokers/population, %)
0.15 0.17
(0.06) (0.17)
Years of experience 18.49 19.51
(10.54) (11.51)
Years of schooling 14.54 14.69
(1.79) (1.80)
Mean number of loans 537,109.57 
(679,999.52)
736,032.00 
(880,192.82)
Mean number of subprime loans  13,995.13
(15,213.93)
95,726.69
(129,101.6)
Mean number of loans in foreclosure 6,214.27
 (8,883.82)
8,580.52
 (9,444.91)
Mean state population 5,471,375.84 
(6,101,905.36)
5,757,977.29 
(6,498,035.30)
Median household income ($) 58,574.57
(7,641.51)
63,504.76
 (10,326.91)
Licensing index (1996) 2.33 
 (1.96)
Licensing index (2005) 6.84
(3.68)
Bonding/net worth index (2000) 1.7
(1.37)
Bonding/net worth index (2005) 1.88
(1.35)
Real bonding/net worth requirement ($)
1996a
15,825.12 
(18,963.83)
Real bonding/net worth requirement ($)
2005a
27,479.08 
(25,928.68)
NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.
a Base year 2000.
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS) of the U.S. Census Bureau; Occupa-
tional Employment Statistics wage survey. 
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before more stringent educational requirements took effect (Cumming 
and Rankin 1999).
The analysis begins by relating regulation to the employment of 
brokers and associated lending professionals. Initially, the results fi nd 
that neither the linear-summated rating scale nor the Rasch index is 
signifi cantly related to mortgage broker employment at the state level. 
The basic fi ndings hold, whether the specifi cation and estimation are 
done with the more rigorous fi xed effects or with random effects. The 
estimation strategy chosen uses the fi xed effects approach since it helps 
avoid omitted variable bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 3.4 shows the relationship between bonding and net worth 
requirements and state-level employment relative to population from 
2000 to 2005. The measure of employment is based on the ACS data 
and represents the number of mortgage brokers and related lending pro-
fessionals per capita by state. The use of the ACS is in many ways pref-
erable to the OES because the OES does not cover self-employed indi-
viduals, and, as was noted earlier, up to 80 percent of licensed mortgage 
brokers are either self-employed or work in small group practices that 
may not be covered in the OES (BLS 2013b). The model uses pooled 
time series and cross-section data that allow an estimate with year fi xed-
effects models and a set of human capital, labor market, and service 
market state controls. The results show that the bonding and net worth 
requirement is signifi cant and negatively associated with employment. 
Using the values at the mean of the distribution, the estimates show that 
doubling the bonding requirement is associated with an approximately 
8 to 10 percent decrease in the number of brokers and related lend-
ing professionals in the state relative to the population. The bonding 
requirement may have a stronger relationship to employment than the 
other licensing components for several reasons: it may be both rela-
tively onerous and easily enforced up front and thus may reduce entry 
into the occupation. One would expect that states with older mortgage 
brokers and related lending professionals were the ones with lower per 
capita levels of employment within the occupation. This may simply 
refl ect the fact that most new entrants are younger, so that impeding 
entry tends to both age the profession and reduce employment. It could 
also be that, as the occupation matures and public policies on regulation 
evolve, the political clout of mortgage brokers will grow, possibly lead-
ing to adoption of more rigorous educational and experience require-
ments that will complement those on bonding. 
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Table 3.4  Fixed-Effects Models of Loan Offi cer Employment/Population 
by State
(1) (2)
Summated regulation index, lagged once 
(no net worth/bonding)/100
0.068 0.058
(0.206) (0.173)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged once 
/1,000,000
−0.545 −0.795
(0.431) (0.350)**
Summated regulation index, lagged twice 
(no net worth/bonding)/100
−0.026
(0.235)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged twice 
/1,000,000
−0.418
(0.403)
Mean experience by state −0.004 −0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Mean experience by state squared/10,000 0.993 0.994
(0.659) (0.658)
Mean years of school by state −0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.005)
Lag median state household income/100,000 0.218 0.211
(0.162) (0.161)
Lag state unemployment rate 0.010 0.010
(0.006)* (0.006)*
Lag state home ownership percentage −0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.172 0.187
(0.176) (0.175)
Year dummy controls (2001–2005), base 2000 Y Y
Observations 300 300
Number of states 50 50
R-squared 0.12 0.11
F-test for one- and two-period lags of summated 
index 
0.06 —
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/net 
worth
3.16** —
NOTE: The two columns contain two different estimates for the infl uence of those 
factors on employment of loan offi cer population to employment. The second col-
umn shows a sensitivity analysis of using a different statistical specifi cation. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 
level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Y = yes. — means no estimates were developed 
for these cells. Blank means the variable was not used in the second specifi cation.
SOURCE: ACS data.
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Restricting entry could have a direct effect on earnings. To examine 
this relationship, a model is estimated showing the association between 
the bonding requirements and annual earnings, using individual-
level data in the ACS. Table 3.5 presents estimates of the relationship 
between regulation and annual earnings from 2000 to 2005 using the 
individual practitioner data for each year. The basic earnings equation 
can be stated as follows:
(3.1) ln(Earningsit) = a + b1Rit + b2 Xit + uit ,
where Earningsit stands for the annual earnings of person i in time 
period t; Rit is the tightness of mortgage broker licensing through bond-
ing and net worth requirements in person i’s state in time period t; the 
vector Xit includes covariates measuring characteristics of each person 
and state, along with year time trends; uit is the error term; and a, b1, 
and b2 are the coeffi cients we estimate. Since regulation generally infl u-
ences only new entrants, it would take some time before the full effect 
of regulation would infl uence wages and employment of the individu-
als in the occupation. We fi nd a positive relationship between mortgage 
broker licensing and mortgage broker earnings, ranging from an impre-
cisely estimated 7 percent to a marginally signifi cant 6 percent.13,14 As 
shown in Table 3.5, the coeffi cients on the nonregulatory explanatory 
variables were consistent with the labor economics and human capital 
literature. Using an F-test in column 1, the joint regulation variables are 
statistically signifi cant. 
The fi ndings show that tighter requirements for bonding and for net 
worth are also associated with lower volumes of loans processed and 
a higher percentage of high-priced loans originated. One interpretation 
of this set of results is that the demand for mortgage broker services 
is approximately of unit elasticity, so that as the numbers of brokers 
and loans processed contract, brokers’ fees per loan processed rise by 
enough to just offset the lower loan volume and higher operating costs 
that result from tighter licensing, leaving the average broker’s net earn-
ings only slightly higher.
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Table 3.5  Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Models of Log Annual 
Earnings, 2000–2005
(1) (2)
Summated regulation index, lagged once 
(no net worth/bonding)/100
0.290 −0.485
(0.520) (0.204)**
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged 
once/100,000
0.076
(0.099)
0.060
(0.033)*
Summated regulation index, lagged twice 
(no net worth/bonding)
−0.009
(0.006)
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged 
twice/100,000
0.148
(0.113)
Experience 0.057 0.057
(0.004)*** (0.004)***
Experience squared/1,000 −1.018 −1.020
(0.089)*** (0.090)***
Log years of school 1.262 1.263
(0.059)*** (0.059)***
Lag median household income/1,000,000 10.823 10.786
(1.677)*** (1.668)***
Lag state population/1,000,000 4.950 4.653
(1.721)*** (1.702)***
Lag state unemployment rate/100 −0.231 −0.046
(1.465) (1.453)
State homeownership percentage/100 −0.088 −0.070
(0.226) (0.222)
Constant 6.430 6.407
(0.262)*** (0.262)***
Year dummy controls (2001–2004), base 2000 Y Y
Observations 6,699 6,699
R-squared 0.13 0.13
F-test for one- and two-period lags of 
summated index 
3.54** —
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/
net worth
1.97 —
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifi -
cations to see if the results are stable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signifi -
cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. 
Y = yes. — means no estimates were developed for these cells.
SOURCE: ACS data.
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DOES BROKER REGULATION INFLUENCE FINANCIAL 
OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS?
A key part of the investigation shows the relationship between 
mortgage broker licensing, the volume of subprime lending, and the 
rate of mortgage foreclosures. As discussed above, stricter licensing 
could reduce the number of subprime loans, for example, by restricting 
the number or work effort of mortgage brokers. Alternatively, stricter 
licensing could boost effective loan demand by enhancing the quality 
of broker services, thereby increasing the willingness both of marginal 
borrowers to step forward to use their services and of lenders to also 
see these services as being of high quality. To probe these potential 
outcomes, the following model is estimated:
(3.2) ln(sp − loans originatedit) = α + β1Rit + β2Xit + μit ,
where sp − loans originatedit is the number of new subprime mortgages 
in state i over period t; Rit represents the state-level mortgage broker 
licensing indices in time period t; the vector Xit includes covariates mea-
suring the characteristics of each state, along with year time trends; 
μit is the error term; and α, β1, and β2 are the coeffi cients we estimate. 
Subprime loans originated were measured as the number of all origina-
tions in a state for a given year that were made by lenders on the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s list for that year (or 
for the most recent year available) of institutions whose mortgage activ-
ity is primarily in the subprime market.
The state fi xed-effects results estimated over 2001–2005 with the 
bonding/net worth requirements are presented in Table 3.6. The results 
show that the two-lag specifi cation of bonding requirements is associ-
ated with fewer loans originated. These estimates are consistent with 
those on employment. The results show that imposing bonding require-
ments correlates with fewer brokers and fewer subprime loans origi-
nated in the state. Quantitatively, the coeffi cients imply that a doubling 
of the mean bonding requirement to approximately $54,000 would be 
associated with a cut in the number of subprime loans originated by 
about 220,000 per year in 2004, or approximately 9 percent. 
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Table 3.6  Fixed-Effects Estimates of the Log of State Subprime Loan 
Originations
Constant (1) (2)
Summated regulatory index, lagged once 
(no net worth/bonding)
−0.023
(0.011)**
−0.020
(0.010)*
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged 
once/100,000
0.104
(0.253)
−0.321
(0.223)
Summated regulatory index, lagged twice 
(no net worth/bonding)
−0.002
(0.012)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged 
twice/100,000
−0.741
(0.219)***
Lag state unemployment rate −0.017 −0.014
(0.034) (0.035)
Lag state population/100,000 0.024 0.022
(0.010)** (0.010)**
Lag median state household income/100,000 0.622 0.511
(0.938) (0.965)
State homeownership percentage 0.050 0.049
(0.012)*** (0.012)***
Constant 4.661 4.823
(1.048)*** (1.076)***
Year dummy controls (2002–2005), base 2001 Y Y
Observations 254 254
Number of states (including DC) 51 51
R-squared 0.76 0.74
F-test for one- and two-period lags of 
summated index 
2.78* —
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/
net worth
6.91*** —
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical speci-
fi cations to see if the results are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * signifi cant 
at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Y = 
yes. — means no estimates were developed for these cells.
SOURCE: ACS data.
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If there are fewer loans with stricter licensing, does the quality of 
those loans, as measured by fewer negative outcomes such as foreclo-
sures, also vary with licensing requirements? If state licensing improves 
the quality of broker services, the effects might include more appro-
priate loan selection and more accurate loan underwriting, resulting in 
fewer foreclosures. Alternatively, foreclosures could be positively cor-
related with tighter licensing, perhaps because a reduced availability of 
brokers leads to less accurate underwriting or because states that have 
higher foreclosure rates for other reasons (e.g., low or volatile incomes) 
are more likely to enact tighter restrictions. To assess these possibilities, 
we estimate two versions of the following model with regard to owner-
occupied properties, one for only subprime mortgages and one for all 
mortgages:
(3.3) Home Foreclosuresit = α + β1Rit + β2Xit + μit ,
where Home Foreclosuresit is the percentage of mortgages (on owner-
occupied properties) in foreclosure for state i over period t (as measured 
in the National Delinquency Survey of the Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion, 1979–2005); Rit represents the state-level measures of mortgage 
broker bonding/net worth requirements in time period t; the vector Xit 
includes covariates measuring characteristics of each state, along with 
year time trends; μit is the error term; and α, β1, and β2 are the coeffi -
cients we estimate. 
As shown in Table 3.7 for the estimation period 1999 through 2004, 
there is a signifi cant positive relationship between bonding/net worth 
requirements and foreclosure rates for both subprime and all mortgages 
when state-level labor market and service market factors are also con-
trolled for. The estimates are consistent with the view, discussed above, 
that occupational regulation reduces the quality of an occupation’s 
output. However, the results do not clarify the mechanism by which 
mortgage broker bonding would lead to higher foreclosures. One could 
speculate that fewer brokers, which is the outcome of tougher regula-
tion, may reduce the “nudging” to maintain the serviceability of loans 
that brokers may have consummated (Thaler and Sunstein 2008).
Given the positive relationship between bonding and foreclosures 
that could arise because states enact bonding or net worth requirements 
in response to previous periods of high foreclosure, additional quality 
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safeguards are provided. As a check on this possibility, an estimated 
subsequent passage of a bonding or net worth requirement is developed. 
Table 3.8, which uses a Weibull hazard model with covariates similar 
to those in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, shows that the relationship is not statisti-
cally signifi cant, indicating an absence of this form of simultaneity bias. 
This statistical approach is used to measure the time to the adoption of 
the licensing bill based on the major socioeconomic characteristics in 
the state. 
One fi nal issue we address in this section is presented in Table 3.9, 
which shows the relationship of bonding/net worth requirements to 
homeownership. Using the same type of model as Table 3.7, we show 
estimates of the relationship of mortgage broker bonding/net worth 
requirements and homeownership. The fi ndings show that income is 
positively related to homeownership, but there is no statistically signifi -
cant relationship between the measures of regulation and homeowner-
ship. Although bonding may matter for the quantity and quality of sub-
prime mortgages, it does not seem to vary with the overall rate of state 
homeownership. It might refl ect the fact that mortgage originations are 
fl ow variables and hence can change more from year to year than a 
stock variable like homeownership.
FURTHER PROBING OF REGULATION AND FINANCIAL 
OUTCOMES FOR CONSUMERS
Brokers have short-term incentives to sell high-priced loans to 
consumers. The federal banking regulators track high-priced loans 
through the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data collection, 
which records most home mortgage applications and originations in the 
United States. The focus is on fi rst-lien mortgages in our analysis. A 
high-priced fi rst-lien mortgage is defi ned as one whose annual percent-
age rate (APR) is 3 or more percentage points above the contemporane-
ous 30-year Treasury bond yield. APR is defi ned essentially as an inter-
nal rate of return, taking into account initial fees and introductory rates 
and setting any index variables in the contract at current market values, 
assuming they remain constant for the scheduled maturity of the loan. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
subinfclose subinfclose allinfclose allinfclose
Summated reg. index, lagged once (no net worth/bonding) 0.022 0.004 0.016 0.021
(0.093) (0.078) (0.016) (0.014)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged once/100,000 1.357 3.186 0.217 0.540
(1.585) (1.245)** (0.280) (0.226)**
Summated reg. index, lagged twice (no net worth/bonding) −0.100 0.013
(0.104) (0.018)
Real net worth/bonding requirement, lagged twice/100,000 3.659 0.476
(1.598)** (0.283)*
Lag state unemployment rate 0.873 0.970 0.222 0.251
(0.224)*** (0.196)*** (0.040)*** (0.036)***
Lag state population/100,000 −0.005 −0.059 −0.032 −0.033
(0.069) (0.055) (0.012)*** (0.010)***
Lag median state household income/100,000 −5.080 −7.396 −1.560 −3.003
(6.709) (6.059) (1.187) (1.100)***
State homeownership percentage −0.292 −0.319 −0.057 −0.057
(0.087)*** (0.080)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)***
Constant 27.444 28.629 6.617 6.673
(7.197)*** (6.168)*** (1.273)*** (1.120)***
Year dummy controls (2000–2004), base 1999 Y Y Y Y
Observations 255 306 255 306
Number of states (including DC) 51 51 51 51
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NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifi cations to see if the results 
are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. 
Y = yes. — means no estimates were developed for these cells.
SOURCE: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data from FFIEC (2007); U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing, 
various years.
R-squared 0.66 0.63 0.42 0.43
F-test for one- and two-period lags of summated index 0.50 − 1.46 −
F-test for one- and two-period lags of bonding/net worth 5.51*** − 3.29** −
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72  Table 3.8  Hazard Model Estimates of Time to Adoption of a Net Worth or Bonding Bill, 1998–2005 (using a Weibull distribution of duration) 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. percentage of subprime loans in foreclosure, ’98–’00 0.17 0.15
(0.19) (0.26)
Avg. percentage of all loans in foreclosure, ’98–’00 0.53 0.98
(0.75) (1.25)
Avg. state unemployment rate, ’98–’00 0.186 0.185
(0.386) (0.390)
Avg. state population, ’98–’00/1,000,000 −0.030 −0.050
(0.062) (0.072)
Avg. state median household income, ’98–’00/1,000 −0.047 −0.042
(0.062) (0.064)
Avg. state homeownership percentage, ’98–’00 −0.005 0.003
(0.085) (0.089)
Constant −3.742 −2.029 −3.422 −2.858
(1.274)*** (7.921) (1.113)*** (8.308)
Observations 17 17 17 17
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) and columns (3) and (4) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical specifi cations to see if the results 
are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: HMDA data from FFIEC (2007); U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing, various years.
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If mortgage broker licensing succeeds in protecting consumers, 
high-priced loans may be reduced.15 There is a further assessment of 
the empirical relationship between mortgage broker regulation and the 
probability that a mortgage will be high-priced. For broker-originated 
loans the model assesses how broker regulation affects the chance that 
any mortgage, brokered or not, is high-priced. This also would be plau-
sible, since mortgage brokers compete strongly with other mortgage 
origination providers. However, looking at the entire mortgage market 
could weaken the model’s ability to detect the direct effects of mortgage 
broker regulation, so there is a preference to focus as closely as possible 
on broker-originated mortgages.
Focusing on brokered mortgages, however, presents a problem 
because the HMDA data do not indicate whether a mortgage was 
brokered. A couple of strategies can deal with the issue of this miss-
ing information. For federally regulated banks and thrifts, there is the 
potential to use the borrowers’ location (available at the census tract 
level from the HMDA data) to condition on whether the loan was made 
outside the lender’s Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) assessment 
area. Under the CRA, federally regulated banks and thrifts must declare 
an assessment area where the degree of services they provide will be 
evaluated for compliance with the CRA. Typically these areas include 
the lender’s principal retail offi ces, and lenders generally have fewer 
offi ces outside their assessment area. Federally regulated lenders are 
presumed to rely on their retail offi ces to originate the majority of their 
mortgages within their assessment areas but are presumed to rely much 
more on brokers to reach mortgage customers outside their assessment 
areas. Accordingly, for federally regulated banks and thrifts, the focus 
is on mortgages originated outside each reporting lender’s CRA assess-
ment area.16
For mortgage banks not subject to the CRA, there is a reliance on 
reports from industry publications and industry experts to identify a set 
of lenders known to rely almost exclusively on mortgage brokers for 
loan applications. For one lending company, Option One, in 2005, the 
year examined in this study, the fi rm obtained almost all of its mort-
gage applications through brokers. Thomas LaMalfa, formerly man-
aging director of Wholesale Access (2005), helped identify nine other 
“broker-dependent” mortgage originators in 2005: 1) Taylor, Bean, and 
Whitaker Mortgage Company; 2) First Magnus Financial Corporation; 
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3) American Mortgage Network; 4) Loan City; 5) Green Point Mort-
gage Funding; 6) Argent Mortgage Company; 7) New Century Mort-
gage Corporation; 8) Nova Star Home Mortgage; and 9) Résumé.17
In Table 3.10, an estimated linear probability model for whether 
a loan is high-priced, using four different data sets, is developed.18 
Observations are clustered by state to compute robust standard errors 
that allow for less than full independence among the observations in 
each state. This controls for the state regulatory environment, the bor-
rower’s income and racial/ethnic identity, the loan amount, and sev-
eral economic and demographic properties of the census tract where 
the property is located (the distribution of credit scores, unemployment 
rate, median age of applicants, median age of housing stock, percentage 
Table 3.9  Fixed-Effects Models of State Homeownership Percentage
(1) (2)
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged 
once/100,000
0.881
(1.154)
1.206
(0.943)
Real bonding/net worth requirement, lagged 
twice/100,000
0.582
(1.188)
Lag state unemployment rate −0.194 −0.191
(0.155) (0.155)
Lag state population/100,000 0.066 0.066
(0.043) (0.043)
Lag median state household income/100,000 10.896 11.029
(4.778)** (4.763)**
Constant 61.428 61.415
(3.004)*** (2.999)***
Year dummy controls (2000–2004), base 1999 Y Y
Observations 306 306
Number of states (including DC) 51 51
R2 0.26 0.26
F-test for one- and two-period lags of net 
worth/bonding requirements
0.94 —
NOTE: Columns (1) and (2) show sensitivity analyses using different statistical speci-
fi cations to see if the results are stable. Standard errors in parentheses. * signifi cant 
at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Y = 
yes. — means no estimates were developed for this cell.
SOURCE: HMDA data from FFIEC (2007); Census of Population, various years.
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of minority population, median income, and the percentage of owner-
occupied and vacant housing units).
For mortgage refi nancing, the results are fairly consistent. There is 
a clear difference in the size of the constant term, which is low for the 
CRA lenders outside their assessment areas (0.10) and higher for the 10 
broker-dependent lenders (0.38). The 2005 national average was 0.26 
for fi rst-lien refi nance mortgages. Although this gives a very different 
starting point to the two refi nancing regressions, the marginal effects 
of many of the explanatory variables are similar. The coeffi cients on 
the mortgage broker regulatory variables for 2004, which was the only 
year there were data for, are of primary interest here. In Table 3.10 
the coeffi cient on the bonding/net worth requirement is positive and 
signifi cant, indicating that a $100,000 increase in this requirement is 
associated with, respectively, a 5.4 or a 3.5 percentage-point increase in 
the probability that a refi nancing is high-priced in these two columns. 
The coeffi cient on the index of other mortgage broker regulations is not 
signifi cant in Table 3.10. 
The results for two other regulatory variables—an index of state 
antipredatory-lending laws and an indicator of states that prohibit defi -
ciency judgments—are also consistent across the refi nancing regres-
sions in Table 3.10. The coeffi cient on the index of antipredatory-
lending laws is negative but not signifi cant at the 0.10 percent level. The 
coeffi cient on the indicator of no defi ciency judgments is signifi cant but 
with an unexpected negative sign, suggesting that high-priced loans are 
less likely in states that do not allow creditors to pursue defi ciency judg-
ments. A possible explanation is that lenders ration credit more strictly 
in states that rule out defi ciency judgments but use risk-based pricing 
to lend to a wider selection of applicants where they have the right to 
pursue a defi ciency judgment.19
The coeffi cient on the percentage of adults in the census tract of 
the mortgaged property who have very low credit scores is consistently 
positive and signifi cant in Table 3.10. A 10-percentage-point increase in 
the percentage of adults in the tract with a very low score is associated 
with about a 5- to 6-percentage-point increase in the probability that a 
mortgage refi nance loan in that tract will be high-priced.20
African American, Hispanic, and female borrowers are signifi cantly 
more likely to get a high-priced mortgage refi nancing than are non-
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Table 3.10  Logarithmic Probability of a High-Priced Loan in a Cross 
Section of 10 Broker-Dependent Lenders’ Mortgages
Mortgage 
refi nance
Home-purchase 
mortgage
State broker bonding/net worth requirement 
($100,000)
 0.054
(0.021)**
 0.050
(0.028)*
Index of other state broker licensing 
requirements
 0.002
(0.003)
 0.002
(0.003)
Index of state antipredatory-lending laws −0.012  0.004
(0.008) (0.009)
State prohibition of defi ciency judgments 
(dummy variable)
−0.130
(0.029)***
−0.098
(0.027)***
Borrower's income ($1,000) −0.505 −0.280
(0.077)*** (0.068)***
Borrower's income squared ($1,000,000)  0.093  0.035
(0.020)*** (0.011)***
Adults in census tract with very low credit 
score (%)
 0.005
(0.001)***
 0.006
(0.001)***
African American borrower (dummy 
variable)
0.146 0.173
(0.018)*** (0.011)***
Asian American borrower (dummy variable) −0.060 −0.032
(0.019)*** (0.023) 
Hispanic borrower (dummy variable)  0.074  0.119
(0.013)*** (0.019) ***
Female borrower (dummy variable)  0.039  0.163
(0.006)*** (0.006)***
Constant  0.382  0.537
(0.073)*** (0.069)***
Number of state clusters for standard errors 
(DC included)
51 51
R2 0.095 0.107
N 273,365  185,773
NOTE: * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: HMDA data from FFIEC (2007); U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population 
and Housing, various years.
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Hispanic white male borrowers. The largest effect is for African Ameri-
can borrowers. For example, for mortgage refi nance loans by federally 
regulated banks and thrifts lending outside their CRA assessment areas, 
the probability of getting a high-priced loan increases by 21 percentage 
points for an African American borrower, compared with increases of 
9 percentage points for Hispanics and 4 percentage points for women. 
For other racial groups, we fi nd no signifi cant effects, except that Asian 
Americans refi nancing with the 10 broker-dependent lenders are about 
6 percentage points less likely to get a high-priced loan.
The results for the regulatory variables are not as strong or as con-
sistent with home-purchase mortgages as with mortgage refi nance 
loans. The bonding/net worth variable is positive and signifi cant at a 
0.10 level for the 10 broker-dependent lenders but has an insignifi cant 
and small negative coeffi cient for the CRA-regulated lenders on loans 
outside their assessment areas. The index of the remaining mortgage 
broker regulations is insignifi cant in the home-purchase regressions, 
as is the index of antipredatory-lending laws. The indicator of no-
defi ciency judgments is again negative and signifi cant for the broker-
dependent lenders, but it is now insignifi cant for the CRA-regulated 
lenders’ loans outside their assessment areas. Apparently, the process 
for making home-purchase loans differs in important ways from the 
process for making mortgage refi nance loans, at least at the CRA-
regulated institutions.21
 As Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2006) note, CRA-regulated lend-
ers’ mortgage underwriting appears to be quite different inside, com-
pared with outside, their assessment areas. The authors speculate that 
one explanation may be the use of differing marketing channels, includ-
ing greater use of brokers outside assessment areas. 
To limit the potential infl uence of unmeasured location-specifi c 
effects, a reestimation is developed with a sample restricted to only 
observations in MSAs that straddle state borders, similar to the methods 
in Holmes (1998) and Bostic et al. (2007). The data used were on 51 
MSAs that cross state boundaries, touching parts of 39 states.22 They 
estimate the same equations in Table 3.10 but with fi xed effects for each 
MSA, which has the advantage of controlling for location-specifi c fac-
tors not measured by the other variables, such as the percentage of loans 
with adjustable rates or the level or rate of change in housing prices 
(LaCour-Little 2007c). This is useful, in that the nature of interest-rate 
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data (a single cross section) precludes controlling for these factors by 
means of state fi xed effects, because they would be collinear with the 
state-level policy variables. 
For the data from the broker-dependent lenders, the results on the 
sample from multistate MSAs for the bonding variable (and most of the 
other variables) are similar to those in Table 3.10.23 In particular, for 
mortgage refi nancing loans by the broker-dependent lenders, the coef-
fi cient on the state broker bonding variable has a t-statistic of 2.05 and 
a coeffi cient of 0.048, compared with 0.054 in Table 3.10. For home-
purchase mortgages from the same lenders, the coeffi cient on the bond-
ing variable has a 1.96 t-statistic and a coeffi cient of 0.041, compared 
with 0.050 in Table 3.10. For home-purchase loans by CRA lenders 
outside their assessment areas, the coeffi cient on the bonding variable 
is −0.004 and insignifi cant for the multistate MSA sample with fi xed 
effects, very similar to the results in Table 3.10. 
Thus the results for Table 3.10, which uses data almost exclusively 
on broker-originated loans, are reasonably robust to location-specifi c 
effects not explicitly controlled for in the model. These results are 
also robust to the omission of data from the 12 states without multi-
state MSAs, including California. However, the same is not true of 
the results for mortgage refi nance loans by CRA lenders outside their 
assessment areas, which probably consist of a mixture of broker-
originated and other loans. The coeffi cient on the bonding variable for 
those loans becomes marginally insignifi cant when observations from 
the 12 states without border-crossing MSAs are dropped from the full 
sample or when they are estimated on the multistate MSA sample with-
out fi xed effects. With fi xed effects on the multistate MSA sample, the 
coeffi cient becomes clearly insignifi cant.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE POLITICS OF ENHANCING 
HIGHER BONDING REQUIREMENTS 
To examine the potential endogeneity or lack of a causal relationship 
of mortgage broker regulations, information was gathered on the legis-
lative history information from industry sources and regulators in eight 
states that have raised their bonding requirements at least once. Overall, 
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these conversations suggest a somewhat long and complicated chain of 
legislative causality. Successful efforts to raise bonding requirements 
tend to originate from the mortgage broker industry or from state regu-
lators, rather than directly from consumer groups. However, consumer 
advocacy and issues still can motivate the industry or give rise to regu-
latory proposals, and there are also some signs of grassroots industry 
opposition to proposals made by state mortgage broker associations. In 
addition, the gestation time between an initial legislative proposal and 
fi nal passage and implementation may go several years, so any market 
outcomes that initiated the legislative process may have changed by the 
time of implementation. Consumer issues seem to serve as the back-
ground from which industry and regulatory agency–initiated bonding 
requirements emerge, often during a multiyear process.
Of the nine increases we discussed, fi ve were described as fi rst pro-
posed or drafted by the state’s mortgage broker association (Ohio 1999, 
Texas 1999, North Carolina 2002, Idaho 2004, and Montana 2004), and 
four were described as initiated by the state regulatory authority (New 
Jersey 2001, Tennessee 2001, Ohio 2002, and Minnesota 2007). The 
distinction is somewhat blurred by the industry’s frequent practice of 
vetting its proposals with state regulators, which often yields at least 
technical drafting suggestions but sometimes yields more affi rmative 
legislative support from the regulator. No successful bonding proposal 
was said to have been opposed by state regulators. Sometimes earlier 
proposals that had not been vetted with the regulator had failed. As a 
result, regulators have been involved, actively or passively, in most of 
the successful bonding bills we examined.
The stated motivations of the industry and the regulators differed. 
Industry proposals were described as attempts to make the occupation 
more professional and to provide a degree of consumer protection by 
inhibiting some forms of fraud, thereby enhancing the occupation’s 
reputation. However, industry-supported increases to bonding require-
ments were sometimes motivated on narrow grounds (e.g., North Caro-
lina 2002), such as to ensure that consumers could be compensated if 
a broker absconded with the relatively small amount of cash the cus-
tomer had entrusted to the broker, but not to help the consumer col-
lect on larger judgments for less narrow forms of fraud or negligence. 
By contrast, proposals initiated by the regulatory authorities tended to 
have bonding requirements that were higher and broader in scope, with 
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the apparent intention of providing both more resources to compensate 
consumers and more incentives for appropriate broker behavior.
None of the sources (which did not include consumer groups) sug-
gested that the bonding requirement that passed had been either fi rst 
proposed or subsequently opposed by consumer advocates. However, 
the industry’s proposal in Texas was in part a response to a much higher 
bonding proposal previously introduced by a legislator on the grounds 
of consumer protection, and in at least two other cases (Ohio 1999, 
North Carolina 2002) the industry’s proposal was said to be motivated 
in part by competing regulatory proposals (not including bonding) from 
consumer groups. Opposition to the bonding bills that passed was said 
to be limited and mainly from legislators who were concerned that it 
might be onerous enough to hurt their constituents who were in the 
business. In some cases, this was thought to refl ect, in part, grassroots 
lobbying by mortgage brokers at odds with their own industry associa-
tion’s position.
CONCLUSIONS 
Mortgage brokers make up a relatively new occupation that has 
recently been regulated in the United States. About 40 years ago, there 
were almost no mortgage brokers, because individuals who wanted a 
loan to buy or refi nance a house went to a bank or savings and loan. 
With deregulation of fi nancial services and technology improvements 
that allow easy development and dissemination of credit scores, this 
picture began to change, and in 2004 as much as two-thirds of all hous-
ing fi nance was initiated through a mortgage broker. However, by 2009 
there had been a dramatic drop in the number of brokerage companies 
and brokers.
This chapter examines the relationships between state regulation 
of mortgage brokers, outcomes in the labor market, and outcomes for 
consumers of these services during the period of growth. The occu-
pation, although at an early stage of regulation, is much more regu-
lated than that of interior designers, the focus of Chapter 2. The fi nd-
ings show that the relationship between mortgage broker licensing and 
market outcomes differs among the types of licensing requirements; in 
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particular, fi nancial bonding or net worth requirements are associated 
with somewhat higher earnings, with modest reductions in the num-
ber of mortgage brokers and the number of subprime loans originated, 
and with somewhat higher foreclosure rates and higher interest rates on 
brokered loans. 
Much of the empirical analysis for this chapter ends in 2006, just 
as U.S. foreclosure rates on nonprime adjustable-rate mortgages began 
to surge. Financial markets reacted to the raft of foreclosures by raising 
the cost and cutting the availability of funding for both subprime and 
mortgage-broker-originated mortgages. State regulators have tightened 
regulations on mortgage contracts, mortgage origination, and mortgage 
broker licensing as well, and the Housing and Economic Recovery Act 
of 2008 brings federal oversight to mortgage broker licensing. Such a 
result would be consistent with the fi ndings of Law and Kim (2005), 
which show that during the early periods of occupational regulation 
in the United States, the monopoly impacts were modest. As in other 
occupations that have evolved with near-universal licensing in the 
states, mortgage brokers, having survived the Great Recession and the 
bust of the housing market, could also eventually benefi t through higher 
earnings and the ability to control both entry and quality. At this early 
stage of regulation, it is not surprising to fi nd only modest effects. This 
is perhaps similar to the case of unions, which have only modest effects 
on wages when they fi rst organize a fi rm, but in subsequent stages of 
negotiations may have larger effects on wage determination (Freeman 
and Kleiner 1990). In the case of occupational regulation, the initial 
stages of regulation may have modest effects, but over time may reach 
long-run estimates of about 15 percent (Kleiner and Krueger 2010). 
The next chapter examines the regulation of an occupation that is in the 
takeoff stage of regulation—the low-paying occupation and industry of 
early childhood education. 
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Notes
  1. I thank Richard Todd, vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
for his work on and assistance with this chapter. This chapter is based on and uses 
material from Kleiner and Todd (2007).
  2. Some states have recently moved to enact or more strictly enforce laws that make 
the broker an agent of the borrower, but this was not a factor during much of the 
period of the empirical part of the study.
  3. By 2006, the number of fi rms had changed little, but their share of originations 
was estimated to have declined to about 58 percent (Wholesale Access 2007). 
With the volume of subprime lending apparently having fallen signifi cantly in 
2007, mortgage broker numbers may decline further, as brokers had originated the 
majority of subprime mortgages and these types of loans have all but disappeared 
in the post-2008 crash period (Olson 2007).
  4. Some of the other components of mortgage broker regulation also are signifi cant 
in some of the specifi cations and may deserve further research, but here the focus 
is on the bonding and net worth requirements because they were more broadly and 
consistently signifi cant.
  5. For example, see Guttentag (2000); Engel and McCoy (2002); U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (2002); Woodward (2003); El Anshasy, 
Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005); Apgar, Bendimerad, and Essene (2007); 
Essene and Apgar (2007); Jackson and Burlingame (2007); and LaCour-Little 
(2007b). 
 6. The term “broker” is generally used to refer to a fi rm offering mortgage brokerage 
services, whereas the term “loan offi cer” is commonly used to refer to an employee 
of a mortgage broker who actually performs these services. We adopt this common 
usage, with certain exceptions, as for instance in note 7, where “broker” means 
the individual. Indeed, terminology in the industry is not uniform (HUD 2002) 
and can be confusing, not least because the actual roles of brokers, loan offi cers, 
lenders, and others are not rigidly bounded and distinctions often blur. For a wry 
but useful summary of the overlapping roles and confusing jargon in the mortgage 
origination business, see Tanta (2007).
 7. This potential is not limited to mortgage brokers, however. It extends to loan offi -
cers at mortgage lending banks when they are paid incentives based on the size 
and interest rate of the loans they originate.
  8. This index is from a Rasch-type model (Andrich 1988) that places each of the 
variables within a logical structure based on frequency of outcome and an integer 
scale. The empirical measure of the Rasch model we use is known as a partial 
credit model—a nonlinear model that assigns weights that are consistent with an 
implicit structure to the regulatory system. This approach assumes that the dis-
tance between parameters is equal and that the categories are equal integers. The 
development of the Rasch scale uses maximum likelihood estimation to calculate 
a unique index for each state. The estimates derived from using the Rasch index 
did not differ qualitatively from those of the nonlinear approach.
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  9. The anatomy of the regulatory system for brokers by state is generally consistent. 
Simple correlations among the individual items in our index were mostly positive, 
and a large number were statistically signifi cant. None of the negative correlations 
among the components of the index were statistically signifi cant.
 10. For background on the market for surety bonds in general and mortgage broker 
surety bonds in particular, see www.jwsuretybonds.com.
 11. Surety companies investigate the validity of claims before paying out. We are 
referring here to claims they consider valid.
 12. As a check on the results using the ACS, I also use the Occupational Employ-
ment Statistics (OES) wage survey, which has produced employment and wage 
estimates for over 800 occupations by state on a biennial basis from 1999 on. 
The OES also includes a category for loan offi cers and brokers. In both the ACS 
and OES, the data we use include mortgage loan offi cers and agents, collection 
analysts, loan servicing offi cers, and loan underwriters. These state OES fi gures 
are highly correlated (r = 0.81) with the National Mortgage Broker Association’s 
count of membership by state. Similar high correlations were found between 
National Mortgage Broker Association memberships and the ACS fi gures. The 
ACS fi gures are presented because of their ability to show additional individual- 
and state-level covariates to reduce omitted variable bias in the estimates.
 13. Estimates for hourly earnings showed generally similar results. We use total 
earnings in our estimates because of the variable nature of compensation for 
brokers that are commission-based. In addition, since many brokers are in small 
offi ces where profi ts are shared, the earnings variable will capture this form of 
compensation. 
 14. Estimates for changes in licensing and changes in wages also showed no sta-
tistically signifi cant impact. In none of the earnings or wage estimates were the 
licensing index variables signifi cant when we used state-level controls. We also 
estimated nonlinear models of the licensing variables, and they were also not sig-
nifi cant. Furthermore, tests using the OES found signifi cance for the licensing 
variables only when the Xit controls were omitted. The estimates are also available 
from the authors.
 15. Two separate studies, based on proprietary data from selected major lenders’ mort-
gages that originated in 2002, suggest that, on average, consumers using brokers 
did get lower-priced loans than other borrowers, when other factors were con-
trolled for. See El Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005) and LaCour-Little 
(2007a). Results to the contrary were found by LaCour-Little (2007b).
 16. HMDA data from CRA-regulated mortgage originators was used.
 17. Their respective HMDA respondent ID numbers are 7499100008, 7979400002, 
1788100000, 7428900001, 13-3210378, 1917700009, 7900200006, both 
1512400000 and 1707500002 for Nova Star, and 1991500005. To make the data 
more manageable, an estimated 50 percent random sample was developed.
 18. An estimated probit model for each of these regressions obtained very similar 
results.
 19. Karen Pence, assistant director of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System in Washington, D.C., raised this issue. 
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 20. In the full regression results underlying Tables 3.9 and 3.10, the coeffi cient on 
another credit score variable—the percentage of adults with a credit fi le who lack 
a credit score—is signifi cantly positive but smaller for the CRA-regulated lenders 
but not signifi cant for the 10 broker-dependent lenders.
 21. For the home-purchase mortgages examined in Table 3.10, the coeffi cients on the 
credit score and racial/ethnic variables have a pattern of statistical signifi cance not 
too different from that of the mortgage refi nance loans in Table 3.9, although the 
size of the coeffi cients often differs substantially. In results not shown but avail-
able from the author, we repeated the estimates in Table 3.10 for mortgages made 
within the CRA assessment areas of CRA-regulated lenders. None of the regula-
tory variables were statistically signifi cant except the coeffi cient on the indicator 
of no-defi ciency judgments, which was signifi cant and positive for home-purchase 
mortgages. The insignifi cance of the mortgage broker regulation variables in these 
regressions is consistent with our presumption that loans within a CRA assessment 
area are much less likely to involve a mortgage broker. We have no clear explana-
tion yet for why the results for the indicator of no-defi ciency judgments change.
 22. These states are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Geor-
gia, Idaho, Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
 23. The parallels are even closer if we estimate on just the split MSAs without fi xed 
effects.
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Occupational Regulation 
of Child Care Services
with Matthew Hendricks
University of Tulsa
Empirical research cannot tell us for sure how zealously the gov-
ernment should promote quality in child care or Head Start or 
pre-K programs, but it can draw our attention to quality variables 
that really matter. Strong empirical research, combined with clear 
values, can promote a more enlightened public debate on early 
child care and education. Already, it has helped us to distinguish 
between good and bad arguments and good and bad policies. 
—William Gormley (2007)
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of child care services presents a unique opportu-
nity to examine occupational regulation for a service that is provided 
in both the public and private sectors.1 Given the growing policy issue 
of the funding and effects of early childhood education on economic 
development, an empirical examination of the issue of government and 
regulation, as Gormley suggests in the chapter’s opening quotation, 
is an important way to enhance the ability of policymakers to judge 
the effi cacy of various policies (Grunewald and Rolnick 2006; Bartik 
2011). Furthermore, the way that child care centers have evolved in 
the United States has resulted in their serving both as small schools 
and as babysitting services for young children. The chapter presents 
an analysis of occupational regulation in a unique and growing sector 
of the U.S. economy, where licensing is fairly new and generally lax 
(Hotz and Xiao 2011). As with the other occupations that are examined 
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in this book, day care teachers, assistants, and administrators have seen 
an increase in state regulation over time. Given this institutional setting, 
the regulation of day care labor is at an early stage of regulatory evolu-
tion relative to most of the other occupations discussed in the book. 
As the rate of mothers’ labor market participation has increased 
over time, so has the number of children in regular nonparental care 
(Smolensky and Gootman 2003). Estimates from surveys conducted in 
the early 2000s suggest that 43 percent of children under age fi ve and 
53 percent of children between the ages of three and four are in some 
type of nonparental child care, the majority of which is provided by 
professional child-care providers (U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Increas-
ingly, nonparental child care is also recognized as an important context 
for children’s development, particularly for promoting school readi-
ness. Although nonparental care has become more popular, the vari-
ability in the quality of early education and care has become a concern 
to parents and policymakers. Prior analysis of the issue suggests that 
the quality of nonparental care is highly variable and that a substantial 
portion of children’s experiences is of questionable value to the child’s 
educational attainment (Helburn 1995; Kontos et al. 1995; Helburn and 
Howes 1996).
In contrast, several analytical research studies have shown that 
the skills, habits, and attitudes developed in early childhood can have 
important effects as children grow into adults. Parental care giving, 
including investments of time and money, has long been recognized as 
an important infl uence on children’s early human capital development 
(Becker 1991; Shonkoff and Phillips 2000). The impetus to regulate 
child care initially grew out of safety concerns for children and the view 
that many children receive poor quality of care, as measured by safety 
or the quality of learning (Phillips and Zigler 1987). Proponents argued 
that government licensure assures parents of a basic level of quality 
in the provision of child care. Moreover, it ensures greater monitoring 
and transparency in the provision of care and the quality of services 
provided. In addition, through both standards and enforcement actions, 
governmental regulation provides a system to enforce penalties in the 
event of poor quality care.
For child care providers and other regulated industries and occu-
pations, occupational licensing can reduce competition and thereby 
increase revenues for existing providers of the service or product. Qual-
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ity and access to high educational outcomes are of major importance 
to policymakers and legislators, as states consider several alternative 
initiatives to improve early education outcomes and child care quality 
of service. For example, Hotz and Xiao (2011) show that regulatory 
provisions for child care and early education facilities by states grew by 
more than 39 percent from 1983 to 1997, and the estimates derived for 
this chapter show the overall growth of regulation from 1983 to 2007 to 
be more than 40 percent. Although the breadth of coverage has grown, 
the intensity of coverage is still modest.
Despite this increase in regulation, analysis of relevant data on 
how regulation affects children and their families is limited. In order 
to examine these issues in more detail, this chapter addresses three 
important issues on child care regulation. First, a theory on the evo-
lution of the role of government regulation will show the potential 
for an increase in the educational outcomes of the regulated, but the 
potential also to possibly increase child care prices, thus pricing some 
families out of the formal center-based child care market. That result 
causes them to substitute informal care or to reduce maternal labor sup-
ply to the labor market. Second, if regulation reduces the number of 
individuals who can become workers in early childhood facilities, then 
wages will go up. Prior studies have found that stricter regulations both 
decrease the availability of center-based care and increase the price of 
such care. Third, the analysis in the chapter examines whether state 
child care regulations affect children’s school readiness as measured by 
preacademic score outcomes. Although prior research has investigated 
how child care regulations are related to health outcomes (Currie and 
Hotz 2004), the effects of regulation on children’s cognitive and early 
academic measures have not been analyzed in such detail.
In order to address the issues specifi ed above, the chapter is orga-
nized as follows. Initially, background information is provided on the 
regulatory environment for the preschool industry in the United States. 
Next, there is an explanation of the theoretical background and prior 
literature on the effect that government regulation has on both the qual-
ity of child care and the potential consequences for supply and demand. 
The section after that gives the empirical models used in the analysis. 
Next, an overview of the data and descriptive statistics is provided. The 
empirical analysis shows the effects of regulation on the wages of child 
care workers, child access to regulated forms of care, and fi nally the 
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infl uence of these regulations on childrens’ early academic achieve-
ment. The summary and conclusions section develops a discussion of 
the policy implications of the fi ndings.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND THE CHILD 
CARE INDUSTRY
As has been discussed earlier in this book, over the past 60 years, the 
United States has witnessed a major growth in the number of individu-
als who require occupational licensing from the government (Kleiner 
2006). By 2008, about 29 percent of the members of the U.S. work-
force indicated that they worked in an occupation licensed by either 
local, state, or federal governments (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). The 
three types of occupational regulation used by various levels of govern-
ment are licensure, certifi cation, or registration. Licensing is the most 
restrictive form of occupational regulation and the most frequently 
used. State-appointed boards generally have oversight on the licensing 
process, including setting entry and continuing practice standards to 
include education requirements and testing for entry, creating codes to 
govern behavior, and creating penalties for violations of the rules. Pro-
cedurally, licensing an occupation means an individual must pass the 
board’s requirements before practicing in the profession. Individuals 
who fail to meet the licensure requirements face fi nancial or criminal 
penalties if they try to practice the profession for pay. More specifi -
cally, entry requirements vary across occupations; common licensure 
requirements include formal education, experience, an entry test, good 
character, and a period of residency.
In general, the jurisdiction that regulates occupations is at the state 
level, which is also the case in the child care industry (Mocan 2001; 
Kleiner 2006). Every state regulates the child care industry to some 
degree, since child care establishments must obtain licensure to enter the 
market (Hotz and Xiao 2005). In 2005, nationwide, there were approxi-
mately 335,520 licensed child care providers. Of these, one-third were 
center-based and two-thirds were family-based providers (National 
Association for Regulatory Administration [NARA] and National Child 
Care Information and Technical Assistance Center [NCCIC] 2006). 
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State rules regarding the licensing of both center-based child care 
and family-based child care fall into two main categories: structural and 
safety. Structural regulations are those that mandate maximum child-
to-staff ratios, minimum experience/education requirements, ongoing 
education requirements, and maximum classroom size. The child ratios 
and classroom sizes vary, depending on the age of the children in the 
program. Safety regulations include stipulations regarding staff train-
ing in CPR/fi rst aid, immunizations, criminal background checks, and 
compliance with the provision of nutritional meals. In addition, some 
states have licensing rules and policies about the use of developmen-
tally appropriate activities. States also establish guidelines for monitor-
ing programs to ensure that they are complying with child care licens-
ing requirements.
A common and important distinction among child care providers 
is whether the program is center-based or family-based. Center-based 
programs are more academically oriented and generally refer to pro-
grams offered in a dedicated facility or nonhome environment (church, 
synagogue, community center, and so on). “Family-based” refers to 
programs offered in a caregiver's private residence for children related 
and unrelated to the caregiver (family-based care does not include 
informal care provided by a family’s relative). States regulate each of 
these types of child care differently. In addition, regulations may differ 
by the age of the children. For example, states often set lower child-to-
caregiver ratios for infants than for toddlers or for children age three to 
kindergarten.
OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF DAY CARE AND 
REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
The origins of day care are often traced to the welfare and reform 
movements of the nineteenth century. “Day care grew out of a welfare 
movement to care for immigrant and working class children while their 
. . . mothers worked,” write Scarr and Weinberg (1986, p. 1140). The 
early nurseries cared for children of working wives and of widows of 
merchant seamen. Settlement houses were especially active in promot-
ing day care for immigrant children. Jane Addams, the highly regarded 
Kleiner2013.indb   89 9/18/2013   10:10:47 AM
90   Kleiner and Hendricks
Chicago social worker and activist, developed nurseries for poor chil-
dren who needed supervision and care, note Scarr and Weinberg. Dur-
ing World War II, the federal government sponsored day care for more 
than 400,000 preschool children. The focus was the effort to increase 
female labor-force participation during the war. Following the war, the 
federal government stopped subsidizing preschool child-care facili-
ties and got out of both the regulation and the funding of preschools 
(Boschee and Jacobs 1997). 
When the federal government reduced its heavy involvement 
in day care, a number of fi rms established their own centers, which 
created a substantial benefi t for women with children. Firms such as 
Kaiser, Stride Rite, and Marriott established day care centers either on 
their property or with a subcontractor. In recent years, organizations 
such as the National Association of Child Care Resource and Referral 
Agencies and the National Association for Regulatory Administration 
have argued for more and tougher licensing requirements both for the 
facilities and for workers such as teachers and assistants, stating that 
licensing is the path toward higher-quality outcomes for children and 
toward quality assurance for their parents. The fi rst study that gathered 
data on licensing of facilities and their workers was developed by Kay 
Hollestelle, former executive director of the Children’s Foundation, in 
the early 1980s. The report documented the types of regulations that 
each of the states adopted and their coverage (NARA and NCCIC 
2010). Many states require child care centers, including those in private 
homes, to be licensed if they care for more than a few children (the 
number varies by state). In order to obtain their licenses, child care 
centers may require child care workers to pass a background check, get 
immunizations, and meet a minimum training requirement. 
CHILD CARE REGULATION AND CHILD CARE 
EDUCATION QUALITY
The stated goal of the regulators is that licensing of the child care 
market is an attempt by the state to ensure that the provision of child 
care guarantees the safety of children and meets a minimum quality 
standard. Analysts of child care outcomes distinguish between two types 
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of quality indicators: 1) process measures and 2) structural measures 
(Blau and Currie 2006). Process quality refers to children’s experiences 
in child care settings, including children's interactions with caregivers 
and peers, developmentally appropriate activities, and health and safety 
measures. Structural characteristics include the child-to-adult ratio, 
the size of each group of children, and the level of caregiver educa-
tion and training (Vandell and Wolfe 2002). Structural characteristics, 
which are most often the target of regulations, are thought to affect 
children’s development, primarily by shaping the quality of providers’ 
caregiving (National Institute of Child Health and Human Develop-
ment [NICHD] 2002). Developmental analysts found some evidence 
of linkages between child outcomes and the quality of care—both pro-
cess and structural—that children experience. Beginning in the 1960s, 
higher quality caregiving is associated with improved school readiness 
and better early academic skills (Shonkoff and Phillips 2000; Vandell 
and Wolfe 2002; Smolensky and Gootman 2003). 
The effect of state-level regulations on the level of quality in the 
regulated child care market remains uncertain, primarily because the 
few studies that have addressed this question face methodological chal-
lenges. Nevertheless, previous theory and evidence suggest that higher 
levels of state regulation are linked with higher process measures of qual-
ity care in regulated types of care, including family- and center-based 
care (see Chipty 1995; Hofferth and Chaplin 1998; Blau 2003; Heeb 
and Kilburn 2004; Raikes, Raikes, and Wilcox 2005; Rigby, Ryan, and 
Brooks-Gunn 2007). In particular, the work by Hotz and Xiao (2011) 
has found that stringent child-staff ratios have the effect of increasing 
the probability that providers who stay in the market will seek to obtain 
accreditation from the National Association for the Education of Young 
Children (NAEYC), since this is one of the requirements of that organi-
zation. This suggests that the given amount of regulation may indirectly 
cause child care centers to pursue accreditation, which may be one way 
in which regulation improves quality and signals to the market that it 
provides high-quality child care services. 
Although all of these factors may infl uence the effects of stricter 
regulation on child care quality, there remain two potential reasons 
why stricter regulation may not lead to improvements in structural or 
process quality. First, the link between the health and safety quality 
of care, children’s experiences, and measures of academic indicators 
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of quality (regulated or otherwise) may be modest. There is some evi-
dence that provider education and training is associated with child care 
outcomes (Burchinal, Howes, and Kontos 2002; Clarke-Stewart et al. 
2002; NICHD 2002). However, the magnitudes of estimated associa-
tions between structural and process measures of quality are small. 
Second, child care regulations may not be adequately implemented 
or enforced, which implies that the effects of regulation would be 
weaker than intended. For example, centers rarely lose their accredita-
tion or are fi ned, and teachers also infrequently lose their licenses. This 
suggests that in order to estimate the effects of stricter regulations, it is 
also necessary to examine the enforcement mechanism across states, 
which include fi nancial penalties and the number of monitors per state. 
Unfortunately, these data are not readily available, either nationally or 
on a state-by-state basis. 
THE POTENTIAL INFLUENCE OF CHILD CARE 
REGULATION ON PRICE, SUPPLY, AND DEMAND
This section develops the rationale for the role of regulation on the 
key economic factors in child care. The long-term trend of increasing 
participation by women in the labor force has been a key factor in the 
increasing number of children who are in nonparental child care or 
early education centers. A basic rationale for child care provisions sug-
gests that three factors work in concert to affect parents’ labor market 
and child care decisions: 1) availability, 2) price, and 3) quality (as per-
ceived by parents). If regulation is intended, in part, to produce a higher 
quality of child care for those who attend, then there is good reason 
to suspect that it will also affect the economics of child care, such as 
price, supply, and demand for those services. Moreover, within a family 
production function, if the inheritance and passing along of skills and 
education to a new generation is viewed as positive, then early child-
hood education and skill development would be perceived as a normal 
good that would increase as the income of the household grew.
Stricter regulations might increase the perceived quality of regu-
lated care because the downside risks of care are reduced, and with 
this risk reduction, the demand for nonparental care is increased. For 
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example, some advocates of regulation suggest that the establishment 
of minimum quality standard regulations sends a signal to parents that 
providers are guaranteed to meet basic requirements (Akerloff 1970). 
This quality signal can, in turn, stimulate demand because it reduces 
parents’ uncertainty or unease about their children’s experiences in non-
parental child care. 
Similarly, increased regulation may reduce the supply of formal 
care arrangements. For example, by increasing the minimum education 
required for a care provider and decreasing the child-to-staff ratio in 
care facilities, the government could decrease the number of eligible 
care providers willing to work for a given wage. Hotz and Xiao (2011), 
for example, fi nd that regulation of center-based child care reduces 
the supply of child care centers, by increasing the costs of provid-
ing care and thereby outweighing the demand effects. Their analysis 
makes a distinction between regulations related to child-to-staff ratios 
and minimum education requirements. The child-to-staff ratio require-
ments deterred provider entry and reduced supply. Minimum education 
requirement regulations did not deter entry, but they did reduce profi ts 
and ultimately the supply of child care providers. Though important, 
these economic effects did not address wage effects, access, or the 
infl uence of regulation on child educational outcomes. 
 In each case, increased demand or decreased supply would suggest 
that the price of formal care arrangements will increase. As a result, not 
all consumers benefi t from any quality-enhancing effects of regulation. 
Some consumers will, in the absence of a subsidy, be priced out of 
the market for child care and be forced to substitute another arrange-
ment, often choosing either parental care, unregulated informal care, 
or family-based monitoring of children. This potential price increase is 
likely to have the greatest impact on some of the most at-risk children, 
since children from low-income families are most likely to be priced 
out of regulated child care markets. This may result in children from 
lower-income categories starting school behind other children. In child 
care, as in most forms of licensing, there is usually a trade-off between 
access and quality.
The empirical analysis of regulation has consistently found a sig-
nifi cant relationship between regulations, price, and demand for day 
care (Lowenberg and Tinnin 1992; Hotz and Kilburn 1994; Hofferth 
and Chaplin 1998; Heeb and Kilburn 2004). These fi ndings show that 
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regulation of an input, especially a costly one such as labor in pro-
ducing child care, will restrict the supply of these services. Combining 
this supply restriction with potentially increased demand for regulated 
care is associated with an increase in the price of a good or service. 
The analysis of the topic suggests that lower-income individuals lose in 
quantity but that higher-income consumers gain both in the number of 
providers of the service and in the quality of the service (Shapiro 1986; 
Hotz and Xiao 2011). 
The choice of the type of day care facility that parents select has 
been infl uenced by government regulation. Several studies have focused 
on a family’s choice of the mode of child care (Hotz and Kilburn 1994; 
Hofferth and Chaplin 1998; Currie and Hotz 2004; Heeb and Kilburn 
2004). In particular, Currie and Hotz examine the effect of regulation 
on the probability that a child will be enrolled in regulated modes of 
child care (center- or family-based care). They fi nd that families are 
less likely to enroll their children in center-based care as regulations 
and prices rise. Their results suggest that, as regulations increase, fami-
lies substitute away from formal care arrangements (family- and center-
based) into informal child care arrangements (parental care or relative 
monitoring of children). The empirical models of enrollment effects 
closely follow those of Currie and Hotz. However, these analysts 
employ a relatively small sample in their estimation, which prevents the 
inclusion of techniques such as state fi xed effects in their specifi cations. 
Several of the approaches presented in this chapter improve on the Cur-
rie and Hotz specifi cations by including state and year fi xed effects in 
a larger sample. The models also include a rich set of individual-level 
controls offered by the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study (ECLS) 
and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) surveys. 
Prior research on state regulations and the child care and early 
education markets has established that stringent child care regulations 
affecting labor costs have the effect of restricting the supply of child 
care in the regulated sector. In addition, the reduction of supply can 
lead to a higher price for child care and early education in the reg-
ulated sector as parents and guardians bid for fewer child care slots. 
This development would disproportionally disadvantage children from 
lower-income households that cannot obtain need-based subsidies. 
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EARLY 
CHILDHOOD REGULATION
Analytical studies have been slow to consider the associations 
between state or local regulation of early child care and education and 
children’s early academic skills. If, as suggested by prior research, 
stricter regulation improves child care quality, then we would expect 
that such regulation will also improve children’s early academic skills, 
at least in the short run (Anderson 2008). In particular, intuition sug-
gests that stricter structural quality–related regulations such as those 
related to staff training, adult-to-child ratios, and class size would have 
a positive infl uence on academic achievement. Yet there is a possibility 
that regulation will increase child care prices, thereby reducing access 
to formal care arrangements, particularly for lower-income families 
who do not have subsidies for child care such as offered through Head 
Start or other government programs. This could potentially lead parents 
to choose unregulated child care arrangements (or none at all), which 
suggests that any possible benefi ts accruing to those enrolled in more 
highly regulated care may be offset by these unintended negative con-
sequences of regulation. The analysis that follows will measure these 
potential effects of regulation for early childhood services. Specifi cally, 
the intent of the remainder of the chapter is to examine the following set 
of issues: First, can occupational licensing and other regulations raise 
the wages of child care workers? Second, to what extent do regulations 
infl uence the likelihood of children enrolling in a center-based day care 
facility? Third, to what extent does more regulation cause an increase in 
early child academic achievement for those children attending a formal 
day care facility? 
Several data sources are used to estimate the infl uence of regulation 
on wages, enrollment, and educational attainment. These data sources 
include the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study’s kindergarten and 
birth cohorts (ECLS-K and ECLS-B), the National Longitudinal Sur-
vey of Youth (NLSY), the American Community Survey (ACS), and a 
detailed database of child care regulations for all 50 states from 1983 
to 2007. The following section provides a description of the relevant 
variables in each of these data sets.
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CHILD CARE REGULATIONS 
The child care regulation database was originally compiled by Hotz 
and Kilburn (1994) for the years 1983–2000. The regulation database 
provides key information on the nature of the state regulatory environ-
ment under which family-based and center-based child care facilities 
operated over the period. The database was updated from 2000 to 2007. 
It provides a wide variety of information regarding state requirements 
for child care facilities. For example, it indicates which states require 
child development programs, the training and minimum education level 
necessary for directors of child care facilities as well as for instructors 
and their assistants, the required child-to-teacher ratio, and the physi-
cal requirements of the facilities (e.g., building size and playground 
requirements). 
The regulation data include state-level child care regulation indices 
to quantify the degree and intensity of regulation by state for center-
based and family-based child care. Eight summated indices were cre-
ated that summarize the strength of a state’s requirements in separate 
categories. They include an overall index, as well as indices for devel-
opment of children, staff requirements, education within the center, the 
environment of the facility, the ratio of children to staff, health issues, 
and oversight and monitoring of the facility. The components of each 
of these indices are listed in Appendix Tables A.1 and A.2. The overall 
summated index captures the overall intensity of state regulations by 
adding up all of the regulations that apply to child care providers. The 
other indices covering various categories include these seven: 
 1)  The development index sums those regulations that are in-
tended to encourage child development. These variables 
include measures of experience and training of the staff, the 
ratio of children to staff members in the facility, and whether 
the state requires a child development program. 
 2) The staff index sums any regulations that stipulate requirements 
of the staff at child care providers. These regulations include 
education, experience, age, and training requirements, as well 
as criminal background checks and fi rst aid certifi cation. 
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 3)  The education index measures the strength of a state’s regula-
tions related to the minimum education requirements for the 
staff, including their assistants. 
 4)  The environment index attempts to capture the strength of a 
state’s regulations regarding the physical environment of the 
care facility. These regulations include the amount of indoor 
and outdoor space required. 
 5)  The ratio index captures the strength of a state’s regulations 
related to child-to-staff ratios for a provider. 
 6)  The health and safety index measures the strength of a state’s 
regulations related to the health and safety of children. The 
components of this index include requirements for immuni-
zation, health evaluations, policies regarding sick children, 
fi rst aid training requirements for the staff, and criminal back-
ground checks. 
 7)  Finally, the oversight index measures a state’s ability to pro-
vide oversight or enforce its regulatory provisions. Included in 
the index are variables such as whether the state can impose 
fi nes, whether parents have free access to the facility, and 
whether the state has the ability to revoke a license. Unfortu-
nately, enforcement data were not available in the data sets that 
were used for the analysis. 
Measured by the overall summated index, the strength of state reg-
ulation of child care facilities has steadily increased over the period 
1983–2007. Figure 4.1 displays a box-and-whisker plot for each year of 
the summated index for center-based (Panel A) and family-based (Panel 
B) care. The fi gure is a visualization of the mean (over states) and stan-
dard deviation of the summated ratings over time. The fi gure shows an 
increase in the mean number of state regulations facing child care pro-
viders over the years 1983–2007. The declining range of the whiskers 
in the plot also indicates that the variance among states in the strength 
of regulation has steadily decreased over time. Figure 4.1 also suggests 
that state regulation of child care has become stronger on average and 
is becoming less variable across states.
Although there is considerable variation in the level of regulation 
across time, as shown in Figure 4.1, there is also variation across states. 
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Figure 4.1  Box-and-Whisker Graph Showing the Growth and Variation 
of Child Care Regulations by State over Time
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SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011); authors’ compilation of data from 2000 to 2007.
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Table 4.1 shows variation in the overall summated child care regulation 
index across all states in 2007. For example, in 2007 the most highly 
regulated state for center-based care (Rhode Island) had a score of 40 
in the overall summated rating index, whereas the least regulated state 
(Idaho) had a score of only 6. Table 4.1 also depicts considerable varia-
tion of state regulations within a particular state over time. For instance, 
from 1983 to 2007, Mississippi increased its overall regulation score 
for center-based care by 24 points and for family-based care by 14 
points; these values were among the largest increases in these scores. 
The empirical analysis that follows exploits this variation in regulation, 
in general and along specifi c dimensions, within states over time and 
across states to estimate the infl uence of regulation on wage determina-
tion, access, and child care outcomes.
LABOR MARKET DATA
This section provides an explanation of the data used to examine 
the labor market effects of regulation of child care workers. The Ameri-
can Community Survey (ACS) provides annual information on wage, 
education level, race, age, geography, and work experience for a nation-
ally representative sample of child care workers and preschool teachers 
from the “child day care services” industry classifi cation for the years 
2000–2007. The data are used to estimate the infl uence of regulation on 
the hourly wages of child care workers, while holding constant other 
individual characteristics that are related to wages. The ACS provides 
a large sample of preschool teachers and day care workers with which 
to analyze the wage effects of state child care regulations. In each year, 
the ACS has more than 2,000 observations, and in the later years of 
the survey there are a minimum of 16,000 observations. The ACS pro-
vides the standard control variables found in analyzing census data that 
can be used in estimating wage equations such as race, education level, 
and years of experience. Table 4.2 shows the summary statistics in the 
ACS sample covariates used in the estimation of the models that are 
presented later in the chapter. The table provides information for all 
preschool workers, child care workers, and preschool teachers. 
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Overall center-based Overall family-based
State 1983 2007 1983 2007
Alabama 25 22
Alaska 10 23 11 24
Arizona 7
Arkansas 16 25 14 23
California 21
Colorado 24 31 25
Connecticut 9 21
Delaware 25 19
District of Columbia 39 27
Florida 9 17
Georgia 15 22 12 16
Hawaii 22 21
Idaho 3 6 4 5
Illinois 28 35 17
Indiana 25 33 4 18
Iowa 23 15
Kansas 24
Kentucky 9 27 11 20
Louisiana
Maine 35
Maryland 34
Massachusetts 39 24
Michigan 16 14
Minnesota 32 36 27
Mississippi 5 29 10 24
Missouri 21 25 14 18
Montana 26 25
Nebraska 25 27 12 20
Nevada 15 14 21
New Hampshire 25 26 19 24
New Jersey 20 0
New Mexico 16 13
New York 28 36 16 37
North Carolina 32 11 25
Table 4.1  State Levels and Changes in Child Care Regulations, 
1983–2007
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Measures of Child Care Outcomes
The ECLS-K provides information on child outcomes and child 
care arrangements and consists of a cross-sectional data set of over 
20,000 children and their parents in all 50 states from the kindergarten 
class of 1998–1999. This chapter uses the restricted confi dential version 
of the ECLS-K, which provides information on child care arrangements 
and the state in which the children live, as well as individual academic 
skill assessments (reading and math skills). It also provides extensive 
background information on the children’s parents, including education 
level, employment status, income level, marital status, race, and further 
details of the socioeconomic characteristics of the children and their 
families. Although the data are rich in covariates, they have few obser-
vations for many of the smaller states, making the analysis generally 
applicable only to larger states. 
Overall center-based Overall family-based
State 1983 2007 1983 2007
North Dakota 10 32 8 19
Ohio 13 27 25 24
Oklahoma 18 26 23
Oregon 21 30 22
Pennsylvania 24 34 12 20
Rhode Island 40
South Carolina 6 2
South Dakota
Tennessee 17 29 12
Texas 24 10
Utah 22 32 24
Vermont 19 10 23
Virginia 16 9 18
Washington 21 14
West Virginia 20 20
Wisconsin 35 17
Wyoming 21
Table 4.1  (continued)
NOTE: Blank = data not available.
SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011); authors’ compilation.
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Information on child academic achievement is particularly impor-
tant as an outcome variable of the infl uence of occupational regula-
tion. The ECLS-K provides general knowledge, math, and reading skill 
assessment scores for all children. These scores were collected in the fall 
of the children’s kindergarten year and should refl ect their experiences 
prior to school entry. In mathematics, children are tested on their ability 
to identify one-digit numbers, recognize geometric shapes, count, read 
two-digit numerals, recognize sequences, solve simple addition and 
subtraction problems, and additional questions on cognitive ability. The 
reading test consists of measuring the child’s ability to identify upper- 
and lowercase letters, associate letters with sounds, recognize common 
words, and read words in context. In each case, the child’s overall skill 
in each test is given as an item response theory (IRT) skill score, which 
measures their overall aptitude in reading and math skills. These IRT 
scores are then standardized across children and are the key dependent 
variables in our empirical models measuring the effect of regulation on 
academic achievement.
In the analysis, a match was made with children’s type of child care 
along with the appropriate level of state regulation. The goal was to 
classify children by the type of care they received in the year prior to 
entering kindergarten. Information was used from the parent survey to 
categorize the type of care a child received in the year prior to kin-
dergarten as follows: center-based care (including preschool, day care, 
and prekindergarten, but excluding Head Start), family-based care 
(nonrelative care provided outside the child’s home), nonrelative care 
(nonrelative care in the child’s home), and relative care. Because infor-
mation was also collected on how many hours of each type of care 
children typically received, the analysis is able to construct variables 
that capture whether children receive any of each type of care as well 
as designate one type of care as the primary care arrangement (i.e., the 
care category in which children spend the largest number of hours). In 
order to match our state regulation data with the children included in 
the ECLS-K, we match those children that attended center-based care 
with the center-based state regulation variables in 1997 (the year before 
the children entered kindergarten). Similarly, a match was obtained for 
those children that attended family-based care (nonrelative care outside 
of the home) with state-level family-based regulation variables in 1997. 
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Table 4.2  Summary Statistics: American Community Survey (ACS) for 
All Preschool Workers, Child Care Workers, and Teachers
All
Variable Mean sd Min. Max.
years of education 13.05 2.30 0 20
potential experience (age – educ – 6) 19.60 14.44 0 78
potential experience squared 592.78 711.11 0 6,084
female 0.97 0.18 0 1
married 0.57 0.49 0 1
race—white 0.77 0.42 0 1
race—black 0.14 0.35 0 1
N = 64,914
Child care workers
Variable Mean sd Min. Max.
years of education 12.57 2.29 0 20
potential experience (age − educ − 6) 20.07 15.15 0 78
potential experience squared 632.43 760.46 0 6,084
female 0.96 0.19 0 1
married 0.55 0.50 0 1
race—white 0.76 0.43 0 1
race—black 0.14 0.35 0 1
N = 45,054
Preschool teachers
Variable Mean sd Min. Max.
years of education 14.14 1.93 0 20
potential experience (age − educ − 6) 18.52 12.64 0 74
potential experience squared 502.81 573.83 0 5,476
female 0.98 0.14 0 1
married 0.63 0.48 0 1
race—white 0.79 0.41 0 1
race—black 0.14 0.34 0 1
N = 19,860
NOTE: Models include full set of year and state dummies. The value for potential expe-
rience is derived from the person’s age minus that person’s years of education minus 
six (the age of fi rst enrollment in school).
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS).
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An additional source of data for the study is the ECLS-B, a nation-
ally representative birth cohort of 14,000 children born in 2001. This 
longitudinal study follows children from birth until kindergarten and 
includes both parent interviews and direct child assessments. For the 
ECLS-B, information was collected when the children were approxi-
mately nine months old (2001–2002), two years old (2003), four years 
old (2005–2006), and at kindergarten age (2006–2007 and 2007–2008). 
The kindergarten 2006–2007 round of the ECLS-B provides child 
achievement assessments that are compatible with the ECLS-K kinder-
garten test scores. The preschool round of the ECLS-B contains reading 
and math test scores for children that are nearly the same age as those 
in the ECLS-K. The reading and math assessments are similar in each 
data source. 
The ECLS-B data also provide detailed information about child care 
experiences, information on the child’s state of residence, primary child 
care arrangement throughout the child’s fi rst fi ve years, including in the 
year before kindergarten, and family background. The observations in 
the data include information (up to four years of age) regarding chil-
dren’s primary child care arrangements in a way similar to the ECLS-K, 
distinguishing between center-based care, family-based care, Head 
Start, and relative care. Also, similar to the ECLS-K, the ECLS-B has 
a large amount of information that measures or proxies for infl uential 
family processes such as income, mother’s education level, poverty sta-
tus, the number of children in the household, and the family structure. 
The empirical analysis combines the ECLS-K and ECLS-B data so 
that there is a repeated cross section across states. This allows an esti-
mate of the empirical models using various sensitivity approaches. The 
ECLS-K provides a sample of children across all 50 states who attended 
child care in the year 1997, and the ECLS-B provides a sample of chil-
dren attending child care in 2005. Each provides information on the 
child’s primary child care arrangement in the year before kindergarten, 
the child’s reading and math aptitude measured in kindergarten, and the 
child’s individual and family characteristics. 
Table 4.3 shows summary statistics of key variables for the analysis 
by survey type: the ECLS-K or the ECLS-B. The table suggests that the 
individuals, including the children, in the ECLS-K have comparable 
average characteristics with the children in the ECLS-B sample. How-
ever, a slightly higher proportion of children in the ECLS-B belong to 
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ECLS-K ECLS-B
Variable Mean sd Mean sd
standardized reading score fall of 
kindergarten
0.04 1.01 0.03 1.00
standardized math score fall of  
kindergarten
0.09 1.00 0.03 1.00
childcare = center care 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.50
childcare = family-based care 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.23
childcare = head start 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.34
childcare = nonrelative care 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13
childcare = relative care 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33
childcare = parental care 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.38
child age KF (months old)a 68.49 4.29 65.13 3.75
reside in city 0.41 0.49 0.30 0.46
reside in suburb 0.37 0.48 0.42 0.49
reside in town 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33
boy 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50
race is white 0.61 0.49 0.41 0.49
race is black 0.16 0.36 0.15 0.36
race is Hispanic 0.14 0.34 0.21 0.40
race is Asian 0.05 0.21 0.13 0.33
mother works part-time 0.22 0.42 0.19 0.39
mother works full-time 0.47 0.50 0.42 0.49
number of children in household 2.44 1.11 2.52 1.17
family structure: step 0.08 0.28 0.05 0.22
family structure: single parent 0.21 0.40 0.19 0.39
family structure: adoptive or other 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13
household below poverty threshold 0.16 0.36 0.23 0.42
speak English at home 0.92 0.27 0.78 0.42
mother’s education: high school 
diploma
0.30 0.46 0.25 0.43
mother’s education: voc. degree or 
some college
0.34 0.47 0.30 0.46
mother’s education: bachelor’s degree 0.19 0.39 0.20 0.40
mother’s education: advanced degree 0.07 0.25 0.12 0.32
very low birth weight (less than 3.125 
lb.)
0.01 0.10 0.09 0.28
Table 4.3  Summary Statistics from the ECLS-K and ECLS-B Surveys
(continued)
Kleiner2013.indb   105 9/18/2013   10:10:52 AM
106   Kleiner and Hendricks
a racial minority, and children in the ECLS-B are more likely to have 
a low birth weight. The age of children (listed as 68.5 in the ECLS-K 
and 65.1 in the ECLS-B) is in months. Given the youth of the children 
in the samples these differences may matter more than would be caught 
with just a listing by their age in round years. Beside those differences, 
the children in the ECLS-K and ECLS-B come from families with simi-
lar structure and socioeconomic status, are about the same age at the 
time of math and reading testing, and have similar levels of child care 
arrangements. 
A Further Measure of Child Outcomes: National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY)
The NLSY 1979 Maternal and Child Supplement is a panel of chil-
dren born to mothers who were between the ages of 14 and 21 in 1979. 
ECLS-K ECLS-B
Variable Mean sd Mean sd
low birth weight (between 3.125 lb. 
and 5.5 lb.)
0.06 0.25 0.15 0.36
hhincome = $5,001 to $10,000 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20
hhincome = $10,001 to $15,000 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
hhincome = $15,001 to $20,000 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
hhincome = $20,001 to $25,000 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27
hhincome = $25,001 to $30,000 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.25
hhincome = $30,001 to $35,000 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23
hhincome = $35,001 to $40,000 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.23
hhincome = $40,001 to $50,000 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28
hhincome = $50,001 to $75,000 0.20 0.40 0.16 0.37
hhincome = $75,001 to $100,000 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34
hhincome = $100,001 to $200,000 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.34
hhincome = $200,001 or more 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.19
Table 4.3  (continued)
NOTE: Sample sizes limited to complete observations: ECLS-K survey, N = 13,679; 
ECLS-B survey, N = 5,534.
a child age KF (months old) means the child’s age in months at the start of the fall 
semester of kindergarten.
SOURCE: Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Cohort (ECLS-K); Early 
Childhood Longitudinal Study, Birth Cohort (ECLS-B).
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Starting in 1986 and continuing on a biennial basis, direct child assess-
ments were conducted for all children born to women in the original 
NLSY sample. Children born early in the study had comparatively 
young and disadvantaged mothers. However, by the 1990s, the data 
were far more representative. Although not nationally representative, 
the data are national in scope and remain one of few such data sets that 
have repeated panel data with school readiness assessments for young 
children. For this part of our analysis, a selection was made of all cohorts 
of children who were between ages three and four between 1986 and 
2004. This is important because it eliminates children born to the young-
est mothers from the analysis (these children were older than four when 
fi rst observed in 1986). Moreover, because the mother’s age at birth is 
known, this variable can be controlled for in the analysis. To further test 
the sensitivity of the results, given the large sample size, one can also 
remove young mothers or earlier cohorts of children from the analysis. 
The analysis indicates the NLSY provides about 5,300 complete-
record observations of children at ages three through six. In this data set, 
and with the others that focus on educational outcomes, the data that are 
available suggest that there are suffi cient observations for large states, 
but little can be said about educational attainment in smaller states. 
Permission was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to work 
with the restricted-use geocode version of these data. The restricted-use 
NLSY provides much of the same information as the ECLS-K: state 
residence, information on child-care arrangements, child cognitive 
and academic skill assessments (standardized assessment of receptive 
vocabulary and academic skills), and parental and household character-
istics. Information on care arrangements is available for all children for 
the fi rst three years of life (collected prospectively and retrospectively, 
depending on the specifi c year of the survey). Mothers were asked 
about up to three arrangements for each child, and the data have been 
coded so that one can distinguish between center-based care, family-
based care (nonrelative care in others’ homes), and other nonrelative 
or relative care. As with the ECLS-K, the data allow a determination 
of whether children regularly experienced any of these types of care, as 
well as the type of care that was considered the primary care arrange-
ment at age three.
For children’s achievement, the NLSY provides measures of the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), measured at age three or 
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four, which assesses children’s receptive vocabulary, and the Pea-
body Individual Achievement Test (PIAT), a widely used reading rec-
ognition and math assessment, measured at age fi ve or six. Although 
these are different measures of achievement from the ECLS-K or the 
ECLS-B, they provide another outcome variable in order to test the role 
that state regulation has in children’s academic achievement. Similar 
to the ECLS data, the NLSY has a wide variety of child and family 
information that can be employed as covariates. In particular, it has 
extensive demographic information as well as measures of the child’s 
temperament, the mother’s health behaviors, the quality of the home 
environment, and behavioral attitudes.
INFLUENCE OF REGULATION ON 
WAGE DETERMINATION 
As noted earlier, government regulation of child care may infl uence 
the price of child care both by increasing the demand for the regulated 
service and by reducing supply. On the demand side, theory suggests 
that certain regulations, given that they increase the quality of care pro-
vided, could increase demand for formal care because its quality has 
risen. On the supply side, increased regulation may have a direct impact 
on the provider’s costs. 
Two examples of how regulation can infl uence provider costs are 
by 1) requiring providers to hire more highly educated workers or by 
2) requiring providers to maintain a higher staff-to-child ratio. Either 
of these regulations may increase the wages of child care workers in 
a state. For example, if a state requires providers to hire workers with 
a college education, wages will tend to increase if the provider would 
have otherwise hired workers with less education. Similarly, if the state 
ratio requirement forces providers to hire more staff than they would 
have otherwise, assuming workers have limited mobility, the ratio 
requirement will tend to raise the wages of child care workers in the 
state. 
In this section of the chapter, an empirical specifi cation is devel-
oped to test for a relationship between state regulation and the wages of 
child care providers. If state regulation tends to increase wages, regula-
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tion may have a direct infl uence on the supply of regulated child care. 
If regulation increases wages, then the quantity of child care supplied to 
the market will be lower for a given price per child. Consequently, rais-
ing wages and prices reduces the number of children in day care, all else 
being equal. Without subsidies to low-income families, their children 
will be shifted to either parental or other family care. 
Analyzing these relationships suggests that we estimate the follow-
ing log-wage model, which provides an estimate of the determinants of 
wages for individual child care workers:
(4.1)  ln(wageist) = δzst + xitβ + ws + vt + εist .
In Equation (4.1), wageist is the wage of child care worker i in state 
s at time t, xit  is a vector containing observable individual-level vari-
ables that infl uence wages, ws and vt are state and time fi xed effects, 
respectively, and εist represents individual-level unobservables that 
infl uence the wages of workers. Finally, the key explanatory variable 
in this model is zst , which represents the strength of regulation of care 
in state s during year t. In the models, zst is restricted to regulations 
(either indexed or measured individually) that are related to staff-to-
child ratios and education requirements. In this model, δ represents an 
estimate of the causal effect of stricter education and ratio requirements 
on the wages of child care workers.
The next section examines whether these regulations would provide 
benefi ts to children through enhanced academic performance. 
REGULATION AND ENROLLMENT IN 
PRESCHOOL PROGRAMS
As noted earlier, more stringent state regulation of formal child care 
arrangements may increase the price of care. Moreover, stricter regula-
tion may increase demand for formal care because the perceived and 
actual quality may increase, and stricter regulation may decrease supply 
because the increased standards would reduce the number of openings 
and workers in the industry. More specifi cally, stricter regulation may 
reduce the number of children attending formal care arrangements and 
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increase its price if regulation increases provider costs without fueling 
greater demand. 
In contrast, if greater regulation increases the demand for center-
based care by increasing the quality of preschools, while having a rela-
tively small infl uence on the cost of providing formal care, then regula-
tion could have a net effect of increasing child enrollment in formal care 
arrangements. Regulations that are binding and affect the provider’s 
costs of operation are expected to have an infl uence on enrollment in 
formal care arrangements. The expectation is that stricter government 
limitations on child-to-staff ratios, higher minimum education require-
ments, limitations on the size of the establishment, and other govern-
ment regulations will reduce the supply of formal care. This would be 
similar to the results suggested by Blau and Currie (2006) and by Hotz 
and Xiao (2011). In turn, assuming that the demand effects of regulation 
are negligible, the expectation is that states that have stricter regulations 
with respect to formal care will also have lower child enrollment in 
formal care providers. 
The estimation of the effect of state regulation on the type of child 
care chosen by parents employs a multinomial logit model of the indi-
vidual choice of the type of care a child receives (center-based care, 
family-based care, Head Start, or other, informal care arrangements), 
conditional on state regulation indices and state fi xed effects, year fi xed 
effects, and family and individual controls. In this framework, the esti-
mations are able to assess the infl uence of state child care regulations 
on the probability that a child will enroll in formal care arrangements 
conditional on individual- and state-level characteristics. 
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OUTCOMES
A basic relationship of the effect of government regulation on aca-
demic skills can be modeled using the following specifi cation. The 
model of childhood achievement assumes that academic skills are 
determined by the following variables, which differ for individuals in 
center care (j = c) and family care providers (j = f ):
(4.2) ????
? ? ?????
? ? ????? ? ??? ? ??? ? ?????  , where j = c, f .  ß j
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The variable ????
? is the achievement measure (reading or math test 
score measure) for which the data are available for child i at time t in 
state s in care type j, xit is a row vector of individual characteristics 
affecting a child’s outcome, ??
? is a state fi xed effect for care type j, ???
?
is the state child care regulation index for care type j in state s at time 
t, where an increase in ???
?  represents stricter state regulation of care 
type j, ??
? is a time fi xed effect for care type j, and ????
?  is an error term 
containing unobserved variables that affect a child’s achievement mea-
sure. The vector β j and scalar δ j are other covariates that will be used to 
control other factors that may determine test scores. The values for δ j 
give the partial effect of government regulation of child care type j on a 
child’s achievement measure. 
ESTIMATES OF THE INFLUENCE OF REGULATION
The next section of the chapter is divided into three parts. The initial 
section presents estimates of the infl uence of regulation on wage deter-
mination of child care workers in the ACS. Next, estimates of child care 
enrollment are presented. Finally, results of the effect of regulation on 
children’s early academic achievement are shown. At this early stage of 
regulation and with the mobile labor market of young, generally less- 
educated workers that work in the industry, there is likely little infl u-
ence of regulation on the labor market, enrollment in types of programs, 
or educational outcomes. The remainder of the chapter documents how 
the estimates were derived and their implications for child care services 
and for the succeeding chapters, which cover more heavily regulated 
occupations at more advanced stages of regulation.
The Infl uence of State Regulation on Wages of Child
Care Providers
Initially, estimates are provided of the potential labor costs of regu-
lation. Since labor costs are the largest single cost item for day care 
centers, they would likely contribute a great deal to the overall price of 
the service. Given the loose regulatory framework covering preschool 
teachers and their aides, it would be surprising to fi nd a strong infl u-
Kleiner2013.indb   111 9/18/2013   10:10:54 AM
112   Kleiner and Hendricks
ence of regulation on wage determination. Table 4.4 shows the infl u-
ence of regulation on wage determination of preschool teachers with 
(column 2) and without (column 1) state fi xed effects. The key variables 
are education requirements, experience, and teacher-to-child ratios. In 
a similar manner, using a model consistent with Table 4.4, Table 4.5 
gives estimates of the infl uence of regulation of other kinds of child 
care workers who are not teachers, with and without state fi xed effects. 
In addition, given the low levels of skill requirements and the ability 
to replace child care workers, the infl uence of regulation is expected to 
be low. The model uses one-period lags, although estimates using two- 
and three-period lag variables showed similar results. The estimates in 
these two tables demonstrate that the role of education requirements, 
experience, and teacher-to-child ratios are small and generally not sta-
tistically signifi cant in either Table 4.4 or Table 4.5. On the whole, the 
explanatory power of the model is fairly low. Furthermore, since the 
estimates on many of the variables have opposing signs, the use of 
an F-test for the joint signifi cance of the variables would not provide 
additional information about the direction of the regulation effects. In 
the case of preschool education, where workers are easy to replace and 
where requirements are both new and relaxed, there does not appear to 
be much of an infl uence of regulation on wage determination. Similar 
to the fi ndings by Hotz and Xiao (2011), the estimates vary and show 
small effects of regulation on wage determination.2 When government 
regulation requirements are in an occupation where it is easy to replace 
these workers, and where regulations are not onerous, then the eco-
nomic effects appear to be minimal. 
The Infl uence of State Regulation on Enrollment in Formal 
Day Care Facilities
The previous section of the chapter noted the lack of a consistent 
result for regulation on wage determination. However, there may be 
other regulatory factors beyond wage determination that infl uence 
whether children are enrolled in formal or center-based preschool pro-
grams or in family-focused ones. For example, there may be quality 
effects of regulation that enhance the enrollment in center-based care, 
or the staff-student ratio requirements may drive up the prices of these 
services and send children to family-based care. This section empiri-
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(1) (2)
Variables lnwage lnwage
education required in years, aide, day care center 0.00 −0.01**
(0.00) (0.00)
education required in years, director, day care center −0.01 −0.04*
(0.01) (0.02)
education required in years, teacher, day care center 0.01*** −0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
education required in years, family home provider −0.00 −0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
experience required in years, aide in center −0.02 0.34***
(0.02) (0.07)
experience required, director of center −0.00 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01)
experience required, teacher in center 0.06** 0.08
(0.03) (0.06)
experience required, family provider 0.02 0.03
(0.01) (0.07)
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months, 
center
−0.02***
(0.00)
−0.01***
(0.00)
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months, 
family-based
−0.00
(0.00)
0.00***
(0.00)
State fi xed effects No Yes
Observations 16,667 16,667
R-squared 0.089 0.115
N 13,380 13,380
Table 4.4  Estimates of the Infl uence of State Regulation on the Wages of 
Preschool Teachers in the Day Care Industry, 2000–2008
NOTE: Dependent variable is log of wage. Sample restricted to preschool teachers in 
the child day-care services industry. All models include full set of year dummies. All 
covariates are lagged one year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering 
by state. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant 
at the 0.01 level. Column 1 shows the infl uence of regulation on wage determination 
of preschool teachers without state fi xed effects; column 2 shows it with state fi xed 
effects.
SOURCE: ACS.
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(1) (2)
Variables lnwage lnwage
education required in years, aide, day care center 0.00 −0.01
(0.00) (0.01)
education required in years, director, day care center −0.00 −0.05
(0.01) (0.04)
education required in years, teacher, day care center 0.01*** −0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
education required in years, family home provider −0.00* −0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
experience required in years, aide in center 0.00 0.06
(0.02) (0.09)
experience required, director of center −0.01 −0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
experience required, teacher in center 0.03* 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
experience required, family provider 0.04** 0.03
(0.02) (0.03)
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months, 
center
−0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
max. child-to-caregiver ratio for age 48–59 months, 
family-based
−0.00**
(0.00)
0.00***
(0.00)
State fi xed effects No Yes
Observations 39,339 39,339
R-squared 0.082 0.094
Table 4.5  Estimates of the Infl uence of State Regulation on the Wages of 
Child Care Workers in the Day Care Industry, 2000–2008
NOTE: Dependent variable is log of wage. Sample restricted to child-care workers in 
the child day-care services industry. All models include full set of year dummies. All 
covariates are lagged one year. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust to clustering 
by state. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** sig-
nifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Column 1 is without state 
fi xed effects; column 2 is with state fi xed effects.
SOURCE: ACS.
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cally examines whether these factors matter in determining the type of 
care preschool children are enrolled in. A relationship between regula-
tion and enrollment could indicate that state regulations are infl uencing 
the price or the availability of certain types of care. Unfortunately, reli-
able price data do not exist in the data that are examined. The process 
could be that as regulation raises the price of care and reduces its avail-
ability, one would expect to fi nd fewer children attending regulated 
center care in states where regulation is stronger. However, if regula-
tion increases the quality of care, then demand for formal care arrange-
ments may increase. Specifi cally, this section of the chapter examines 
whether increased state regulation of center-based and family-based 
care increases or reduces a child’s probability of enrollment in each 
care type. 
Estimating this relationship involves the use of child care enroll-
ment data from the ECLS-K, the ECLS-B, and the NLSY. Table 4.6 
displays a tabulation for the various types of child care enrollment for 
children in the NLSY and the ECLS-K and ECLS-B in 2007. The tabu-
lations from the three data sets show somewhat different measures of 
enrollment. In the ECLS-K and ECLS-B, overall enrollment of pre-
school children is provided in the year before kindergarten, when the 
children are either age four or fi ve. In the NLSY database, the children 
are age three. As shown in Table 4.6, the most popular care arrange-
ment in the ECLS-K and ECLS-B data set is center-based care, with 46 
percent of children attending some form of center care. The next most 
popular forms of day care are parental care (19 percent), relative care 
(15 percent), family-based care (10 percent), Head Start (10 percent), 
and nonrelative care (1 percent). These values are different from those 
in the NLSY because the proportion attending center-based care in the 
NLSY is much lower and the proportion attending parental care is much 
higher. In the NLSY, only 17 percent of children attend center-based 
care, and 55 percent receive parental care. This disparity is due in part 
to the sampling differences used in each of the databases.
Table 4.7 goes beyond the descriptive statistics in Table 4.6 and 
shows the infl uence of regulation on preschool children’s attendance. 
The table shows the infl uence of regulation when other characteris-
tics are accounted for in the empirical analysis. More specifi cally, the 
estimates in the table attempt to show whether government regulation, 
controlling for individual characteristics, infl uences child care enroll-
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ment. The results show the infl uence of regulation for center-based and 
family-based day care, using both the ECLS-K and ECLS-B in Panel A 
and the NLSY in Panel B. The estimates are a series of marginal effects 
from a multinomial logit model of the type of care for child enrollment 
that relates to state regulation and individual characteristics. Overall, 
the results show no consistent or conclusive results. Nevertheless, for 
the ECLS data used in the table, the results in Panel A show that greater 
state regulation is negatively associated with enrollment in center-based 
preschool programs (given in column one)—programs are calculated 
to be about 7 percent less at the mean value of the distribution used in 
Table 4.7. Since different age groups are in the two data sets, the esti-
mates on enrollment are consistent with the anticipated results. None 
of the other major categories of preschool enrollment show signifi cant 
Table 4.6  Proportion of Enrollment in Various Types of Child Care, 
Using ECLS-K and ECLS-B Data, NLSY Data, 2007
                                              n  % 
Center care            6,268 45.7
Parental care                              2,541 18.5
Relative care                                2,049 15.0
Family-based care                       1,420 10.4
Head Start                                      1,315 9.6
Nonrelative care                              109 0.8
Total                                13,702 100.0
Panel A: Primary child care arrangement in the 
year before kindergarten, ECLS-K and ECLS-B
Panel B: Primary child care arrangement at age 3, NLSY
                      n                          %
Center care                                 1,581 17.3
Parental care                            5,037 55.1
Relative care                             1,396 15.3
Family-based care 931 10.2
Nonrelative care  197 2.2
Total                      9,142 100.1
NOTE: Total in Panel B does not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B, National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY).
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results for the role of regulation. Furthermore, the estimates using data 
from the NLSY in Panel B also show no infl uence of regulation on pre-
school enrollment for center-based care, but these results are for only 
three-year-olds. The estimates in Panel B show only a modest negative 
infl uence for family-based care. Looking at both national data sources, 
it is diffi cult to fi nd a clear pattern for the role of regulation in affecting 
enrollment in preschool programs over the period for the data analysis 
shown in Table 4.7, but to the extent the estimates are informative they 
suggest a negative infl uence of regulation on center-based enrollment.
Finally, the rest of the chapter focuses on the potential effect of reg-
ulation in infl uencing test scores as a proxy for academic achievement.
Table 4.7  Effect of Regulation on Preschool Attendance for Center-Based 
and Family-Based Day Care, Using ECLS-K and ECLS-B Data 
and NLSY Data
Panel A: ECLS-K and ECLS-B—2005
Variables Center Family Head Start Other
overall center −0.03*** 0.0068 −0.0005 0.0235**
(0.01) (0.0058) (0.0040) (0.0106)
overall family 0.0053 −0.0046 −0.0051 0.0044
(0.0126) (0.0056) (0.0041) (0.0117)
Observations 16,363 16,363 16,363 16,363
Variables Center Family Other
overall center −0.0032 0.0024 0.0009
(0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0041)
overall family −0.0051** −0.0001 0.0052
(0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0032)
Observations 3,481 3,481 3,481
Panel B: NLSY Overall Regulation Enrollment Effects
NOTE: Standard errors in parentheses. Model includes a full set of year and state dum-
mies and includes a full set of individual and family controls. Estimates are marginal 
effects at the mean (MEM) from the multinomial logit model. Overall regulation indi-
ces are lagged one year in Panels A and B (1996 or 2004). * signifi cant at the 0.10 
level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B, NLSY.
Kleiner2013.indb   117 9/18/2013   10:10:56 AM
118   Kleiner and Hendricks
The Infl uence of Regulation on Preschool Children’s 
Academic Skills
If regulation accomplishes its goals of improving quality, a measure 
of that goal would be an enhancement of test scores for children in 
regulated preschool environments. The outcomes would occur because 
regulation would produce more highly qualifi ed teachers and staff or 
because the regulations would result in more attention being devoted to 
students through lower staff-to-student ratios (Kleiner 2011). Based on 
the results examined earlier in the chapter, it appears that occupational 
regulation does not infl uence either wage determination or the selection 
of the type of day care facility. However, other regulatory provisions 
may affect the quality of student achievement, which then shows up in 
enhanced student performance. This section of the chapter focuses on 
this issue.
Estimates of student achievement from the ECLS-K 
Table 4.8 shows the effect of each summated regulation index on 
math and reading scores for children sampled in either the ECLS-K or 
the ECLS-B data. The dependent variable is the child’s item response 
theory math or reading score in the fall of his or her kindergarten year 
(measured in 1998), which provides a measure of academic aptitude 
prior to kindergarten. The samples used for the estimates include chil-
dren whose primary care arrangement was center-based (including 
preschool, day care, and prekindergarten, but excluding Head Start) or 
family-based care (nonrelative care provided outside the child’s home) 
in the year prior to kindergarten (1997–1998). 
The table matches each child in the ECLS-K and ECLS-B samples 
with the appropriate state regulation indices (family-based or center-
based, depending on which type of care the child received) for the year 
1997–1998. The match occurs for each child, with the regulation index 
using information from the child’s home state in the year 1997. The 
sample sizes vary based on the regulation data that was available for 
each state. They match with the state regulation indices for that individ-
ual, which measure an overall value along with ones for development, 
health, staff, environment, ratio, oversight, and education. The coef-
fi cients on these variables measure the relationship between a child’s 
test score and the strength of state regulation in each area, given that 
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the child was exposed to the measured regulation. The estimates are 
an approximation of the effect of the strength of government regula-
tion on early childhood academic achievement. This interpretation, 
however, depends heavily on controlling for factors that infl uence aver-
age test scores within a state, and the factors are correlated with the 
number of regulations within the state. To reduce the risk of potential 
bias, the estimates include several covariates in these models, which 
control for individual-, family-, and state-level characteristics that may 
be related to test scores. The individual-level variables include race, 
gender, and birth weight. In addition, family-level covariates include 
family income, father’s and mother’s education and employment status, 
family type, and residence type. Finally, these estimates include state 
controls, such as state per capita income and spending on welfare, and 
regional dummy variables to control for a wide range of differentials in 
children’s test scores by state and region of the country.3 
The results show that state regulation of center-based providers 
in terms of environmental and educational requirements is positively 
related to math and reading scores among children who attended center-
based care. The coeffi cients suggest that additional state regulation in 
either of these areas is associated with an increase in math and reading 
scores by roughly a tenth of a standard deviation. To put this in perspec-
tive, a tenth of a standard deviation increase in test scores is roughly 
equivalent to the black-versus-white test score gap (0.13 of a standard 
deviation) and is more than three times larger than the gender gap (0.03 
of a standard deviation), which is estimated as part of the same model 
that is shown in Table 4.8. While the results suggest that educational 
and environmental requirements carry an important impact, there is no 
evidence in the ECLS that stronger regulation of other aspects of the 
provider’s operation has an effect on child test scores. 
Estimates of student achievement from the NLSY 
To test for robustness and consistency of the estimates in the 
ECLS-K and ECLS-B samples, the NLSY is examined. This is another 
database that contains information on preschool academic achievement. 
Using data on student achievement, Table 4.9 shows results of the esti-
mates of the infl uence of regulation. Again, the sample sizes vary based 
on the regulation data that was available for each state. The NLSY esti-
mates fi nd a similar result for the role of educational requirements on 
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reading scores. However, the result for math scores is insignifi cant. The 
NLSY estimates also fail to reveal an effect of regulations related to 
the environment, as was found in the ECLS. The NLSY results reveal a 
positive relationship between health- or safety-related regulations and 
test scores. The estimates in Table 4.9 show the effect of each summated 
regulation index on math and reading scores for children sampled in the 
NLSY. The method of presentation in Table 4.9 is similar to that for the 
combined ECLS estimates. The dependent variables in Panel A are the 
PIAT (Peabody Individual Achievement Test) math scores measured at 
age six, on average. The dependent variables in Panel B are the PIAT 
Table 4.8  Regulation’s Infl uence on Student Academic Outcomes, Using 
the Combined ECLS-K and ECLS-B Data
Panel A: Infl uence of center-based regulations on math scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Math Math Math Math Math Math Math
overall center −0.02
(0.02)
development 
center
−0.02
(0.02)
health center 0.02
(0.05)
staff center 0.00
(0.02)
environment 
center
0.10***
(0.01)
ratio center −0.02
(0.05)
education 
center
0.11***
(0.03)
Observations 4,810 5,806 8,918 5,852 8,802 9,537 8,712
R2 0.265 0.266 0.281 0.269 0.283 0.282 0.283
NOTE: Columns show the infl uence of regulation on math scores, according to the type 
of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide detailed 
information by type of preschool program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimates include set of year and state dummies and individual and family controls. 
Sample includes only children attending center care in the year prior to kindergarten. 
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the state level. * signifi cant at the 0.01 level; 
** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B.
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reading scores using the same test. Unlike many other standardized 
tests, the ages at which children were tested in math and reading varies 
signifi cantly. For example, children were tested anywhere between the 
ages of two and 11. Consequently, there is a control for the age at which 
the children took the test.4 
In the NLSY, specifi cations used controls that were similar to those 
used in the other analysis in the chapter. These approaches include a 
full set of year and state dummies to estimate state fi xed effects and 
year effects. Some of the individual controls include the child’s age, 
race, and gender. The family controls include the mother’s and father’s 
education levels, mother’s aptitude as measured by the Armed Forces 
Panel B: Infl uence of center-based regulations on reading scores
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading
overall center −0.03
(0.02)
development 
center
−0.02 
(0.02)
health center −0.06*
(0.04)
staff center −0.02
(0.02)
environment 
center
0.13***
(0.02)
ratio center −0.00
(0.04)
education  
center
0.16*** 
(0.05)
Observations 4,768 5,762 8,749 5,808 8,633 9,368 8,542
R2 0.245 0.248 0.242 0.251 0.240 0.240 0.244
NOTE: Columns show the infl uence of regulation on reading scores, according to the 
type of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide 
detailed information by type of preschool program. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Estimates include set of year and state dummies and individual and family controls. 
Sample includes only children attending center care in the year prior to kindergarten. 
Standard errors are robust to clustering at the state level. * signifi cant at the 0.01 level; 
** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: ECLS-K, ECLS-B.
Table 4.8  (continued)
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Qualifying Test (AFQT), and family arrangement. When all of these 
factors are accounted for, it is evident that regulation has no effect for 
the overall measure of regulation, but that some of the individual fac-
tors, such as regulating the environment of center-based preschool edu-
cation and regulating health and safety, matter for some of the measures 
of student achievement. 
Table 4.9  Infl uence of Center-Based Regulation on Math Scores,  
Using the NLSY
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Math Math Math Math Math Math Math
overall center 0.18
(0.23)
development 
center
0.21
(0.29)
health center 1.54***
(0.53)
staff center 0.00
(0.26)
environment 
center
0.48
(1.09)
ratio center 0.89
(1.29)
education 
center
1.37
(1.98)
Observations 604 625 670 632 669 671 659
R2 0.237 0.238 0.251 0.242 0.246 0.247 0.251
NOTE: Columns show the infl uence of regulation on math scores, according to the type 
of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide detailed 
information by type of preschool program. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Regressions include year and state dummies and individual and family controls. 
Sample includes only children attending center care at age three. Standard errors are 
robust to clustering at the state level. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at 
the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: NLSY.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter attempted to measure many of the key elements of 
the costs and benefi ts of government regulation of child care, with a 
focus on occupational licensing. The regulation of child care is at an 
early stage of development, in terms of both the number of states that 
require it and the standards to be licensed. The estimates fail to fi nd any 
evidence that the wages of preschool teachers or child care workers 
are affected by government regulation. This fi nding is not surprising, 
since the requirements are both relatively new and at low levels. How-
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading Reading
overall center −0.02
(0.19)
development 
center
−0.08
(0.22)
health center 1.24***
(0.31)
staff center −0.07
(0.22)
environment 
center
0.25
(0.85)
ratio center −0.59
(1.02)
education 
center
2.20**
(0.82)
Observations 595 616 660 622 659 661 649
R2 0.331 0.319 0.328 0.320 0.324 0.325 0.332
Table 4.9  (continued)
NOTE: Columns show the infl uence of regulation on reading scores, according to the 
type of preschool program the child attended. The ECLS-K and ECLS-B provide 
detailed information by type of preschool program. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Regressions include year and state dummies and individual and family con-
trols. Sample includes only children attending center care at age 3. Standard errors are 
robust to clustering at the state level. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at 
the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level.
SOURCE: NLSY.
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ever, there is some evidence, albeit not conclusive, that government 
regulation appears to affect child care enrollment in center-based care 
by making it more diffi cult to fi nd teachers and support staff, thereby 
reducing enrollment. Unfortunately, no reliable price data are available 
to examine this issue in more detail. One potential benefi t of increased 
regulation is an increase in the quality of child care. This effect could 
be measured by improved child development and early childhood aca-
demic achievement scores. The results for the overall index variable 
fail to show evidence of benefi ts related to increased early childhood 
academic achievement in math and reading scores across two major 
government databases—the ECLS-K and the NLSY—but several indi-
vidual factors such as environment, health, and education-based regula-
tions are signifi cant in some of the estimates for both reading and math 
scores. 
At these levels of regulation and in this industry, the regulation of 
child care is unlikely to show much infl uence. The estimates in this 
chapter confi rm this prediction. If regulation does little to change costs 
through wages or only modestly affects costs through changes in enroll-
ment patterns, there are few reasons to enact the kinds of low levels of 
licensing that are considered in this chapter. This is especially true if 
these regulations result in governmental monitoring or fees that do not 
seem to generate major benefi ts to either workers or children. Further-
more, the estimates show that occupational regulations have no measur-
able infl uence on test scores.
The remainder of the book examines occupations and industries at 
much higher levels of regulation, where licensing laws have been in 
effect for much longer time periods. The expectation is that regulations 
that are more rigorous and have been in force for a longer time are 
more likely to have an infl uence on the compensation of members of the 
occupation and on consumers of their services.
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Notes
  1. I thank Matthew Hendricks for his contributions to this chapter. He is an assistant 
professor of economics at the University of Tulsa. 
 2. Similar estimates of wage determination for other day care workers and for all day 
care workers showed similarly inconclusive results.
   3. Estimates were also developed for the role of overall regulation in family-based 
care, and the results are similar, in that some individual factors have an infl uence 
on preschool children’s test scores.
  4. Additional robustness tests were conducted for family- and center-based care 
using various specifi cations and controls, and none found consistently signifi cant 
results. Overall, these regulation indices did not show any infl uence on children’s 
cognitive test scores using the NLSY. 
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5
Of Life, Limbs, and Licensing: 
Electricians and Plumbers
With Kyoung Won Park
Possession of any of these licenses gives the holder enormous 
economic advantage, for he is protected from competition from 
nonholders. Indeed, so important has the license become that out-
siders wishing to compete for business in an area where they do 
not have a license may seek out a license holder who is no longer 
actively engaged in the business and arrange to rent his master’s 
license.
—Shimberg, Esser, and Kruger (1973, p. 67)
Opposition to statewide licensing had come from plumbers who 
feel that such licensing makes it easier for outsiders to compete 
with them for local jobs. (Ibid., p. 69)
Every job must be passed and approved by the “city’s electrical 
inspectors.” Should the work be unsatisfactory, the contractor must 
bear the expense of making all necessary changes. It is this poten-
tial monetary penalty, say the proponents of licensing only contrac-
tors, that motivates the contractor to hire competent workers and to 
provide them with high-quality supervision. (Ibid., p. 70)
INTRODUCTION 
Most of this book is devoted to the analysis of regulated white-collar 
occupations; however, this chapter examines electricians and plumbers, 
two of the most highly skilled blue-collar occupations in the construc-
tion industry.1 The chapter goes beyond merely looking at the tradi-
tional wage effects of occupational regulation to examine whether the 
training and monitoring of the work that is associated with occupational 
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regulation contributes to the enhanced safety of the workers in the occu-
pation. Although fi rm-related factors, such as fi nancial leverage, may 
infl uence health and safety, the evaluation of the issue represents a fi rst 
attempt to go beyond traditional economic measures to examine some 
of the potential benefi ts of regulation—benefi ts not only for consumers 
but also for workers using measures of nonmonetary outcomes (Cohn 
and Wardlaw 2013).
Analysts of government policies in the labor market have long held 
that licensing laws that restrict the supply of labor cause an increase in 
wages, but there has been little analysis of the infl uence of regulation 
on the conditions of work. We examine the infl uence of occupational 
licensing on the wages and workplace safety of electricians and plumb-
ers, among the most regulated and skilled occupations directly involved 
in the construction industry. 
A focus of this chapter is on the role of occupational licensing and 
other forms of government regulation for electricians, a heavily regu-
lated occupation in the construction industry. The material in the chap-
ter also examines plumbers, but given data constraints and the lack of 
variation in the laws governing this occupation, the analysis is in much 
less depth. Unlike previous chapters, which examine the role of occupa-
tional licensing on wages, prices, access, or quality to consumers, this 
chapter extends the analysis of regulation on the likelihood of occupa-
tional licensing reducing work-related deaths and serious job-related 
injuries, using new methods and data (Shepard 1978; Bond et al. 1980; 
Cox and Foster 1990; Kleiner and Todd 2007). 
The central fi ndings show that certain occupational licensing 
requirements, such as minimum age, education, and exam requirements, 
raise the wages of electricians by about 6 to 8 percent. These results are 
robust for several alternative specifi cations for electricians. However, 
the results for plumbers are murky. Furthermore, the estimates sug-
gest a modest but signifi cant trade-off between wages and work-related 
injuries for electricians, a result that agrees with economic theory on 
compensating differentials of trade-offs of pay for safety. Local licens-
ing of electricians is associated with approximately a 12 percent wage 
premium beyond state regulations. This is consistent with the quotation 
at the beginning of the chapter that local licensing of the construction 
trades is often seen as a major economic benefi t to the members of the 
trade. Neither the estimates for electricians nor those for plumbers show 
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much evidence of a systematic infl uence of occupational licensing on 
the injury rates, severity of injuries, or death rates. As with the other 
chapters in this book, we fi rst describe the institutional environment of 
the occupations and then describe the data and analysis used to examine 
the labor market and health and safety effects of occupational regula-
tion by government. 
PUBLIC POLICY APPROACHES TO OCCUPATIONAL 
HEALTH AND SAFETY
Public policies on health and safety have generally taken two 
approaches: the regulation and setting of standards, and the implemen-
tation of social insurance through worker compensation. Illustrations 
of the regulation approach are the passage of the Coal Mine Safety Act 
in 1969 and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in 1970. 
The federal government has played a major role in protecting the 
health and safety of the workforce. For example, miners have been at the 
forefront of occupational health and safety legislation, largely because 
they have the highest rate of injury and death, and also because they 
have gathered the most attention through the media. Media attention has 
occurred in part because many of the deaths and injuries involve large 
groups of miners who are affected in one incident, usually in dramatic 
fashion. In contrast, deaths and injuries in construction tend to occur 
to a much greater extent in small groups, away from the spotlight of 
public attention. The focus on miners develops even though construc-
tion workers are likely to have multiple times as many overall deaths 
and injuries annually. Recent data provided by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics show that construction workers have by far the greatest number 
of deaths and injuries of any industry, and that they rank high in rates 
of injury and death (BLS 2011). The analysis provided in this chapter 
adds to the literature on occupational health and safety by examining 
whether occupational regulation complements current regulatory poli-
cies to promote workplace health and safety by reducing the occurrence 
and severity of occupational injuries. If occupational regulation matters 
in improving health and safety in this sector, then it could potentially 
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infl uence other sectors of the economy such as agriculture, mining, or 
manufacturing, which also have high levels of workplace injuries.
Furthermore, occupational licensing gives a standard method of pro-
viding a service to include the health and safety of the workers that are 
involved in the industry. For example, in the case of electricians, about 
10 percent of their class time is spent in discussions of health and safety, 
and numerous teaching units in apprenticeship programs are explicitly 
devoted to health and safety (Center for Construction Research and 
Training 2009); see Box 5.1 for examples of these requirements. The 
expectation is that workers who have this background on safety from 
both the classroom and the on-the-job training would incur fewer work-
place injuries and deaths. One of the objectives of this chapter is to 
examine training requirements in more detail with respect to electri-
cians and plumbers, two regulated occupations in the industry. 
Electrician Labor Market 
Electricians were chosen to be examined in this section of the book 
because they are the most government-regulated craft in construction. 
Further reasons to focus the analysis on electricians are because they 
form a key element in the construction workforce, they are numerous 
in the industry, and they contribute much value to the industry. About 
80 percent of all electricians work in the construction industry, and 
about 695,000 were employed in the industry in 2008. About 32 per-
cent of all electricians are members of a union, with the largest portion 
belonging to the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. In 
comparison, about 13.8 percent of all construction workers are repre-
sented by a union (BLS 2012c; Hirsch and Macpherson 2011). As with 
other prevalent occupations in construction (e.g., plumbers and labor-
ers), electricians’ high level of unionization may raise wages, and the 
infl uence of unions on work rules is expected to be especially important 
within this occupation. As a consequence, unions may also contribute to 
reductions in occupational injuries. All states that have licensing for the 
occupation require electricians to take classes on safety. Michigan, for 
example, requires electrician apprentices to present a training course 
plan on health and safety in order to become licensed.
Until the Great Recession, the construction industry had been grow-
ing over time, and Figure 5.1 shows the increase by billions of dollars 
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Box 5.1  Training and Qualifi cations for Becoming an Electrician 
Each year of training includes at least 144 hours of classroom 
instruction and 2,000 hours of on-the-job training. In the classroom, 
apprentices learn electrical theory, blueprint reading, mathematics, 
electrical code requirements, and safety and fi rst aid practices. They 
also may receive specialized training in soldering, communications, 
fi re alarm systems, and cranes and elevators. 
On the job, apprentices work under the supervision of experienced 
electricians. At fi rst, they drill holes, set anchors, and attach conduits. 
Later, they measure, fabricate, and install conduits and install, connect, 
and test wiring, outlets, and switches. They also learn to set up and 
draw diagrams for entire electrical systems. Eventually, they practice 
and master all of an electrician’s main tasks.
Some people start their classroom training before seeking an 
apprenticeship. A number of public and private vocational-technical 
schools and training academies offer training to become an electrician. 
Employers often hire students who complete these programs and usu-
ally start them at a more advanced level than those without this training. 
A few people become electricians by fi rst working as helpers—assist-
ing electricians by setting up job sites, gathering materials, and doing 
other nonelectrical work—before entering an apprenticeship program. 
All apprentices need a high school diploma or a general equivalency 
diploma (GED). Electricians also may need additional classes in math-
ematics because they solve mathematical problems on the job.
Education continues throughout an electrician’s career. Electri-
cians may need to take classes to learn about changes to the National 
Electrical Code, and they often complete regular safety programs, 
manufacturer-specifi c training, and management training courses. 
Classes on such topics as low-voltage voice and data systems, tele-
phone systems, video systems, and alternative energy systems such as 
solar energy and wind energy increasingly are being given as these 
systems become more prevalent. Other courses teach electricians how 
to become contractors.
(continued)
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from 1990 to 2010 (BLS 2012a). Although the construction industry is 
highly cyclical and suffered a precipitous decline in output starting in 
2006 and continuing through 2010, the fi gure shows the steady growth 
in output until the dramatic decline that began just before the reces-
sion of 2008. Figure 5.1 includes major sectors such as construction of 
buildings, heavy civil engineering construction, and specialty contrac-
tors over time (Center for Construction Research and Training 2009). 
Since employment grows and then declines based on business activity, 
we are careful to adjust for employment in the construction industry 
when showing the level of workplace deaths and injuries in subsequent 
tables and fi gures such as Figure 5.2.
The deaths and injuries of electricians rank among the highest in the 
construction industry (BLS 2011). However, deaths and injuries at the 
workplace have been in decline. Figure 5.2 shows the extent to which 
the death and injury rates for electricians have declined. A large decline 
took place in 1996, and the period following that steep fall has seen a 
steady decline in both deaths and injuries for electricians. According to 
the Center for Construction Research and Training, the secular decline 
occurred for a number of reasons. From a public policy perspective, in 
1993 OSHA set standards that were implemented from 1993 through 
Box 5.1 (continued)
Licensure. Most states and localities require electricians to be 
licensed. Although licensing requirements vary from state to state, 
electricians usually must pass an examination that tests their knowl-
edge of electrical theory, the National Electrical Code, and local and 
state electrical and building codes. 
Electrical contractors who do electrical work for the public, as 
opposed to electricians who work for electrical contractors, often need 
a special license. In some states, electrical contractors need certifi ca-
tion as master electricians. Most states require master electricians to 
have at least seven years of experience as an electrician or a bachelor’s 
degree in electrical engineering or a related fi eld.
SOURCE: BLS (2012b).
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1996. These changes required electricians to reduce their work with live 
circuits, increased the use of aerial lifts as opposed to step ladders, and 
introduced underground utility mapping and verifi cation requirements 
(Dong, Wang, and Herleikson 2010).
Figure 5.3 shows the growth in the number of states that require 
licensing for electricians and the percentage of electricians who are 
union members, which has declined in the occupation over time. Simi-
lar to national trends, the decline in the number and percentage of union 
members is related to the number of workers covered by state licens-
ing (Kleiner and Krueger 2010). Specifi cally, the number of states that 
license electricians grew from 40 to 45 from 2000 to 2007, whereas the 
percentage of electricians in unions declined from 39.0 percent to 34.2 
percent during the same period. 
Not only has the level of licensing increased, but the intensity of the 
process of becoming licensed has become more diffi cult. Key offi cials 
at the Center for Construction Research and Training, as well as focus 
Figure 5.1  Construction Sector Output in Constant 2005 Dollars from 
1990 to 2010
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Offi ce of Occupational Statistics and Employ-
ment Projections.
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groups comprising practitioners from the construction industry, collec-
tively identifi ed the following fi ve components as important in becom-
ing licensed: 1) a general age/education requirement, 2) an appren-
ticeship, 3) a written exam, 4) a practical performance exam, and 5) a 
continuing education requirement. These elements form the foundation 
of an index of the rigor of the licensing process, in addition to the type 
of licensing (i.e., state or local). This index makes it possible to trace 
the evolution of the intensity of the licensing index from 1992 through 
2007. This evolution is shown in Figure 5.4 using a box-and-whisker 
graph of the sum of the fi ve key elements of the licensing regulations 
for electricians. The results show a modest upward movement in the 
mean values, and the variance declines over time as the licensing pro-
Figure 5.2  Injury and Death Rates for Electricians, 1992–2007
NOTE: Injury and death rates were computed as follows: Injury Rate = (Sum of the 
weight for the national estimate from the SOII / Estimated employment of electricians 
from the CPS MORG) × 100; and Death Rate = (Actual number of deaths from the 
CFOI / Estimated number of employed electricians from the CPS MORG) × 10,000.
SOURCE: Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and Survey of Occupational 
Injuries and Illnesses (SOII).
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visions become more standardized. Occupational licensing is growing 
among states, and its provisions for an electrician to enter and maintain 
good standing as a licensed professional are becoming more stringent. 
The path to becoming a licensed electrician generally involves four 
years of training and includes being an apprentice, a journeyman, and 
then a master electrician. The path usually includes full-time work plus 
attending classes several nights a week. Pass rates vary by region and 
often include local licensing beyond state-level regulations for each of 
the stages toward becoming a licensed electrician. About 10 percent of 
electricians then become contractors and open their own businesses. 
For states that license individuals, only licensed electricians can cer-
tify the quality of electrical work on a construction project, and only 
licensed individuals are allowed to perform wiring procedures on con-
struction sites. Given this institutional background on the labor market 
for electricians, related factors might lead workers to earn more, work 
under safer conditions, and reduce job-related injuries. 
Figure 5.3  Growth of State Occupational Licensing and Decline of 
Unions for Electricians, 2000–2007 
SOURCE: Current Population Survey (CPS) Outgoing Rotation Group (ORG) data, 
2000–2007, and the authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state from 
1992 to 2007.
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Plumber Labor Market
The licensing of plumbers has followed a trajectory similar to that 
of electricians. Traditionally, the licensing of plumbers has been a 
local issue, since building codes have usually varied by city or county. 
Shimberg, Esser, and Kruger (1973) contend that the public health and 
safety argument for local licensing is “little more than a smoke-screen 
to obscure self-interest” (p. 69). Some states such as California preempt 
local licensing, and all regulation is at the state level. Others have state 
minimum requirements but have additional regulations based on unique 
local characteristics. 
Figure 5.5 presents a box-and-whisker graph of the sum of the fi ve 
key elements for state licensing regulations for plumbers from 1992 
through 2007. There are no major changes in the fi gure to denote an 
increase in the toughness of those regulations or changes in the vari-
ance of the regulations. The major changes in the regulations governing 
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Figure 5.4  Box-and-Whisker Graph of the Sum of the Five Key 
Elements of State Licensing Regulations for Electricians, 
1992–2007
SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state, from 1992 
to 2007.
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licensing took place prior to 1992—the year in which the data analy-
sis in this chapter begins. As is the case with electricians, regulations 
appear to be getting modestly more stringent for plumbers, according 
to measures of education and training.2 The data in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 
also show there is a movement toward state licensing and away from 
local licensing, which broadens the geographic market for plumbers 
at the expense of local regulations. Perhaps unions and their members 
prefer a wider geographic market with more potential jobs to a market 
with higher wages and fewer job opportunities, which are the likely 
outcomes of local licensing. 
THEORIES OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION
ON WAGES AND SAFETY 
This section fi rst focuses on the theory of wage determination and 
then examines the role of occupational regulation on reducing work-
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Figure 5.5  Box-and-Whisker Graph of the Sum of the Five Key Elements 
of State Licensing Regulations for Plumbers, 1992–2007
SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for plumbers by state, from 1992 
to 2007.
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related deaths and injuries. A starting point for the examination of 
wages and work injuries can be found in the comments of the eigh-
teenth century economist Adam Smith on compensating differentials 
for various types of work. He noted that workers will demand a com-
pensating wage differential for jobs that are perceived as risky or other-
wise unpleasant (Smith 1937). 
The analysis of wage determination under licensing in construction 
builds on work by Perloff (1980) on the infl uence of licensing laws 
on wage changes in the construction industry. The basic model posits 
that market forces are largely responsible for wage determination in 
construction and that the industry is highly cyclical. Perloff presents 
two cases. In the fi rst, there are no costs to shifting across industries, so 
the labor supply to the construction industry is completely elastic at the 
opportunity wage. In this case, the increase in the demand for construc-
tion work would have little effect on wages, since workers would fl ow 
between the construction industry and other industries. (Manufacturing 
would be the most likely substitute in the model and would appear to be 
a plausible substitute for the skills of construction workers.)
In the other extreme case, a licensing law renders the supply of con-
struction labor inelastic. Here, labor cannot fl ow between the sectors, 
so variations in construction demand would be refl ected in the construc-
tion wage. In his empirical work, Perloff (1980) shows that for electri-
cians, more so than for either laborers or plumbers, state regulations 
make the supply curve highly inelastic. Consequently, the ability of a 
state to limit entry or impose major costs on entry through licensing 
would enhance the occupation’s ability to raise wages. 
The institutional labor market literature has developed one addi-
tional issue that has been an important focus in construction: the deter-
mination of the geography of markets (Dickens and Lang 1992). These 
researchers argue that institutions in the labor market, such as unions 
or occupational associations, attempt to capture a geographic area. In 
the case of both electricians and plumbers, limiting the geographic area 
would result in greater control of the labor market and higher wages. 
Therefore, there is an incentive to limit the area to local licensing rather 
than expand the market to the state level. To the extent that the market 
has been expanded, it has been done to increase employment, but that 
may have come at the expense of higher wages. 
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The issue of the role of occupational regulation on the reduction of 
deaths and injuries is less developed. In general, a model developed by 
Viscusi, Harrington, and Vernon (2005) of the risk of injury or death 
can be presented as follows:
(5.1)  Riskt = α + β1Occupational Regulationt − 1 
  + β2Cyclical Effectst + β3Industry Characteristicst 
  + β4Worker Characteristicst + ε
 ,
where occupational regulation includes the training, selection, and stan-
dardization effects of occupational licensing, cyclical effects in con-
struction include the boom of the early 2000s, and industry controls 
include whether the person was in the construction industry and the 
human capital characteristics of the individuals that are covered in the 
sample. 
An important issue in the occupational health and safety literature is 
whether regulations or standards for work are more effective than litiga-
tion such as worker compensation laws in reducing the incidence and 
severity of injury and the incidence of death. Most of the analyses on 
standards such as OSHA legislation fi nd that occupational regulations 
or standards are not more effective (Smith 1976; Viscusi, Harrington, 
and Vernon 2005). In contrast, many of the studies on worker compen-
sation and its infl uence on the incidence and severity of injury and the 
incidence of death show much larger infl uences. For example, Moore 
and Viscusi (1990) show that worker compensation laws reduce job 
fatality rates by about one-third, and that this legislation is much more 
effective than setting standards. Based on these fi ndings, the expecta-
tion is that there are modest effects of occupational regulation standards 
in reducing injuries, and that the infl uence of these policies would be 
similar to the effects of legislation such as OSHA, where the infl uence 
of the policies appears to have diminished (Gray and Mendeloff 2005).
To the extent that licensing introduces standardization of proce-
dures in electrical work or plumbing that take health and safety con-
cerns into effect, the expectation is that regulation would reduce inju-
ries and deaths. Specifi c programs such as apprenticeships, required 
classes on health and safety, and continuing education would all serve 
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to reduce the likelihood of injuries at the workplace. Furthermore, 
licensing eliminates the lower part of the quality distribution within the 
occupation through time-intensive classes and the costs of occupation-
specifi c education, and consequently would diminish the likelihood of 
death and injury by keeping more careless individuals from working 
in the occupation. Only those individuals who are willing to take on 
the time and money costs of continuing education, are committed to 
the occupation, and are willing to pay annual fees and attend seminars 
to stay in the occupation would be likely to know the appropriate pro-
cedures to stay safe at the workplace. Practitioners could also benefi t 
from technological innovations learned in the workplace or at construc-
tion sites. Although these innovations could reduce injuries or deaths, 
they may be overlooked in assessments because they do not fi t into the 
standard method of doing things. In addition, attempts at implementing 
unorthodox methods in response to technological change may result in 
the loss of a license.3 
One fi nal issue that helps defi ne the role of occupational regulation 
in construction is the state or local political jurisdiction in place. In 
most jurisdictions, licensing for electricians and plumbers is done at the 
state level. However, some states have local licensing for electricians, 
and these local licensing regulations are sometimes more diffi cult for 
workers to complete than state-level regulations. Cook County, which 
includes the city of Chicago, is often given as an example of a jurisdic-
tion having more and tougher requirements than the ones at the state 
level. Given the pervasiveness of local licenses that may, in some cases, 
be more rigorous than the ones at the state level, the analysis will exam-
ine the infl uence of local licenses to regulate electricians. Consequently, 
the issue of whether the regulation of occupations matters in raising 
wages or reducing the injuries and deaths of electricians is an empirical 
issue. The chapter now turns to that empirical issue. The data to esti-
mate the models described above are detailed in the following section. 
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DATA ON LICENSING STATUTES, WAGE DETERMINATION, 
AND HEALTH AND SAFETY
Regulation Data
A group of researchers working with funding from the Depart-
ment of Labor were among the fi rst to examine the role of occupational 
regulation in construction. In a study that was commissioned by the 
department’s Offi ce of Research and mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, Shimberg, Esser, and Kruger (1973) discussed the role of occu-
pational regulation in construction and also mentioned the diffi culties 
of health and safety issues in the industry. The researchers also focused 
on the variations in occupational licensing in the industry for several 
occupations. The key elements of their fi ndings were on the process of 
licensing and not on the outcomes. Their work focused on who is on the 
licensing boards for the occupation and whether state and local boards 
are or should be regulating the occupation. Their study also examined 
whether the boards were composed of political appointees, whether the 
pay was low, whether the boards were dominated by members of the 
occupation, and whether they had public members. Other analysis, also 
funded by the Department of Labor, focused on the quality of work 
under occupational licensing (Carroll and Gaston 1981). 
In order to examine which of these occupational issues dominates 
the determination of health and safety for electricians, a regulatory 
index was developed based on the focus group responses that capture 
the major elements of the statutes across states. Table 5.1 displays the 
key elements (and their operational defi nition) of the licensing provi-
sions in the statutes and administrative regulations that were examined 
for each of the states in the sample for electricians. Table 5.2 presents 
information on the changes in the various licensing statutes regulating 
the occupation by states over time.4 It tabulates only the changes in 
occupational regulations in state statutes. For example, electricians in 
Alaska were licensed at the state level, and the fi ve key elements of the 
licensing provisions did not change between 1992 and 2007. 
Table 5.2 presents these values over the period from 1992 through 
2007. The details of the provisions and the states and years in which 
they were passed are presented in Appendix Table B.1. The results indi-
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cate that the occupation experienced growth in regulations governing 
the entry and training requirements. The level of the index, or the num-
ber of items included in the measure, grew from 2.11 in 1992 to 2.38 in 
2007, or almost 13 percent. This refl ects the intensity of the growth of 
requirements to enter the occupation of electrician and maintain mem-
bership in that occupation. 
In order to fully implement the empirical estimation strategy, we 
show in Panel A of Table 5.3 the states that changed licensing poli-
cies. For example, Iowa switched to state licensing from local regula-
tions, and Louisiana changed from no licensing to state regulation of 
the occupation. A number of states allow electricians to be regulated at 
the local level, including populous states such as Illinois and New York. 
In Panel B of the table, we list the states that ranked highest and lowest 
using our index of regulation. 
Table 5.4 gives the changes in the statutes for the period 1992 
through 2007 for plumbers, the other occupation that is the subject of 
the analysis. The results show that a number of states had local regula-
tion of the construction occupation. However, both South Dakota and 
Variable Defi nition
license 1 if either license is required by state statute or local statute; 
otherwise 0. 
state license 1 if license is required by state statute; otherwise 0.
local license 1 if license is required by statute of local municipality; 
otherwise 0.
Five major components
general requirements 1 if either a minimum level of education or of age is 
required to be licensed; otherwise 0. 
apprentice codes 1 if occupation-specifi c experience as apprentice (or 
equivalent years of education) is required to be licensed; 
otherwise 0.
written exam 1 if a written exam is required to be licensed; otherwise 0.
performance exam 1 if a performance exam is required to be licensed; 
otherwise 0. 
continuing education 1 if state has any requirement for license renewal; 
otherwise 0. 
Table 5.1  Key Elements and Defi nitions of Regulatory Variables
SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians and plumbers by 
state, from 1992 to 2007.
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Virginia moved to state licensing from local regulations, and Idaho 
moved to state certifi cation from local regulations. Nebraska remained 
as the only state with no regulations for the occupation; Alaska, North 
Dakota, and Tennessee all moved from not having any regulation to 
state licensing during the period that was examined. 
Table 5.5 shows the growth in the level of licensing for plumbers 
using the index developed earlier. For example, from 1992 until 2007, 
the mean of the index grew by 17 percent, and the standard deviation 
declined over the same time period. Over the period there was a stan-
dardization of state licensing beyond the clear growth shown in the 
table. Nevertheless, the changes in the index of statutes for plumbers 
were much smaller than those for electricians. 
Year
No. of changes in occupational 
regulations in state statutes Mean sd
1992 38 2.11 0.98
1993 38 2.11 0.98
1994 38 2.18 1.04
1995 38 2.24 1.02
1996 38 2.24 1.02
1997 38 2.24 1.02
1998 38 2.29 1.01
1999 38 2.34 0.94
2000 40 2.33 0.94
2001 41 2.29 0.96
2002 41 2.32 0.96
2003 42 2.38 0.88
2004 43 2.35 0.90
2005 43 2.35 0.90
2006 43 2.35 0.90
2007 45 2.38 0.91
Total 642 2.28 0.95
Table 5.2  Changes in the Index of State Licensing Regulation for 
Electricians, 1992–2007
SOURCE: The authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state from 1992 
to 2007.
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Workplace Safety Data
The analysis of information comes from two sources of confi dential 
data: the Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) and the 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), with Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) supervision over the handling of the data for public dis-
semination (for detailed information, see BLS [2013a]). To examine the 
role of occupational licensing in potentially reducing serious nonfatal 
injuries, we use the SOII, which is a confi dential establishment-level 
survey for nonfatal injury data administered by the BLS and stored at 
its Washington, D.C., offi ces. The SOII lists nonfatal injuries reported 
by establishments in the private sector for 39 states between 1992 and 
2007. Although the injuries are divided into three categories,5 the focus 
Table 5.3  States Staying with or Switching Their Level of Licensing, and 
State Rankings of Occupational Regulation of Electricians, 
1992–2007
State licensing Local licensing No licensing
Stayers All other states Illinois, Kansas, 
Missouri, New York, 
Pennsylvania
Indiana
Switchers Delaware (to state 
licensing in 2000), Iowa 
(to state licensing in 
2007), Kentucky (to 
state licensing in 2001), 
Texas (to state licensing 
in 2003)
Louisiana (to state 
licensing in 2004),  
Massachusetts (to state 
licensing in 2007), 
Tennessee (to state 
licensing in 2000) 
Panel A: Stayers and switchers of occupational regulation of electricians, 1992–2007
Top States
Sum of the fi ve 
requirements Bottom states
Sum of the fi ve 
requirements
Arizona 5 Alaska 1
Massachusetts 4 Kentucky 1
Wyoming 4 Louisiana 1
Alabama and 17 other 
states
3 Mississippi 1
Panel B: Regulation rankings of the top and bottom groupings 
of states for electricians, 2007
SOURCE: Authors’ survey of licensing statutes for electricians by state, 1992 to 2007.
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Table 5.4 Stayers and Switchers in Occupational Regulation of 
Plumbers, 1992–2007
State 
licensing
Local 
licensing Certifi cation
No 
licensing
Stayers All other states Iowa, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, 
Mississippi, New 
York, Pennsylvania, 
Wyoming 
Nebraska, 
West Virginia 
Switchers South Dakota (to state 
licensing in 1999), 
Virginia (to state 
licensing in 1995) 
Idaho (to state 
licensing in 
1996) 
Alaska (to state 
licensing in 
2005), North 
Dakota (to state 
licensing in 
1993), Tennessee 
(to state licensing 
in 2006) 
SOURCE: Authors’ survey of licensing statutes for plumbers by state, 1992 to 2007.
Year           
No. of changes in occupational 
regulations in state statutes Mean sd
1992 42 2.24 1.21
1993 42 2.33 1.18
1994 42 2.33 1.18
1995 43 2.35 1.17
1996 43 2.42 1.18
1997 43 2.42 1.18
1998 43 2.42 1.18
1999 44 2.36 1.22
2000 44 2.39 1.20
2001 44 2.41 1.23
2002 44 2.43 1.23
2003 44 2.50 1.17
2004 44 2.50 1.17
2005 44 2.55 1.11
2006 44 2.61 1.06
2007 44 2.61 1.06
Total 694 2.43 1.16
Table 5.5  Changes in the Index of State Licensing Regulation for 
Plumbers, 1992–2007
SOURCE: Authors’ survey of licensing statutes for plumbers by state, 1992 to 2007.
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is on cases involving injuries of workers from the age of 16 to 64 that 
resulted in an absence from work, as measured by “days away from 
work.”6
Table 5.6 shows the main events resulting in workplace nonfatal 
injuries for electricians and plumbers from 1992 through 2007. The 
industry rate for both occupations is about the same—namely 15 per-
cent for electricians and 13 percent for plumbers. For both regulated 
occupations, overexertion in lifting resulted in the highest number of 
nonfatal injuries. For electricians, injuries such as falling and bending 
were also important types of injuries. Similarly, bending and falls were 
major forms of nonfatal injuries for plumbers. 
To maintain consistency in the analysis, much of the data is restricted 
to fatal injuries among workers ages 16 to 64 in the private sector, but 
including 50 states and the District of Columbia. The data are from the 
CFOI, another confi dential fatal injury data source that is administered 
and stored at the BLS offi ces in Washington, D.C.
Because the SOII and CFOI do not have the employment informa-
tion, one important issue in building an uninterrupted time series for 
the empirical analysis is to estimate the denominator (i.e., the employ-
ment within states in a given year) for computing both the injury rates 
and death rates at the workplace. Using the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) data from 1992 to 
2007 (downloaded from http://www.nber.org/morg/annual/), an esti-
mate was developed for employment of electricians in a state in a given 
year, and then the injury rates and death rates by state and year were 
computed.7 Finally, the sample selection rules for this study (e.g., per-
sons from the age of 16 to 64 and in the private sector) would necessar-
ily produce death and injury rates that are different from those publicly 
available through the BLS. 
Table 5.7 summarizes the fi ve most frequent events that led to fatal 
injuries for electricians. Not surprisingly, the results show that four of 
the frequent events were related to electrocutions and explained about 
55 percent of electrician deaths. Figure 5.6 compares the days away 
from work (a measure of the severity of the injury) for electricians, 
a regulated occupation, and for laborers, an unregulated construction 
occupation. The fi gure highlights two fi ndings. First, there are relatively 
small differences in the days away from work for the two occupations, 
which do very different tasks, but both are involved in diffi cult con-
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Electricians Plumbers
Events (code)
Estimated 
occurrences
% of estimated 
occurrences Events (code)
Estimated 
occurrences
% of estimated 
occurrences
Overexertion in lifting (221) 12,400 9.05 Overexertion in lifting (221) 17,100 14.05
Fall from ladder (113) 11,625 8.48 Bending, climbing, crawling, 
reaching, twisting (211)
7,742 6.36
Bending, climbing, crawling, 
reaching, twisting (211)
8,608 6.28 Struck by falling object (021) 6,406 5.26
Struck against stationary object 
(012)
7,405 5.40 Fall to fl oor, walkway, or other 
surface (131)
6,858 5.63
Struck by slipping handheld 
object (0232)
7,267 5.30 Fall from ladder (113) 6,061 4.98
Others 89,788 65.49 Others 77,552 63.71
Total 137,093 15 Total 121,719 13
SOURCE: The SOII and CFOI from 1992 to 2007.
Table 5.6  Five Main Events Causing Workplace Non-Fatal Injuries, 1992–2007
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Table 5.7  Five Main Events Causing Workplace Deaths for Electricians, 
1992–2007
Events (code)
% of actual 
occurrences
Contact with wiring, transformers, or other electrical 
components (3120)
26.0
Contact with overhead power lines (3130) 18.2
Fall from ladder (1130) 5.8
Contact with electric current of machine, tool, appliance, 
or light fi xture (3110)
5.0
Contact with electric current, unspecifi ed (3100) 4.5
Others 40.4
Total 99.9
NOTE: Column does not sum to 100.0 because of rounding.
SOURCE: The CFOI from 1992 to 2007.
Figure 5.6  Severity of Injuries Due to Nonfatal Injuries for Electricians 
and Laborers, by the Percentage Who Lost Days of Work
SOURCE: The SOII from 1992 to 2007.
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struction tasks at work. Second, most of the injuries were relatively 
minor: 47.7 percent of injured electricians returned to work within fi ve 
days, and 77 percent returned to work within a month. Injuries causing 
absence from work for more than 180 days made up only 1.6 percent 
of the total.
Economic Data
As a key part of the examination of the infl uence of regulation on 
the labor market, the analysis uses data from the CPS MORG. Table 
5.8 presents the basic information that was used for the analysis. The 
standard variables from the MORG include human capital variables 
for electricians such as gender, age, experience, education, race, part-
time employment, union membership, and sector. The estimates for the 
wage models, using information from the American Community Sur-
vey (ACS) from 2000 through 2007, show that the results are similar to 
those in the CPS. Since the ACS has no information on unionization—
an important element for occupational licensing in wage and safety 
determination—the results only present estimates from the CPS. 
The empirical strategy was to initially estimate the role of regula-
tion on wage determination for workers in construction, with an empha-
sis on electricians.8 These models will update and refi ne the work by 
Perloff (1980). Next, estimates were developed of the infl uence of occu-
pational licensing on the incidence, severity, and death of construction 
workers, with a focus on electricians. The estimates provide several 
tests of the robustness of the estimates with various specifi cations and 
across databases and occupations.
Wage Determination
Initially, there is an examination and estimate of an earnings model 
with licensing regulations. The basic model is specifi ed as follows:
(5.2) ln(Earningsist) = α + βRst + γXist + δs + θt + εist ,
where Earningsist represents the hourly earnings of electricians i in 
state s in year t; Rst stands for the licensing occupational regulations 
and components of the regulation in person i’s state s in year t; Xist is 
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the vector that includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each 
person; δ and θ are state and year fi xed effects, respectively; and εist is 
the error term in the panel data. 
Table 5.9 shows the estimates from the above model of the infl u-
ence of licensing on wages for electricians. The model also includes 
estimates of the infl uence of unions on wage determination, since it is 
also an important labor market institution in the construction industry. 
The results show no statistically signifi cant impact of the measure of 
the overall index of licensing on earnings. However, the additional esti-
mates suggest that licensing matters in most of the specifi cations in the 
model. For example, the summated rating scale of licensing at the state-
level variable is statistically signifi cant, but the magnitude of the coef-
fi cient is small. In contrast to the overall effects of licensing in the econ-
omy, the value for local licensing is signifi cant and positive for almost 
all the specifi cations (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). The range of signifi -
cant coeffi cients is from 8 to 13 percent. Several of the specifi c entry 
requirements are signifi cant. Local licensing regulations, such as ones 
Variable n Mean sd
Hourly earnings 9,747 21.13 9.85
Gender (1: male; 0: female) 11,050 0.98 0.13
Age (years) 11,050 37.09 10.91
Experience (age − years of school − 6) 11,050 18.46 10.95
Experience squared (÷ 1,000) 11,050 4.61 4.68
High school graduate 11,050 0.46 0.50
Some college experience 11,050 0.24 0.43
College diploma or more 11,050 0.23 0.42
Marriage 11,050 0.63 0.48
White 11,050 0.92 0.27
Hispanic origin 11,050 0.83 0.28
Part-time 11,050 0.02 0.15
Government 11,050 0.02 0.14
Union member 9,748 0.37 0.48
Table 5.8  Basic Statistics from the CPS MORG, 1992–2007, for 
Electricians
SOURCE: The Current Population Survey’s Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) 
fi les, from 1992 to 2007.
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that are quite diffi cult (e.g., those that exist in Cook County, Illinois), 
can serve to raise the wages of electricians. In addition, the coeffi cients 
for the general requirements of age and education are signifi cant, as are 
the provisions for taking an exam and having an apprenticeship. This 
is also consistent with the institutional industrial-relations approach 
that holds that occupations can gain economic advantages by limiting 
the geographic market (Perlman 1928). Further analysis of licensing at 
the local level and for other construction-related occupations could add 
more detailed geographical data to the basic results for electricians.
In order to probe the basic wage estimate further, Table 5.10 presents 
the role of potential compensating wage differentials within the context 
of occupational licensing, injury rates, and worker compensation insur-
ance controls. The estimates suggest a small infl uence of approximately 
1 percent on the logarithm of hourly wages for a 1-percentage-point 
increase in the injury rate. Most of the other licensing variables main-
tain similar magnitudes and signifi cance, with the inclusion of both a 
measure of workers’ compensation insurance premiums and the rate of 
injury. These fi ndings are consistent with other estimates, dating to the 
original work by Adam Smith (see the 1937 edition of the original 1776 
volume) on the trade-off of higher wages for more risk, and appear to 
hold for the model and the use of the CPS data (Smith 1937).
In contrast to the estimates for electricians, the wage effects for 
plumbers were not nearly as robust or as clear, and consequently are not 
shown in a separate table, since the estimates are not stable or signifi -
cant.9 As with electricians, the infl uence of the overall index for licens-
ing is not statistically signifi cant. Moreover, there is no clear pattern 
of regulation having an infl uence at the state or local level or having 
an impact on wage determination. Unlike the infl uence of apprentice-
ships, exam requirements, and continuing education requirements for 
electricians, there was, if anything, a small, negative infl uence of these 
required policies on the wage determination for plumbers. In other 
words, low-quality plumbers may be substituted for those who do have 
these requirements, and they are the ones who are getting more work in 
the construction industry. Moreover, given the lack of variation in the 
data for plumbers, there may be more noise in the wage data for this 
occupation. Nevertheless, these results can serve as a starting point for 
further research into the puzzle as to why regulations matter so little for 
this highly skilled and regulated occupation. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Union 
membership
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
0.270***
(0.013)
State license −0.056**
(0.025)
−0.045*
(0.024)
−0.007
(0.045)
0.013
(0.041)
Local license 0.069
(0.052)
0.083*
(0.048)
0.124***
(0.032)
0.128***
(0.029)
0.065**
(0.029)
0.130***
(0.038)
0.125***
(0.030)
0.070**
(0.029)
0.072**
(0.030)
0.086*
(0.043)
Summated 
measures
0.028***
(0.009)
0.033***
(0.008)
General 
requirements
0.087***
(0.021)
0.077**
(0.036)
Apprenticeship 
code
0.064**
(0.029)
−0.018
(0.028)
Written exam 0.070**
(0.027)
0.044
(0.028)
Performance 
exam
0.004
(0.009)
−0.055
(0.038)
Continuing 
education
0.054
(0.037)
0.035
(0.023)
Constant 1.745***
(0.121)
1.743***
(0.106)
1.696***
(0.129)
1.683***
(0.116)
1.597***
(0.124)
1.588***
(0.106)
1.691***
(0.098)
1.631***
(0.111)
1.619***
(0.107)
1.694***
(0.099)
1.695***
(0.099)
1.715***
(0.110)
Basic controlsa Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State controlsb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 5.9  The Infl uence of Occupational Licensing on Hourly Earnings for Electricians, 1992–2007
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NOTE: Columns show the infl uence of each measure of regulation on hourly earnings of electricians with the control variables listed below. *signifi cant 
at the 0.10 level; **signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a “Basic controls” include gender; age; experience and experience squared; dummy variables indicating  high school graduates, some college experience, 
and college graduates and more levels of education; marital status; white, Hispanic origin; part-time; and governmental workers. 
b “State controls” include employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction industry.
SOURCE: CPS data.
N 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724 9,724
R-squared 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36
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Table 5.10  Compensating Differentials for Injuries with Licensing Effects on Hourly Earnings for Electricians, 
1992–2007
Hourly earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Wc premium ratea −0.010 −0.010 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010 −0.011
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Injury rate 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Union 
membership
0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261*** 0.261***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
State license −0.056** 0.021
(0.024) (0.040)
Local license 0.107** 0.140*** 0.083*** 0.152*** 0.136*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.074**
(0.041) (0.021) (0.019) (0.043) (0.027) (0.019) (0.020) (0.032)
Summated 
measures
0.031***
(0.009)
General 
requirements
0.111***
(0.030)
0.016
(0.037)
Apprenticeship 
code
0.069***
(0.041)
−0.030*
(0.016)
Written exam 0.063** 0.026
(0.030) (0.030)
Performance 
exam
−0.012
(0.016)
−0.014
(0.016)
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NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; **signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, 
are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a “Wc premium rate” is the compensating differential—how much extra workers get paid for doing more dangerous work.
b “Basic controls” include gender; age; experience and experience squared; dummy variables indicating  high school graduates, some col-
lege experience, and college graduates and more levels of education; marital status; white, Hispanic origin; part-time; and governmental 
workers. 
c “State controls” include employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction industry.
SOURCE: CPS data.
Continuing 
education
0.024
(0.071)
−0.000
(0.049)
Constant 1.752*** 1.679*** 1.605*** 1.702*** 1.634*** 1.631*** 1.712*** 1.698*** 1.716
(0.099) (0.108) (0.102) (0.096) (0.110) (0.106) (0.096) (0.095) (0.105)
Basic controlsb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State controlsc Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.033
N 5,975 5,975 5,975 5,975 5,975 5,975 5,975 5,975 5,975
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IMPLEMENTING THE HEALTH AND SAFETY MODELS 
WITH LICENSING REGULATIONS
The main part of the analysis focuses on the incidence of injuries at 
the state level. This approach is then expanded by including two more 
stringent measures of safety outcomes in the model. The methods of 
developing the data for our analysis are shown in Appendix Table B.2. 
These measures include the severity of injuries, as measured by days 
away from work due to injury or illness and by the death incidence 
rates at the state level. The basic model for the injury incidence rate 
can be stated as follows:
(5.3) Injury Ratesst = α + βRst + γXst + δs + ηt + εst ,
where Injury Ratesst stands for the injury incidence rates of electricians 
in state s in year t; Rst represents the licensing occupational regulations 
and components of the regulation in state s in year t; Xst is the vector 
that includes covariates measuring characteristics of each state s; δ and 
η are state and year fi xed effects, respectively; and εst is the error term.10 
Table 5.11 shows the infl uence of licensing on the reporting of inju-
ries for electricians. The overall summated rating scale shows a positive 
infl uence, and several of the elements of the index, such as general age 
and education requirements, apprenticeships, and continuing educa-
tion, are all positively related to the incidence or reporting of workplace 
injuries. However, the existence of a performance exam, which pro-
vides direct evidence of the skills an electrician must exhibit in order 
to become licensed, is negatively related to the reporting of workplace 
injuries. One reason for the increase in the reporting and documentation 
of injuries may be that licensing requires more incidence reporting and 
documentation of any type of work-related injury. The implementation 
of a licensing regime requires the more technical types of regulatory 
requirements, but they are not necessarily related to serious types of 
injuries.11 
Table 5.12 provides information on the role of state licensing on 
the state injury rate for plumbers. The results show that the regulations 
have no infl uence on the injury rates. The injury rate for plumbers is 
low, and there is little variation in the injury rates for the members of 
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the occupation across states. Similar to the licensing of electricians, 
licensing of plumbers does not seem to improve the injury rate in the 
occupation.
The next section of the analysis of injuries and occupational regula-
tion examines the severity of injuries at the individual level using infor-
mation on the duration of time away from work because of injuries, 
as recorded in the SOII. The severity of injury model can be stated as 
follows:
(5.4) Severity of Injuryist = α + βRst + γXist + δs + ηt + εist ,
where Severity of Injuryist is measured by the days away from work 
because of injury/illness of individual electricians i in state s in year t; 
Rst is the licensing measure of occupational regulation and its compo-
nents in person i’s state s in year t; Xist is the vector that includes covari-
ates measuring the characteristics of each injured/ill person as well as of 
the state where the person was injured; δ and η are state and year fi xed 
effects, respectively; and εist is the error term.
Specifi cally, we estimate Equation (5.4) using a Weibull survival 
model, a commonly used estimation method in the unemployment and 
workers’ compensation literature (e.g., Butler and Worrall 1983). This 
statistical model estimates the time it takes to return to work based on 
the characteristics of occupational licensing and state and year of the 
injury. It should be noted that some of the information on these indi-
viduals from the SOII that was needed to create the control variables is 
different from those in the wage equations. From the survival analysis, 
the estimates for the severity of injuries based on the time needed to 
return to work for electricians are presented in Table 5.13. In contrast 
to the positive estimates presented in the previous table, in Table 5.13 
the estimates show that licensing has no signifi cant impact on the time 
it takes to return to work following an injury. The coeffi cient for a per-
formance exam reduces the duration of being away from work, which 
is consistent with the results in Table 5.11. In Table 5.13, the only other 
licensing provision that increases the duration of the days to return to 
work from an injury for electricians is the continuing education vari-
able. The estimates show no general infl uence of the role for licensing 
on the days away from work in the fi xed-effects models. 
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158  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
State license −0.443
(0.952)
−0.182
(0.943)
Local license 0.420 2.625 0.420 3.121 1.359 0.592 1.171 1.982
(1.754) (1.579) (1.451) (1.853) (1.598) (1.456) (1.516) (2.076)
Summated 
measures
1.105**
(0.478)
General 
requirements
3.329**
(1.305)
2.045
(1.445)
Apprenticeship 
code
2.749**
(1.077)
1.123*
(0.641)
Written exam 1.244 0.124
(1.227) (1.245)
Performance 
exam
−4.579***
(0.948)
0.241
(2.371)
Continuing 
education
1.629*
(0.885)
1.086
(0.848)
Constant 3.743 2.240 −2.080 1.415 −1.789 0.483 6.593 2.157 −0.205
(4.373) (4.671) (4.793) (4.177) (4.560) (4.854) (4.427) (4.104) (4.523)
Basic controlsa Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State controlsb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 5.11  Infl uence of Occupational Licensing on Workplace Injury Rates for Electricians, 1992–2007
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NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; **signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, 
are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a “Basic controls” include proportions of the population ages 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64; proportion of married; white and 
other nonwhite; and proportions of high school graduates, some college experience, and college graduates and more levels of education. 
b “State controls” include laborers’ injury rate, employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction 
industry.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
N 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620
R 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42
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The fi nal model that is estimated tests for the role of occupational 
regulation in the incidence of death rates for electricians. The basic 
specifi cation follows the earlier models and is presented as follows:
(5.5)  Death RatesstE = α + βRst + γXst + δs + θt + εst ,
where Death Ratesst represents the death incidence rates of Electricians 
(E) in state s in year t; R
st
 stands for the licensing occupational regula-
Workplace injury rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Licensed 0.073 0.481
(0.304) (1.213)
State license 0.090 0.492
(0.324) (1.220)
Local license −0.042 −2.113
(0.561) (1.386)
Apprenticeship 0.237
(0.564)
Exam 
requirement
0.274
(0.846)
Continuing 
education
0.088
(0.645)
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other state 
controls
N Y N Y Y Y Y
State fi xed N Y N Y Y Y Y
Observations 578 578 578 578 514 514 514
R-squared 0.16 0.28 0.16 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27
Table 5.12  The Effects of Occupational Licensing on the State 
Workplace Injury Rates for Plumbers, 1992–2007
NOTE: Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Other state con-
trols include the percentages of the following variables: the six age groups 20–24, 
25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 and greater (age group 16–19 is used as a refer-
ence); marriage status; white and nonwhite (the portion of African American is used 
as a reference); Hispanic origin; high school diploma, some college, college diploma 
and more (high school dropouts used as a reference); part-time; unemployment rate, 
employment growth, and union coverage in the construction industry. Y = yes; N = no.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
Kleiner2013.indb   160 9/18/2013   10:11:11 AM
Of Life, Limbs and Licensing: Electricians and Plumbers   161
tions and components of the regulation in state s in year t; Xst is the vec-
tor that includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each state s; 
δ and θ are state and year fi xed effects, respectively; and ε
st
 is the error 
term. 
Table 5.14 shows that measures of occupational regulation have 
little infl uence on the death rates of electricians in construction. The 
overall measure of regulation is negative but does not rise to the level 
of statistical signifi cance. Although the coeffi cient on the performance 
exam is statistically signifi cant and positive only at the 0.10 level, in 
contrast to the previous fi ndings in the other tables, the other compo-
nents of the government regulations are not signifi cant in reducing the 
death rates of electricians. The performance exam result for workplace 
deaths may be due to the small number of these events relative to the 
larger number of injuries that are more frequent and can be evaluated 
more carefully. We found that the results for regulations were similar to 
those of OSHA, which also found that regulations seem to have small 
effects on outcomes for safety and health (Weil 2001). 
In order to be consistent with reporting the earlier estimates for elec-
tricians, we include Table 5.15, which shows similar results for plumb-
ers. The model is the same basic one that was used for electricians. The 
results suggest that local licensing is associated with somewhat reduced 
death rates, but that state regulations do not have much statistical infl u-
ence on the death rates for plumbers for the period 1992 through 2007. 
Regulations at the state level do not appear to infl uence either wage 
determination or death and injury rates for plumbers. 
A fi nal set of estimates, presented in Table 5.16, illustrates the 
potential effect of endogeneity, which may present an issue to the extent 
that high levels of deaths and injuries in a previous period may have 
infl uenced the passage of state or locally based occupational licens-
ing laws for electricians. Table 5.16 shows the hazard ratios from a 
Weibull survival model. The estimates on prior deaths and injuries or 
prior workers’ compensation rates are not statistically signifi cant, indi-
cating an absence of this form of simultaneity bias.12 Although there 
may be unobservables that are not accounted for in the model, such 
as unique political factors in a state that contributed to the passage of 
licensing laws, there are no variables in standard data sets that show that 
these factors are obviously associated with the passage of laws regulat-
ing electricians. 
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Table 5.13  Hazard Model Estimates of the Infl uence of Occupational Licensing on Duration of the Days to Return 
to Work for Electricians (using a Weibull distribution of duration), 1992–2007
Days to return to work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
State license −0.018 −0.229
(0.075) (0.184)
Local license −0.149 0.106 0.070 0.210* −0.019 0.072 0.083 0.411***
(0.188) (0.081) (0.055) (0.116) (0.110) (0.054) (0.053) (0.116)
Summated measures 0.020
(0.030)
General requirements 0.028 −0.366***
(0.062) (0.136)
Apprenticeship code 0.137 0.469***
(0.112) (0.050)
Written exam −0.118 −0.171
(0.125) (0.124)
Performance exam −0.139* −0.135
(0.094) (0.091)
Continuing education 0.158*** 0.168***
(0.045) (0.056)
Constant −0.748*** −0.637* −0.916*** −0.857*** −0.991*** −0.735** −0.716** −0.863*** −0.991***
(0.272) (0.310) (0.316) (0.271) (0.313) (0.307) (0.306) (0.273) (0.318)
Basic controlsa Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State controlsb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
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NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; **signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Unstandardized coeffi cients are 
shown; standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a “Basic controls” include age, age squared, gender, and dummy variables, indicating four different groupings of length of services and 
four different groupings of races. 
b “State controls” include laborers’ injury rate, employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction 
industry.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
State fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Log Likelihood −266,510 −266,502 −266,526 −266,528 −266,509 −266,514 −266,529 −266,510 −266,426
N 20,745 20,745 20,745 20,745 20,745 20,745 20,745 20,745 20,745
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
State license −0.848 0.045
(0.882) (0.533)
Local license 1.478 1.333 1.408 0.578 1.524 1.435 1.377 −0.267
(1.495) (1.704) (1.348) (1.685) (1.671) (1.348) (1.531) (2.031)
Summated measures −0.056
(0.312)
General requirements 0.482 1.519
(1.024) (1.567)
Apprenticeship code −0.931 −2.025*
(0.812) (1.094)
Written exam 0.144 0.687
(0.997) (1.005)
Performance exam 5.806* 1.918
(3.160) (2.318)
Continuing education −0.170 −0.521
(0.830) (1.093)
Constant 0.354 −0.662 −0.388 −0.716 0.753 −0.796 −6.414 −0.614 −0.814
(4.431) (4.442) (4.145) (4.002) (4.198) (4.446) 5.372) (4.057) (4.012)
Basic controlsa Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State controlsb Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
State fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 5.14  Infl uence of Occupational Licensing on Workplace Death Rates for Electricians, 1992–2007
Kleiner2013.indb   164
Kleiner2013.indb   164
9/18/2013   10:11:12 A
M
9/18/2013   10:11:12 A
M
   165
NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parenthe-
ses, are clustered by state. Y = yes.
a “Basic controls” include proportions of the population ages 20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, and 55–64; proportion of married; white and 
other nonwhite; and proportions of high school graduates, some college experience, and college graduates and more levels of education. 
b “State controls” include laborers’ injury rate, employment growth rate, unemployment rate, and rate of union coverage in the construction 
industry.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
N 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809 809
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The general issue of occupational regulation has particular rel-
evance to the potential health and safety of electricians and plumbers, 
whose rates of occupational injuries and deaths are among the high-
Death rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Licensed −0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.009)
State license −0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.006)
Local license −0.007*** −0.016***
(0.002) (0.007)
Apprenticeship 0.005*
(0.003)
Exam 
requirement
−0.001
(0.005)
Continuing 
education
−0.003
(0.004)
Year fi xed Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Other state 
controls
N Y N Y Y Y Y
State fi xed N Y N Y Y Y Y
Observations 787 787 787 787 666 666 666
R-squared 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24
Table 5.15  The Effects of Occupational Licensing on the State Death 
Rates for Plumbers, 1992–2007
NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. Other 
state controls include the percentages of the following variables: the six age groups 
20–24, 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, and 65 and greater (using the age group 16–19 
as a reference); marriage status; white and nonwhite (using the portion of African 
American as a reference); Hispanic origin; high school diploma, some college, col-
lege diploma and more levels of education (using high school dropouts as a refer-
ence); part-time; and the unemployment rate, employment growth, and union cover-
age in the construction industry. Y = yes; N = no.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
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est of any blue-collar occupation. The main focus of this chapter has 
been the development of the fi rst analysis in a modeling framework 
of how licensing infl uences both wage determination and health and 
safety in the workplace. The chapter provides multivariate estimates 
linking various levels of state or local occupational regulation to levels 
of and changes in occupational injuries and deaths of electricians and 
plumbers. 
There has been signifi cant growth of licensing for both occupa-
tions at the state level from 1992 to 2007. First, the chapter documents 
the growth of regulation by states in the occupations. Next, the results 
show estimates of the impact of occupational regulation on wages. The 
results suggest that the infl uence of occupational regulation has gener-
ally been signifi cant for wage determination at both the state and local 
levels. Furthermore, estimates fi nd that there is a small but statistically 
signifi cant wage premium for the incidence of work-related injuries, 
which is consistent with much of the literature on compensating wage 
differentials for dangerous or unpleasant work. A potentially more 
effective policy seems to be the use of a social insurance such as work-
ers’ compensation to reduce the most severe occupational injuries and 
deaths at the workplace. 
Finally, the results for the incidence and severity of injury and death 
rates show that the impact of occupational regulation on deaths and 
injuries is statistically insignifi cant or murky in the multivariate analy-
sis for both electricians and plumbers. The estimates presented in this 
chapter provide a fi rst approximation and new data for the relation-
ship between occupational licensing, wages, and deaths and injuries for 
important occupations in the construction industry. Although regulation 
may have an infl uence through the monopoly effect on wage determi-
nation for electricians, licensing does not appear to be infl uential in 
reducing either life-threatening injuries or the risk of injuring limbs—
two hazards that workers in these two essential occupations face in the 
construction industry. 
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No licensing to state licensing Local licensing to state licensing
Variables (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
injury rate t 1.315 1.250 0.846 0.816
(0.240) (0.227) (0.100) (0.102)
injury rate t − 1 1.047 0.941 1.129 1.084
(0.309) (0.241) (0.268) (0.141)
work comp premium rate t 1.049 1.930 0.874 1.930
(0.316) (3.704) (0.246) (3.704)
work comp premium rate t − 1 1.015 0.551 0.910 0.551
(0.274) (1.077) (0.198) (1.077)
union coverage rate t 0.851* 0.778 0.807* 0.778
(0.833) (0.213) (0.100) (0.213)
union coverage rate t − 1 0.899* 1.098 0.883*** 1.098
(0.538) (0.246) (0.039) (0.246)
χ2 4.22 19.72 – 6.82 10.66 249.23
prob > χ2 0.23 0.00 – 0.08 0.01 0.00
log pseudo—likelihood 19.01 17.77 19.33 18.49 17.32 18.89
N 67 60 60 91 82 82
Table 5.16  Hazard Model Estimates of Time to Adoption of a State Occupational Licensing Statute for Electricians 
(using a Weibull distribution of duration), 2009
NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at the 0.01 level. Hazard ratios are shown. Standard 
errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered by state. χ2 and its p-value in column 3 with no licensing to state licensing are not shown, 
because these estimates were regarded as not reliable under the parameters set by StataCorp Data Analysis and Statistical Software.
SOURCE: CPS, SOII, and CFOI.
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Notes
 1. The research in the chapter was partially funded by the Center for Construction 
Research and Training through a grant from the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. I thank Kyoung Won Park for his assistance with this chapter. 
Park is an assistant professor in the School of Economics and Business Adminis-
tration at Hanyang University in the Republic of Korea.
 2. Table 5.5 shows the changes in the index of regulation from 1992 through 2007. 
  3. One example of such an innovation is plastic wiring, which may demand a differ-
ent safety protocol than copper wiring, but the licensing authority may still require 
the older procedures. The delays in implementation of offi cial protocol may lead 
to workplace injuries for electricians. 
 4. Although there is an ability to track the changes in the licensing provisions in the 
statutes and administrative regulations when these occupations are licensed at the 
state level, the ability to track local statutes is limited by both data availability and 
costs, and there is a lessened ability to obtain those changes when these occupa-
tions are licensed at the local level, such as with city and county regulations. As a 
consequence, the data contain only information on whether these occupations are 
licensed at the state or local level, and have only partial information on specifi c 
provisions of some key elements of the occupational regulations for plumbers and 
electricians at the substate level. 
 5. The three categories are 1) injuries that cause an absence from work, 2) injuries 
that cause a restriction of work or job transfer, and 3) injuries that do not affect 
working capacity (BLS 2013a). 
 6. Starting with the 2002 data, the SOII does not report injuries separate from ill-
nesses. We expect that the change in the measure should not have affected our 
analysis because illnesses account for less than 2 percent of nonfatal injuries and 
illness in BLS reports (Center for Construction Research and Training 2009).
 7.  Specifi cally, we computed the injury rate and death rate as follows: Injury rate = 
(Sum of the weight for the national estimate from the SOII / Estimated employ-
ment of electricians from the CPS MORG) × 100; and Death rate = (Actual num-
ber of deaths from the CFOI / Estimated number of employed electricians from the 
CPS MORG) × 10,000.
 8. The estimates for plumbers showed murky results both for the issue of wage deter-
mination and for health and safety. The results for health and safety show that 
there was a decline in deaths and injuries, but that decline stopped in the early 
2000s and held steady following that period. 
 9. Wage estimates for plumbers using state and year fi xed effects can be found in 
Kleiner and Park (2010b).
 10. The state-level control variables were aggregated using the individual variables 
from the CPS MORG data. The same state-level control variables are also included in 
empirical analyses for the state death rates.
 11. Another rationale for these fi ndings is that the use of state fi xed effects may serve 
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to infl ate the coeffi cient values. When we estimate the models without state fi xed 
effects, none of the licensing coeffi cients are signifi cant. 
 12. Estimates were also developed using the same models for death rates and injury 
rates for plumbers, and the results were qualitatively similar.
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Battles among Universally 
Licensed Occupations 
    
with Kyoung Won Park
   
Whether or not a dental hygiene clinic can be a successful busi-
ness model is none of a dentist’s business. The free market system 
will determine that, not a dentist. Most dentists are notoriously 
very poor businessmen/women.
—Reader comment made to a blog post about a California law 
allowing hygienists to open independent clinics (Frey 2008)
The American Dental Association has taken a strong stance against 
dental therapists in Minnesota and nationally, arguing that only a 
dentist has the skills to pull teeth or engage in other permanent or 
invasive procedures.
—Jackie Crosby (2012), Minneapolis Star Tribune writer
What are the policy issues among universally licensed occupations? 
This chapter focuses on occupations that are licensed in all states and 
focuses on one of the policy issues that may arise when two related 
occupations are not only complementary to each other but also able to 
be substituted for one another.1 The broad growth of occupational regu-
lations over the past 60 years has resulted in some situations in which 
licensing regulations create overlap between occupational groups, and 
in these situations occupations may compete for the same type of work. 
Unlike the previous chapters, which examine occupations that are not 
universally licensed, this chapter looks at occupations that are regulated 
in all 50 states and at some of the unintended consequences resulting 
from the policy of universal licensure. The issue of who gets to do the 
work and whether government should decide on these jurisdictional 
disputes is growing as the number of occupations that are licensed con-
tinues to expand. Furthermore, occupational subfi elds such as dental 
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hygienists have developed to the point where they are now licensed in 
all states. Examples of occupations that are both complementary and 
competitive are doctors and nurses, physical therapists and occupa-
tional therapists, dentists and hygienists, architects and interior design-
ers, engineers and architects, and electricians and electrical engineers. 
The public policy consequences can be substantial. In health care, for 
example, in states where licensing laws allow only doctors to provide 
certain common procedures related to well-baby exams, these proce-
dures cost as much as 8 to 10 percent more than in states where nurse 
practitioners can perform the same procedures (Kleiner et al. 2012). 
This chapter focuses on two occupations—dentists and dental 
hygienists—that are universally licensed and provide complementary 
services to patients, but that also, as service providers, can act as sub-
stitutes for certain tasks. However, for key services the states determine 
who can do the work, the market structure, and what is required for the 
patient. The chapter examines the labor market implications of these 
governmental requirements. With the growth in the number of individu-
als who are regulated or are seeking regulation by the states, this case 
study is able to illuminate the potential economic issues of the increased 
regulation of occupations in the U.S. labor market, especially where the 
work of the regulated occupations overlaps. It also gives an illustration 
of the kinds of issues that arise as more occupations become regulated 
and turf battles arise over who is legally allowed to do work for pay.
In order to examine the relationships between dentists and hygien-
ists, the chapter initially explores the evolution of state regulation for 
both occupations, and what battle lines have evolved for the occupa-
tions. Next, it shows the anatomy of state regulations for dental hygien-
ists over time. The chapter further develops an approach that describes 
the basic production function in dentistry, with dentists fulfi lling an 
essential role and hygienists providing additional key elements. The 
results show how a potential monopsony relationship between dentists 
and hygienists can develop—i.e., a relationship where there is only one 
feasible employer, where there are frictions in the market and employ-
ers have the ability to collude to set wages, and which then infl uences 
the earnings and employment of hygienists and dentists. In an empirical 
section, the infl uence on hygienists’ earnings of state regulations that 
grant hygienists the ability to be self-employed is shown to be associ-
ated with an earnings increase of approximately 10 percent. Further-
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more, when hygienists are able to work without the supervision of a 
dentist, there is an associated increase in the state-level employment 
growth of hygienists, but a decrease in the employment growth and 
earnings for dentists. This suggests that for some tasks they are sub-
stitutes for one another. These results are robust to sensitivity tests for 
similar partially licensed occupations and other health-related occupa-
tions that are regulated. To the extent that these results suggest ineffi -
ciencies due to licensing and monopsonistic deadweight loss, the chap-
ter provides estimates of these losses. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
REGULATION OF DENTISTS AND DENTAL HYGIENISTS
This part of the chapter presents the evolution of state licensing of 
dentists and hygienists and shows how state policies have changed from 
fostering a situation in which dentists had almost exclusive control of 
the hygienist labor market activities to creating a situation that favors 
greater autonomy for dental hygienists (Adams 2004).
The state licensing of dentists initially started in South Carolina in 
1876; Pennsylvania followed suit the next year. The last state to fully 
license dentists was North Carolina in 1935. As of 2011, most mem-
bers of licensing boards are appointed by the governor through a list 
provided by the state dental association. Generally, dentists dominate 
membership on the state licensing boards. However, other licensed pro-
fessionals such as hygienists or dental assistants may also be on licens-
ing boards in states where they are regulated, and they generally have a 
minor role in the process. In 2010, 17 states had separate hygienist com-
mittees that provided recommendations to the board and, in some cases, 
to the legislature (Wanchek 2010). As recently as 1994, nine states for-
bid the employment of more than two hygienists per dentist in a dental 
offi ce, fi xing the ratio for these two occupations (ADHA 1994). One of 
the functions of the licensing board is to deal with disciplinary issues 
involving dentists, which vary from sexual harassment of patients to 
incompetent delivery of dental services. However, the licensing board 
function that deals with the allocation of work among various service 
providers and that gives services to clients is of direct interest for the 
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analysis. For example, the licensing board makes recommendations to 
the legislature on regulations governing which occupation provides cer-
tain dental services. Furthermore, it provides legal services to defend 
regulatory practices in state courts. In addition, the board can issue 
statements on appropriate regulations for continuing education, such as 
which classes count toward the completion of the requirement. Finally, 
the licensing board usually has the ability to determine which proce-
dures, such as dental sealants, are appropriate for each occupational 
category, from dentist to dental assistant.
The Regulation of Hygienists
The state licensing of dental hygienists began with the regulation 
of hygienists by New York in 1868. Over 50 years passed before other 
state governments followed suit, when fi ve additional states licensed 
this occupation between 1919 and 1921. By 1952, 29 states had full 
licensing of dental hygienists, and by the early 1950s all of the other 
states started to license dental hygienists (Council of State Governments 
1952). A relatively unique part of the regulation of dental hygienists is 
that hygienists are regulated by dentists, rather than self-regulated, in 
most states (Wanchek 2010)—exceptions are Washington, Connecticut, 
and New Mexico. In Washington, dental hygienists are regulated by the 
director of the state health department in consultation with a commit-
tee of three dental hygienists and a consumer. In Connecticut, dental 
hygienists are regulated directly by the health department. In New Mex-
ico, hygienists are regulated by a committee of fi ve dental hygienists, 
one dentist, and a consumer. In all the other states, dentists dominate the 
decision-making process of who gets to do the work.
Initially, dental hygiene programs lasted for one year, but they have 
since been expanded. In 2010, depending on the state, it took between 
two and four years to complete the education requirements. A particu-
larly illustrative example of regulatory oversight of the occupation 
occurred when military dental hygienists who returned to the civilian 
workforce requested permission to sit for the hygienist’s exam. The 
civilian hygienists protested, saying that the military hygienists needed 
the same number of years of dental hygiene training as the civilian 
hygienists in order to take the licensing exam. 
Kleiner2013.indb   174 9/18/2013   10:11:15 AM
Battles among Universally Licensed Occupations   175
One of the key issues for the licensing boards of dental services was 
the work that dentists could do relative to hygienists and the supervision 
of dental hygienists by dentists (Helm 1993). Traditionally, dentists are 
required to be physically present when hygienists are doing their work. 
The licensing board would determine the precise meaning of the require-
ment, but it would generally mean that dentists had to be physically 
present somewhere in the building. Since dentists can either engage in 
leisure or see other patients while hygienists are seeing patients, this 
practice could be perceived as a form of featherbedding, where services 
are paid for without any clearly defi ned work being provided.
As early as 1932, the issue of determining the proper tasks of 
hygienists relative to dentists was raised at national meetings of hygien-
ists, with a view that hygienists should have greater autonomy. Spe-
cifi cally, this meant the ability to work independently of dentists and to 
conduct more sophisticated dental procedures. A key part of the history 
of the profession has focused on the importance of hygienists playing 
a more important role in the policy process, particularly with respect to 
legislative issues. Until 1988, when Colorado fi rst allowed hygienists to 
practice without the direct supervision of a dentist, hygienists had been 
required to work for or be under the direction of a dentist. Since that 
time, seven states have allowed hygienists to be self-employed without 
the direct oversight of a dentist. Hygienists also have attempted to limit 
the supply of practitioners. For example, as of 2007, no state permit-
ted reciprocity, or the movement of dental hygienists from other states. 
Dental hygienists must meet the requirements of the state they are mov-
ing to in order to be granted a license. 
As of 2007, seven states (California, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, 
New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington) allowed hygienists to be self-
employed other than as independent contractors to dentists, and only 
three states (California, Colorado, and New Mexico) permitted a dental 
hygienist to own a dental hygiene practice (Beach et. al. 2007). Mon-
tana and Nebraska adopted the provision allowing hygienists to be 
self-employed other than as independent contractors in 2003 and 2007, 
respectively. The work by dental hygienists who are self-employed is 
restricted to specifi c dental practices that vary across these states. For 
example, in Colorado hygienists are allowed to clean teeth and do sim-
ple restorative work, independently of dentists.
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In the late 1970s, the American Dental Hygienists’ Association 
(ADHA) supported alternative practice methods that would allow the 
dental hygienist to become the primary provider of initial services, in 
accordance with state dental and dental hygiene practice acts (Motley 
1988). In response to these policy changes, the American Dental Asso-
ciation (ADA) passed a resolution stating that dental hygienists are 
auxiliaries who must work under the supervision of a dentist, who also 
would retain ownership and managerial authority (Beach et al. 2007). 
Over time, hygienists have been able to gain greater authority in certain 
states (as granted by the legislatures) as their numbers have increased 
in overall dental practice and consequently their infl uence in crafting 
licensing laws has grown. As of 2008 there were more than 174,000 
dental hygienists in the United States (BLS 2012a). These policy provi-
sions by the two dental service organizations set the battleground for 
confl icts in state legislatures, licensing boards, and the courts.
State-Level Examination of Dental Hygienists’ Legally Permitted 
Job Characteristics
As noted earlier, the number of tasks that dental hygienists have 
been permitted to do over the past several years has grown. Table 6.1 
provides a full listing of the provisions that are graphed in Figure 6.1; 
some of the key components of the tasks include prophylaxis (clean-
ing), fl uoride treatment, sealant application, x-rays, amalgam restora-
tions, local anesthesia, nitrous oxide, initial screening, and patient refer-
ral (National Center for Health Workforce Analysis 2004). In order to 
show the growth in hygienists’ autonomy over time, Figure 6.1 uses 
a box-and-whisker graphic analysis of state regulation, which gives 
the mean and spread of the regulation of hygienists over the period 
2001–2007. Panel A shows the overall ranking of the dental hygienists’ 
professional practice environment that is allowed by statute or legal 
rulings. Panel B shows the number of dental tasks that hygienists are 
permitted to do, independently of dentists, by state law or administra-
tive or court rulings in the state.  
A report funded by the Kellogg Foundation, the Rasmuson Founda-
tion, and the Bethel Community Services Foundation showed that dental 
hygienists did as well as dentists in performing routine tasks such as the 
ones listed here (Wetterhall et al. 2010). The results in Panels A and B 
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of Figure 6.1 show a movement toward greater autonomy for hygienists 
in dental practice from 2001 to 2007. The mean value of the summated 
rating scale for all states was 43.67 (sd = 19.84) in 2001 and increased 
to 49.10 (sd = 20.54) by 2007 (out of 100 possible points). Most of the 
changes in state regulations occurred between 2002 and 2007, a period 
during which more states allowed hygienists to perform additional pro-
cedures. Panel A shows the overall results, which suggest that in spite of 
generally greater control of the regulatory process by dentists, hygien-
ists have been able to gain more autonomy over the delivery of dental 
services, including the ability to control their own offi ces without the 
supervision of a dentist. Moreover, even within states that have full 
control over the delivery of dental services, there has been growth in the 
independence of hygienists from monitoring by dentists with respect to 
Figure 6.1  Box-and-Whisker Graph Showing the Growth and Spread of 
State Regulations on the Professional Practice Environment 
of Dental Hygienists, by State over Time
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Panel A: Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI), 2001–2007
(continued)
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specifi c dental procedures, and likely an increase in the skills and edu-
cation of hygienists, as provided to clients of dental services.
The next section of the chapter verbally models the role of dentists 
and hygienists in the production of dental services and shows how the 
market for hygienists’ services may resemble a monopsony in certain 
elements of the market for dentists and hygienists.
NOTE: The box-and-whisker plot shows annual values, by year, of the median, inter-
quartile range, and outliers of the summated rating scale based on the National Center 
for Health Workforce Analysis’s (2004) Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index 
(DHPPI). The line in the middle of the box represents the median. The bottom and top 
edges of the box are the fi rst and third quartiles, respectively. The whiskers extend-
ing from the box represent the most extreme point within the range of one-and-a-half 
times the interquartile range (the difference between the third and fi rst quartiles). The 
remaining points represent outliers that do not fall within the range of the whiskers; 
for the defi nition of each of the variables, see Table 6.1, and for detailed sample sta-
tistics, see Panel B in Table 6.3.
SOURCE: National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2004).
Panel B: Number of tasks permitted over 2001–2007
Figure 6.1  (continued)
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A MODEL OF DENTAL SERVICES PRODUCTION
This section initially develops the basic production function for 
dental services and then expands it to include government regulation 
of work practices, where dentists are required to supervise hygienists. 
The model serves as a basis to inform the empirical work, rather than as 
a fully specifi ed general equilibrium model of dental production under 
regulation. The unit of analysis for the model is the offi ce-based dental 
practice. Following Reinhardt (1972), this entity can be treated as a fi rm 
of which the dentist is the owner/manager who faces a profi t maximiza-
tion decision. Within this context, the dentist makes decisions regarding 
Variables Defi nitions
DHPPI A simple sum of all the components of the DHPPI, ranging 
from 0 to 100.
tasks permitted 
(summated)
A simple sum of whether hygienists are permitted to perform 
the following practices: prophylaxis, fl uoride treatment, sealant 
application, x-rays, amalgam restorations, local anesthesia, 
nitrous oxide, initial screening/assessment, refer patients, 
and other expanded functions. We coded each practice as 1 if 
hygienists are allowed to perform; otherwise coded as 0. 
tasks permitted 
(Rasch)
A Rasch scale of tasks permitted that is used to form the 
summated measure of tasks permitted.
independence 
from dentists 
(summated)
A simple sum of whether hygienists are able to perform 
dental hygiene practices without supervision of dentists at the 
following locations: dentist’s offi ce, long-term care facilities, 
schools, public health agencies, correctional facilities, 
mental health facilities, hospitals/rehabilitation hospitals or 
convalescent settings, and personal residences. We coded each 
location as 1 if hygienists are able to perform dental hygiene 
practices without supervision of dentists; otherwise 0.
independence from 
dentists (Rasch)
A Rasch scale of independence from dentists that is used to 
form the summated measure of independence from dentists.
self-employment 
allowed
We coded 1 when the provision allows hygienist to be self-
employed other than as independent contractor; otherwise 0.
Table 6.1  Defi nitions of Regulatory Variables
SOURCE: National Center for Health Workforce Analysis (2004).
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her own effort to maximize income, subject to constraints including the 
technical production relationship between her labor and other inputs. 
These inputs include capital and the use of hygienists and other some-
what less knowledgeable workers, such as dental technicians, aides, 
and clerical and administrative assistants.
As was noted earlier in this book, Shapiro (1986) provides a guide 
for analyzing occupations that are universally licensed. In his model 
of licensing he envisions a labor market where service output has two 
types of workers: high-skilled and lower-skilled. In order to adapt the 
model to a production function and the market for dentists and hygien-
ists, one can think of a stylized version of production and output. If 
labor services can be provided only by a dentist and hygienists can 
work only for a dentist, then dental services can be provided only when 
a dentist is present. Hygienists’ income and work are therefore tied to 
the success of a dentist. 
Within this profi t relationship for the dentists, the hygienist’s wage 
is determined by the decisions of the dentist as to the use of the hygien-
ist’s labor input and technology mix by the high-skilled provider, the 
dentist. Assuming profi ts are constant, as the hygienist’s wage goes 
down, the dentist’s wage will go up. Also implied is that the hygienist’s 
employment will go up and the dentist’s employment will go down. 
These conditions, which are a modifi ed production function, can there-
fore lead to conditions that are consistent with elements of a monop-
sony market for hygienists who are controlled by dentists.
CAN REGULATION RESULT IN CONDITIONS CONSISTENT 
WITH MONOPSONY IN THE LABOR MARKET?
Milton Friedman noted that under occupational licensing, all reg-
ulated occupations are often assumed to attempt to capture the rents 
of licensing and reallocate resources from the consumer to the regu-
lated practitioners (Friedman 1962). The application to this case study 
assumes that the relatively low-skilled (hygienist) workers can by law 
do only low-skilled work and are allowed to work only under the super-
vision of relatively high-skilled workers. With favorable regulation for 
dentists, the high-skilled workers that control low-skilled workers’ tasks 
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and their ability to do work only for certain types of employers have 
the monopsonistic characteristics of employing lower-skilled workers 
and capturing rents. When regulation of employment by high-skilled 
workers of low-skilled workers ceases, low-skilled workers can open 
their own establishments and capture the licensing rents for themselves 
(Groshen 1991). For monopsony to exist, the labor market must gener-
ally have two key assumptions (Manning 2003). First, important fric-
tions are assumed to be present. In the case of two universally licensed 
occupations, with one dominant, this requires the supervision of the 
other, and the assumption of frictions in the labor market is established. 
In this case, state law requires that hygienists work under the supervi-
sion of a dentist; they are not allowed to work on their own or open an 
offi ce in competition with a dentist. 
Second, employers have some ability to set wages. Since dental 
hygienists have no major options for employment other than working 
for or under the supervision of a dentist, dentists can have signifi cant 
market power to collude to set wages in a local market. This is consis-
tent with one of the elements of monopsony (Lipscomb and Douglass 
1982). Even if there are many dentists bidding for their services, the 
market for hygienists is less than it would be without either the legal 
constraints established through law or the administrative rules estab-
lished by the dental board. Although not an ideal case of monopsony, 
such as the textbook cases of mine operators in a small town or a large 
manufacturer in a small isolated town, the general conditions estab-
lished by Manning are present in the case of dentists and hygienists.
A simple model of monopsony in the context of occupational licens-
ing is shown in Figure 6.2, where a monopsonist employer maximizes 
profi ts with employment L, which equates demand (given by the mar-
ginal revenue product of labor [MRPL] curve) to marginal cost MC at 
point A. With licensing, both occupations are able to restrict the supply 
of labor and raise wages within their occupation. The model informs the 
empirical work in the next section of the study.
In the case where dentists are making positive profi ts on the marginal 
hygienists, there is no incentive to increase employment because doing 
so would require increasing the wage to attract the extra worker, and 
this higher wage must be paid to all existing workers. The gap between 
the wage and the marginal revenue product in Figure 6.2 is referred to 
as the rate of exploitation (Manning 2003). In the case of hygienists, 
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the model predicts that laws that require hygienists to work for or be 
supervised by dentists would result in lower wages and employment for 
hygienists. In addition, if the laws were relaxed, there would likely be 
lower earnings and employment for dentists, since the level of exploita-
Figure 6.2  A Graphical Representation on Monopsony and Licensing
NOTE: A monopsonist employer maximizes profi ts with employment LM, which 
equates demand, given by the marginal revenue product of labor (MRPL) curve, to 
marginal cost MC at point A. Supply curve SL is the result of licensing. The wage is 
then determined on the supply curve of licensed workers SL, at point M, and is equal 
to wM. By contrast, a competitive labor market would reach equilibrium at point C, 
where supply S* equals demand. This would lead to employment L* and wage w*. 
Triangle AMC is deadweight loss, the part that has been lost by society as a result of 
the monopsonistic restriction of employment; and rectangle wLwMMM’ is the part that 
the monopsonist licensed employer has exploited from the other licensed workers. 
Triangle LL”C is deadweight loss, the part of the competitive social surplus that has 
been lost by society because of the licensing of workers.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors.
W
ag
e
Y’(N)
wL
wM
w*
A
M’
M
L
L’ C
S*
SL
MCSL
L”
MRPL
LM LL L*
Employment
Kleiner2013.indb   182 9/18/2013   10:11:18 AM
Battles among Universally Licensed Occupations   183
tion would be reduced. Furthermore, the lower employment and wage 
caused by the monopsony power has two distinct effects on the eco-
nomic welfare of the occupations. First, the law favors dentists’ control 
over the market structure and, as a consequence, it redistributes welfare 
away from workers (hygienists) to their employers (dentists). Second, 
the market structure established by these two occupations reduces the 
aggregate (or social) welfare enjoyed by both groups taken together, 
since the employers’ net gain is smaller than the loss infl icted on work-
ers. It is a net social loss or deadweight loss. As such, it is a measure of 
the market failure caused by monopsony power, through a misalloca-
tion of resources to employer dentists and away from worker hygienists. 
Figure 6.2 also shows that a monopsonist employer in the face of 
licensing maximizes profi ts with employment LM in a way that equates 
demand (given by the marginal revenue product of labor [MRPL] 
curve) to marginal cost MC at point A. The supply curve SL is the result 
of licensing. The wage (w) is then determined on the supply curve of 
licensed workers SL, at point M, and is equal to wM. By contrast, a com-
petitive labor market would reach equilibrium at point C, where supply 
S* equals demand. This would lead to employment L* and wage w*. 
Triangle AMC is deadweight loss, the part that has been lost by soci-
ety as a result of the monopsonistic restriction of employment by both 
occupations; and rectangle wLwMMM’ is the part that the monopsonist 
licensed employer has exploited from the other licensed workers. Trian-
gle LL”C is deadweight loss, the part of the competitive social surplus 
that has been lost by society because of the licensing of workers.
The estimates of the empirical infl uence of monopsony without 
licensing have been mixed. For example, the results for specifi c indus-
tries range from major league baseball, where the impact has been large 
(100 to 600 percent), to teachers, nurses, and nursing assistants, where 
the infl uence has been 5 percent or less (Scully 1974; Zimbalist 1992; 
Kahn 2000; Matsudaira 2010). For the overall labor market, the impact 
of monopsony has been estimated at less than 3 percent (Brown and 
Medoff 1989). This analysis is the fi rst attempt to estimate monopsony 
for both workers and their primary occupational employer as a result 
of variations in occupational licensing statutes, specifi cally related to 
the ability of hygienists to open their own dental-practice offi ces or do 
work independently of dentists, which is a weak form of monopsony 
(Boal and Ransom 1997).
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HOW TO MEASURE DENTAL HYGIENE 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES
The Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI) is used to 
assess state government regulations on the professional practice envi-
ronments of dental hygienists. The National Center for Health Work-
force Analysis (2004) originally compiled this index, which consists of 
state government regulations in the 50 states and the District of Colum-
bia for 2001, and the index is extended and updated to 2007 (Table 6.1 
gives the main regulatory components that have changed since 2001). 
These major professional regulatory components include the following:
• Legal and regulatory environment. This includes governance 
of the profession through the state regulatory board of dental 
hygiene or through a dental hygiene committee empowered by a 
dental board with a mandate to regulate the profession, licensure 
by credential/endorsement with no new clinical exam required, 
scope of practice defi ned in law or regulations, and restriction to 
patient of record of the primary employing dentist.
• Supervision in different practice settings. This includes dental 
supervision requirements across a variety of health settings in-
cluding private dental offi ces, long-term care facilities, schools, 
public health agencies, correctional facilities, and similar insti-
tutional facilities. The supervision requirements vary from direct 
supervision to general and collaborator supervision, to complete 
autonomy. 
• Tasks permitted under varying levels of supervision. This in-
cludes tasks allowed for dental hygienists to provide basic ser-
vices such as prophylaxis (dental cleaning), sealants, fl uoride 
treatments, x-rays, and hygiene screening and assessment, as 
well as expanded functions such as placing amalgam restora-
tions (tooth fi llings), administration of local anesthesia, and ad-
ministration of nitrous oxide.2 
• Reimbursement. Direct Medicaid reimbursement and direct 
payment to hygienists by other third-party insurers or patients.
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The raw score of the DHPPI is a 100-point scale with different 
weights attached to subitems under the four major components, indicat-
ing that a higher score means a less restrictive practice environment for 
dental hygienists. 
For empirical analysis, a DHPPI index is an overall index to capture 
the spread in each state’s regulatory system for the professional prac-
tice environment, as coded by the National Center for Health Work-
force Analysis (2004). Because certain regulatory components are more 
important to wage determination and employment outcomes than other 
components, we also examine each individual component in two ways. 
In particular, we focus on two major components: 1) tasks permitted 
and 2) supervision requirements. Because the weights to the subitems 
of these components of the DHPPI are assigned in somewhat arbitrary 
fashion, we develop both the summated rating scale and the statisti-
cally weighted index (Rasch index) for each component. Therefore, we 
examine how each state’s regulatory system for the professional prac-
tice environments affects the market outcomes of the professions by 
using both linear (summated rating scale) and nonlinear (Rasch index) 
measures of the regulatory system. Finally, we analyze whether the pro-
vision that permits hygienists to be self-employed other than as inde-
pendent contractors affects the market outcomes. Table 6.1 gives the 
key values of the indices.3 
Table 6.2 shows the top and bottom fi ve states ranked by their 
summated DHPPI. Although the rankings of the top fi ve states have 
remained the same, with only a minor change in the DHPPI for the years 
2001–2007, the rankings of the bottom fi ve states have changed, with 
a relatively larger growth in the DHPPI. In particular, Kentucky, the 
second-lowest state in the DHPPI, went through a substantial change 
during the period. The state with the largest growth was Montana, with 
an increase of 43 points. Not only has the DHPPI been increasing, but 
there also has been considerable variation across states and over time.
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LABOR MARKET ANALYSIS FOR DENTISTS AND 
HYGIENISTS WITH OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 
REGULATIONS
Table 6.3 provides descriptive statistics from the American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) for key labor market variables as well as other 
market and regulatory variables used in our analysis.4 The values show 
that the average age of dentists is about six years higher than that of 
hygienists, and that dentists have six more years of schooling. Further-
more, the dentistry profession tends to be male-dominated, whereas 
97 percent of hygienists are females. The average hourly earnings of 
Top fi ve states Bottom fi ve states
Year State DHPPI State DHPPI
2001 Colorado 97 Mississippi 15
Washington 94 Alabama 18
Oregon 88 Kentucky 18
California 86 West Virginia 20
New Mexico 86 Virginia 21
2007 Colorado 97 Mississippi 15
Washington 94 Alabama 20
Oregon 90 Georgia 23
California 88 West Virginia 26
New Mexico 87 Arkansas 28
Table 6.2  Rankings of the Top and Bottom Five Regulated States 
and Changes in Their Dental Hygiene Professional Practice 
Index (DHPPI)
Top fi ve states by change in DHPPI 2001–2007
2001 2007 Change
Montana 43 86 43
Oklahoma 28 52 24
Nebraska 44 68 24
Kentucky 18 40 22
Arizona 42 62 20
SOURCE: Author survey of occupational regulation among states, tabulated using DHPPI.
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dentists are more than three times higher than those of hygienists. One 
important distinction gleaned from the data is that 71 percent of den-
tists are self-employed, but only 2 percent of hygienists work for them-
selves. Part of this difference may be due to state laws that require den-
tists to directly supervise the work of hygienists. The data for dentists 
were derived from the ACS, and the methods are shown in Appendix C, 
with the sample selection criteria in Appendix Table C.1.
The estimates in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 demonstrate the association 
between DHPPI and hourly earnings for dental hygienists and den-
tists, using individual-level data in the ACS. The basic general earnings 
equation can be stated as follows:
(6.1)  ln?Earningsist? = α + ßRst + γXist + θZst + δs + ηt + μist ,
 
where Earningsist is the hourly earnings of the dentist (D) or dental 
hygienist (H) i in state s in time period t; Rst represents the DHPPI 
and its components in person i’s state s in time period t; the vector Xist 
includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each person; the 
vector Zst includes time-varying state-level controls such as the state 
median household income and the percentage of uninsured in the state; 
δs and ηt are state and year fi xed effects, respectively; and μist is the error 
term.5 
Table 6.4 shows the infl uence of the overall DHPPI index on the 
logarithm of hourly earnings of hygienists, using all the controls for 
individual characteristics shown in Table 6.3, which were extracted 
from the ACS. These estimates show that the DHPPI level is not a 
signifi cant factor in determining hourly earnings. However, the legal 
ability either to be self-employed or to have tasks unsupervised is a 
key factor infl uencing wage determination. For example, having the 
legal ability to be self-employed raises hygienists’ hourly earnings by 
approximately a statistically signifi cant 10 percent. Similarly, working 
unsupervised, measured by the summated score and the Rasch score, is 
associated with a 1.2 and 0.7 percent increase in earnings for hygienists, 
respectively. These additional measures of legal restrictions are used to 
provide additional sensitivity analysis for the measures of legal restric-
tions on the practice of dentistry. The issue of whether hygienists were 
directly reimbursed under the state government regulations with the 
same specifi cations was also examined. Although we do not report the 
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Table 6.3  Summary Statistics for the Labor Market Variables Using the ACS, 2001–2007
Panel A: Individual sample statistics
Dental hygienists
  (n = 5,886)
Dentists 
(n = 7,220)
Mean sd Mean sd
Age 40.55 10.11 46.98 10.02
Schooling (in years) 14.65 1.25 20.30 1.05
Experience (in years) 19.90 10.07 20.67 10.09
Gender (male: 1; female: 0) 0.03 0.17 0.80 0.40
Married (married: 1; not married: 0) 0.74 0.44 0.84 0.37
Experience squared (/1,000) 0.50 0.42 0.53 0.41
White (white: 1; others: 0) 0.92 0.26 0.84 0.36
Black (black: 1; others: 0) 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15
Others (others: 1; otherwise: 0) 0.05 0.23 0.13 0.34
Citizen (U.S. citizen: 1; others: 0) 0.98 0.13 0.96 0.19
Work for for-profi t (yes: 1; no: 0) 0.94 0.24 0.22 0.41
Work for not-for-profi t (yes: 1; no: 0) 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14
Work for government (yes: 1; no: 0) 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.22
Self-employment (yes: 1; no: 0) 0.02 0.14 0.71 0.45
Hourly earnings (in 2007 dollars)  28.81  11.93 95.46 67.66
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Panel B: State sample statistics
n Mean sd Source
DHPPI 357 46.80 20.02 Nat. Ctr. for Health Workforce Analysis (2004)
Tasks permitted (summated) 357 7.19 2.55 “ ”
Tasks permitted (Rasch) 357 1.44 1.76 “ ”
Independence from dentists (summated) 357 1.12 2.56 “ ”
Independence from dentists (Rasch) 357 −8.19 4.27 “ ”
Self-employment allowed 357 0.11 0.32 “ ”
Growth in the number of dental hygienists 298 0.04 0.15 Occupational Employment Survey
Growth in the number of dentists 272 0.02 0.21 “                                                      ”
State median household income ($) 357 44,984.93 7,597.42 Current Population Survey
Percentage of uninsured 357 13.67 3.76 “                                      ”
State median price of amalgam restoration ($) 336 112.66 19.73 Survey of Dental Fees (American Dental 
State median price of prophylaxis ($) 343 49.47 8.54 Association 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007)
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS) and Dental Hygiene Professional Practice Index (DHPPI).
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Table 6.4  Pooled OLS Model of Log Hourly Earnings for Dental Hygienists Using the ACS, 2001–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DHPPI 0.000
(0.002)
Tasks permitted (summated) 0.005
(0.007)
Tasks permitted (Rasch) 0.005
(0.010)
Independence from dentists 
(summated)
0.012**
(0.006)
Independence from dentists (Rasch) 0.007*
(0.004)
Self-employment allowed 0.100**
(0.041)
Experience 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017**** 0.017****
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Experience squared (/1,000) −0.345**** −0.345**** −0.345**** −0.344**** −0.344**** −0.344****
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
Schooling (in years) 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043**** 0.043****
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Gender −0.065* −0.064* −0.064* −0.064* −0.065* −0.064*
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Marital status 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
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NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 
0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level; **** signifi cant at the 0.001 level. State controls include state median household income and 
the percentage of uninsured in the state. For this and the following tables, the six columns show different specifi cations—i.e., different 
independent variables used or different control variables to show how the alternative specifi cations infl uenced wage determination. These 
varying estimates provide a guide for the sensitivity of the model to alternative specifi cations. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.
White 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Black −0.080 −0.080 −0.080 −0.080 −0.080 −0.080
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Citizen 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.143***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044)
Work for for-profi t 0.168**** 0.168**** 0.168**** 0.167**** 0.167**** 0.167****
(0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Work for not-for-profi t 0.093* 0.093* 0.093* 0.093* 0.093* 0.093*
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Self-employment 0.137* 0.137* 0.137* 0.137* 0.137* 0.137*
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Constant −3.087 −3.106 −3.256 −2.793 −2.981 −3.036
(3.048) (2.998) (2.963) (3.078) (2.980) (2.968)
State controls with state fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.172 0.172 0.172
N 5,886 5,886 5,886 5,886 5,886 5,886
Kleiner2013.indb   191
Kleiner2013.indb   191
9/18/2013   10:11:20 A
M
9/18/2013   10:11:20 A
M
192  
Table 6.5  Pooled OLS Model of Log Hourly Earnings for Dentists Using the ACS, 2001–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DHPPI −0.002
(0.003)
Tasks permitted (summated) −0.005
(0.020)
Tasks permitted (Rasch) −0.014
(0.023)
Independence from dentists 
(summated)
−0.005
(0.017)
Independence from dentists (Rasch) −0.014*
(0.008)
Self-employment allowed −0.162**
(0.077)
Experience 0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031**** 0.031****
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Experience squared (/1,000) −0.610**** −0.609**** −0.609**** −0.610**** −0.610**** −0.611****
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.112)
Schooling (in years) −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015 −0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Gender 0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244**** 0.244****
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Marital status 0.115**** 0.115**** 0.114**** 0.115**** 0.115**** 0.115****
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
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NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 
0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level; **** signifi cant at the 0.001 level. State controls include state median household income and 
the percentage of uninsured in the state. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.
White 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097**** 0.097****
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Black −0.036 −0.036 −0.036 −0.037 −0.037 −0.037
(0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Citizen 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Work for for-profi t 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387**** 0.387****
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Work for not-for-profi t 0.111* 0.111* 0.111* 0.111* 0.110* 0.110*
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Self-employment 0.500**** 0.500**** 0.501**** 0.500**** 0.500**** 0.500****
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Constant 11.574* 11.848* 12.090* 11.727* 11.365* 11.511*
(6.138) (6.065) (6.144) (6.095) (6.142) (6.046)
State controls with state fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.122
N 7,220 7,220 7,220 7,220 7,220 7,220
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results in the table, we fi nd that the direct reimbursement was associ-
ated with approximately 5.1 percent higher earnings for hygienists and 
8.4 percent lower earnings for dentists, and that it was statistically sig-
nifi cant at the 0.01 level only for hygienists. However, the direct reim-
bursement was not statistically signifi cant in the employment growth 
models in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. In order to test for the robustness of the 
results, a further analysis also examined whether state provisions that 
allow for hygienists to be self-employed are associated with earnings 
dispersions for the two occupations. These further tests were estimated 
in Appendix Table C.2 and were consistent with the results presented in 
Tables 6.4 and 6.5.
In contrast, for dentists in Table 6.5, the estimates from the model 
using the same set of controls from the ACS as in Table 6.4 indicate that 
having state provisions that allow for hygienists to be self-employed is 
associated with approximately 16 percent lower hourly earnings for the 
dentists in that state. It appears that dentists lose more, perhaps because 
they are no longer able to require hygienists to work only for them 
in order to provide dental services. The consequence of the legal pro-
vision may result in higher costs due to higher wages for hygienists. 
In addition, there may be lost income because hygienists may be tak-
ing patients away from full-service dentists and recommending fewer 
costly dental procedures. For example, the assumption is that indepen-
dent dental hygienists are more likely to recommend lower-cost dental 
sealants, but that a hygienist who works in a full-service offi ce may 
have incentives to recommend a higher-cost dental fi lling because of 
bonuses or promotion opportunities. To further illustrate, there are 
strong incentive effects for dentists to recommend more costly proce-
dures. On average, sealants cost $37, but most fi llings cost more than 
$100 and also need to be replaced periodically (Simonsen 1991). Once 
fi llings are installed, there is a greater likelihood for both crowns and 
root canal procedures, both of which cost more than $1,000 each. Since 
hygienists can only work with sealants, having independent hygienists 
can have a major impact on dental incomes by changing the service and 
product mix. There is some evidence that sealants provide protection 
from further tooth decay that is as good as or better than the protection 
from fi llings (Gooch et al. 2009). Furthermore, the signs of the coef-
fi cients for the ability of hygienists to engage in broader work assign-
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ments are negative in the remainder of the specifi cations for dentists’ 
wage determinations.
The analysis also examined whether state provisions that allow for 
hygienists to be self-employed are associated with earnings dispersions 
for the two occupations. The employment effects of variations in state 
statutes for dental hygienists and dentists are given in Tables 6.6 and 
6.7, respectively.6 The general employment equation can be stated as 
follows: 
(6.2) Employmentst  = α + ßRst + γXst + δs + ηt + μst ,
 
where Employmentst is the employment growth of dentists (D) or 
hygienists (H) in state s in time period t; Rst is the DHPPI and its com-
ponents in state s in time period t; the vector Xst includes covariates 
measuring economic and dental characteristics within each state; δs and 
ηt are state and year fi xed effects, respectively; and μst is the error term.
The estimates from the reduced form model in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 
use the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS 2013b). One advantage of the data is that it is 
collected at the state level and gives information on an aggregate state 
level, as opposed to the individual-level information provided in the 
ACS. Since almost all hygienists are required to work for a dentist, the 
estimates from the database have few errors in the values for employ-
ment change that might be present if hygienists worked independently. 
Although the ACS has individual-level data, the estimates for small 
states may have large errors. The estimates show that the overall index 
is not signifi cantly associated with the employment growth of hygien-
ists in equations that include state-level controls, such as the growth in 
the number of dentists in the state, the state median household income, 
the percentage of uninsured in the state, and the state median prices 
of amalgam restoration and prophylaxis in each specifi cation in the 
table. However, as shown in Table 6.6, whether hygienists can be self-
employed is positively and statistically signifi cant at the 0.10 level in 
its association with employment growth of hygienists by about 6 per-
cent. Furthermore, enhancing the ability of hygienists to do various 
tasks without the supervision of dentists is also associated with positive 
employment growth for their occupation. 
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Table 6.6  Models of Employment Growth for Dental Hygienists by State, Using the OES Data, 2001–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DHPPI 0.004
(0.003)
Tasks permitted (summated) −0.020
(0.034)
Tasks permitted (Rasch) −0.037
(0.045)
Independence from dentists (summated) 0.009*
(0.005)
Independence from dentists (Rasch) 0.006**
(0.003)
Self-employment allowed 0.061*
(0.034)
Dental hygienist’s employment growth rate −0.146** −0.155** −0.151** −0.150** −0.150** −0.151**
(0.064) (0.061) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
State median household −0.015 −0.013 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014 −0.014
Income (/1,000) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Rate of uninsured −0.004 −0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
State median price of prophylaxis 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
State median price of amalgam restoration 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
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NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 
0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level; **** signifi cant at the 0.001 level. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.
Constant 1.399 1.381 1.245 1.421 1.472 1.409
(1.102) (1.108) (1.140) (1.111) (1.104) (1.112)
State fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.221 0.216 0.219 0.215 0.215 0.215
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
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Table 6.7  Models of Employment Growth for Dentists by State, Using the OES Data, 2001–2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DHPPI −0.005
(0.003)
Tasks permitted (summated) −0.022
(0.042)
Tasks permitted (Rasch) 0.022
(0.050)
Independence from dentists 
(summated)
−0.036****
(0.005)
Independence from dentists (Rasch) −0.024****
(0.003)
Self-employment allowed −0.255****
(0.039)
Dentists’ employment growth rate −0.282 −0.300 −0.293 −0.287 −0.287 −0.288
(0.192) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189) (0.189)
State median household −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
Income (/1,000) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Rate of uninsured −0.002 −0.003 −0.005 0.000 −0.001 −0.001
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
State median price of prophylaxis 0.007 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
State median price of amalgam 
restoration
0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
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NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 
0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level; **** signifi cant at the 0.001 level. Y = yes.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors using ACS data.
Constant 0.817 0.772 0.911 0.792 0.607 0.847
(1.774) (1.762) (1.688) (1.738) (1.736) (1.748)
State fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-squared 0.243 0.239 0.238 0.247 0.246 0.246
N 250 250 250 250 250 250
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Table 6.7 shows the relationship between the statutes and the 
growth of employment for dentists in the state. The estimates show that 
giving greater autonomy to hygienists is associated with a signifi cantly 
negative 26 percent employment growth of dentists. Since the aver-
age growth rate of dentists’ employment is 2 percent, having a law that 
allows hygienists to have an independent business would reduce den-
tists’ growth rate to about 1.5 percent. This is a small absolute amount. 
Since hygienists and dentists are often substitutes for each other in the 
production of dental services, the state provisions favoring hygien-
ists may reduce the need for dentists in the state. In order to test for 
the robustness and sensitivity of the results, estimates show two cases 
involving the role of the DHPPI in the earnings of dental assistants who 
are not universally licensed and have different requirements from den-
tal hygienists, and they found no infl uence on their earnings in the ACS 
of the index to include market structure. In another test case, estimates 
were performed for another robustness check using data from the ACS 
for registered nurses, who have another set of statutes infl uencing the 
market structure for their occupation. The estimates showed that the 
DHPPI had no infl uence on the earnings of registered nurses. These 
results suggest that the estimates were not a consequence of other fac-
tors that were not captured by the state fi xed effects. 
Since the results suggest elements of monopsony as shown in the 
theory, there are also potential redistribution effects and economic 
losses within the context of both occupations being licensed. If there is 
no reduction in the quality of services that are provided to patients with 
fewer regulations in dentistry, then an application of a deadweight loss 
analysis can give the basic parameters to estimate potential losses to 
society from monopsony in the market (Kleiner and Kudrle 2000). Using 
the parameters developed from the results in the earlier tables, Box 6.1 
shows that the reallocation from hygienists to dentists is approximately 
$1.34 billion per year. The output loss due to the monopsonistic restric-
tion of employment is approximately $0.08 billion per year. The output 
loss due to licensing is between $0.54 and $0.68 billion per year. There-
fore, the total losses associated with overall occupational licensing and 
within-occupation regulation are between $0.62 and $0.76 billion annu-
ally. This results in approximately a 1 percent annual reduction in the 
output of dental services for those states that required dentists’ supervi-
sion of dental hygienists, using a basic deadweight loss analysis (Car-
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Box 6.1  A Static Simulation of the Effects of State Regulations on 
U.S. Dental Service Costs
Estimates of U.S. dental service expenditures:
• U.S. dental service expenditures are approximately $96.36 billion 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2008).
• Labor costs account for 60 percent of health care spending 
 (Schwieters and Harper 2007). 
• Dental hygienists account for approximately 23.2 percent of the 
total labor costs (from the ratio of the average hourly earnings of 
dentists and hygienists in Table 6.3).
• Therefore, labor costs for hygienists are approximately $13.40 
 billion (= $96.36 billion × 0.60 × 0.232), which is rectangle 
 wMOLMM (= wM × LM ) in Figure 6.2.
Analysis of monopsonistic exploitation and deadweight loss using 
basic demand analysis:
• Monopsonistic exploitation (rectangle wLwMMM’ in Figure 6.2). 
° We substitute the estimates of 0.100 for (WL − WM)/WM and 0.061 
for (LL − LM)/LM (from Tables 6.4 and 6.6). 
° Then, we are able to compute the reallocation from hygienists to 
dentists (rectangle wMwLM’M) as follows: 
 (wL − wM) × LM = 0.100 wM × LM = 0.100 × $13.40 billion = $1.34 
billion. 
° Although we cannot compute a deadweight loss because of the 
restrictions (i.e., triangle AML as a whole), we can approximate it 
with triangle M’ML by multiplying by two. Then, the deadweight 
loss due to the monopsonistic employment restriction is 
 (wL − wM) × (LL − LM) = 0.100 wM × 0.061 LM = 0.100 × 0.061 × 
$13.40 billion = $0.08 billion.
• Licensing effect
° To compute the licensing effect, we compute hygienists’ total rev-
enue (rectangle wLOLLL in Figure 6.2). For this, we only need to 
compute rectangle MLMLLL’ as follows: 
 (LL − LM) × wM = 0.061 LM × wM = 0.061 × $13.40 billion = $0.82 
billion.
° Then, hygienists’ total revenue is $15.64 billion (= $13.40 billion + 
$1.34 billion + $0.08 billion + $0.82 billion).
(continued)
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neiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2009). This analysis does not include the 
misallocation of resources within production or the losses to consumers 
who allocated their resources toward dentistry and away from other 
purchases (Schmidt 2012).
REVIEW AND SUMMARY
The licensing of occupations is most pervasive among health care 
occupations. This chapter has examined two occupations—dentists and 
dental hygienists—that are universally licensed in all 50 states in the 
United States. Initially the chapter explored the evolution of licensing 
for these two occupations, as well as the legal conditions governing per-
missible tasks for hygienists that affect both occupations. Confl ict has 
arisen over the allocation of work and the supervision of tasks. Next the 
chapter developed the anatomy and timing, by state, of the implemen-
tation of regulations that guide the work that each of the occupations 
can legally do according to state statutes and administrative decisions. 
Given this institutional background, we developed a basic model of 
Box 6.1  (continued)
° Given that the licensing premium is 15 percent economy-wide 
(Kleiner and Krueger 2010), then the reallocation from consumers 
to hygienists’ services is $2.35 billion (= 0.15 × $15.64 billion). 
° Also, given that the mean value of demand elasticity of labor is 0.3 
(Hamermesh 1993), the deadweight loss due to licensing (i.e., tri-
angle LL”C in Figure 6.2) should be about $0.70 billion. If only 80 
percent is deadweight (Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil 2009), then 
it would be more like $0.56 billion.
• The total output losses would be $0.56 to $0.70 billion because of 
licensing plus the monopsony effect of $0.08 billion, which equals 
$0.64 to $0.78 billion.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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dental production that has elements of occupational licensing favoring 
dentists in the production of services for patients. The results from the 
model show that regulations requiring dentists to supervise hygienists 
result in higher earnings for dentists and lower earnings and employ-
ment for dental hygienists. The model is extended to show that it has 
elements of monopsony that can result in potential deadweight losses to 
society if licensing and these monopsony rents are pervasive. 
The estimates from the empirical models show the infl uence of reg-
ulations that favor tasks that hygienists can perform on the wages and 
employment of dentists and hygienists for the period 2001–2007. During 
this time period, hygienists were allowed to do more tasks, and in seven 
states they were allowed to work without the supervision of a dentist. 
The time and state fi xed-effects models for both dentists and hygienists 
show that fostering greater autonomy by legally allowing hygienists to 
work independently of dentists is associated with an approximately 10 
percent higher wage and a 6 percent increase in the employment growth 
of dental hygienists. Conversely, these state provisions are associated 
with approximately a 16 percent reduction in dentists’ hourly earnings 
and a 26 percent reduction in dentists’ employment growth in the states 
that have adopted them. In part, this larger loss by dentists is a result of 
the change in the service and product mix that is delivered by hygienists 
as compared to full-service dental offi ces. In a simple deadweight loss 
analysis consistent with a monopsony model, the typical state would 
lose approximately 1 percent of dental expenditures because of licens-
ing and by not allowing hygienists to practice on their own. These esti-
mates are lower-bound estimates, and the loss to society is likely higher.
Overall, the results suggest that state laws on permissible tasks 
matter in wage and employment determination for both dentists and 
hygienists. With occupational licensing, the fi nal arbiter of who gets 
to do the work is the responsibility of the state legislature and the 
courts. The decisions by these policymakers appear to infl uence wage 
and employment outcomes for practitioners in the occupations. One 
could also examine, in the manner outlined in this chapter, additional 
potential confl icts for licensed occupations, such as architects and inte-
rior designers or doctors and nurses, arising from the issue of who can 
legally do certain tasks.  
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Notes
 1. I thank Kyoung Won Park for his assistance with this chapter, which is based on 
and uses material from Kleiner and Park (2010a).
 2. We note that this component also includes other provisions, such as whether a 
hygienist may be self-employed other than as an independent contractor. We sepa-
rated this provision from the other components and treat it as a qualitatively dif-
ferent variable in our empirical analysis.  
 3. The correlations among the major components of the original DHPPI range from 
0.56 to 0.96, and their intercorrelation (i.e., Cronbach’s alpha) is 0.77. Although 
the correlations among the two summated ratings of task permitted and self-
employment range from 0.50 to 0.75 and their intercorrelation is 0.67, the correla-
tions among the two Rasch indices and self-employment range from 0.41 to 0.73, 
and their intercorrelation is 0.51. 
 4. We choose to analyze the ACS as our main data set over alternative data sets 
such as the CPS, because the use of the ACS over time allows us to have enough 
observations by state to fully implement the empirical model, which requires state 
and year controls. For a detailed sampling framework of the ACS, see U.S. Census 
Bureau (2013). 
 5. Although an alternative specifi cation might be a difference-in-difference 
approach, the data available do not track the same individuals over time by state. 
However, our ability to control for time and state fi xed effects suggests that our 
policy variables infl uence wages for each occupation beyond state- or time-
varying characteristics.
  6. As a further test of the reliability of our employment data, we correlated the data 
from the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) with membership data from 
the ADHA by state for 2002–2006 and with the number of active dentists in 2006 
from the ADA. Their correlation was 0.92 and 0.96, respectively. This suggests 
that the OES is an appropriate measure of dentists’ and hygienists’ employment 
by state and year.
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Lessons from Studies on the 
Stages of Occupational Regulation
The essential task of democratic society is to establish a proper 
balance between freedom and order. A danger in modern democ-
racy is the threat of overthrowing the equilibrium either by exces-
sive emphasis on governmental regulation on the one hand or by 
the irresponsibility and inequalities of completely unregulated 
freedom on the other hand. 
Flowing directly from this major concern of democratic govern-
ment and more immediately pertinent to the problems involved in 
state licensing of occupations is the role of government in rec-
onciling public and special interests. Ours is a society in which 
organized special groups are in confl ict with each other not only 
in serving their own private interests but over the very defi nition of 
what constitutes the public interest. Much of the business of state 
administration therefore consists in reconciling the demands of 
special groups upon government. These interest groups compete 
with one another in attempting to bring public policy into confor-
mity with their own particular objectives. 
—Council of State Governments (1952, p. 1)
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the book has been to examine several occupations 
that are at different stages of government regulation and determine to 
what extent licensing has infl uenced the individuals in the occupation, 
consumers, or other closely related occupational practitioners. Since 
governments at the local, state, and national levels are confronted with 
the interests of the members of the occupations and, in rare cases, con-
sumers of the services seeking more regulation, the goal of this book is 
to provide new analysis and evidence on how these labor markets work 
in the face of government regulations. With the decline of union mem-
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bership and the growth of employment in the service sector, workers 
and their agents (unions or professional associations) have attempted to 
establish a “web of rules” to regularize work and reduce competition in 
the fi eld (Dunlop 1958). The book has provided a number of case stud-
ies that examine how licensing has affected interior designers, mortgage 
brokers, preschool teachers, electricians and plumbers, and dentists and 
hygienists. Along a continuum moving from less to more regulation, 
the book has traced the regulatory development of interior designers, 
the least-regulated occupation, and that of dentists and hygienists, both 
universally licensed occupations.
As stated in Chapter 1 as part of the introduction to this volume, the 
stages of regulation are an arbitrary and, in some ways, a limited way of 
looking at the sequence of regulation. The approach utilizes not merely 
the uniformities in the sequence of regulation but also the uniqueness of 
each occupation’s experience with regulation (Rostow 1960). The vol-
ume also examined the tension that exists between the occupations over 
the “span of control” of job tasks that are regulated by the state. Occu-
pations that have been regulated for a relatively short period of time 
and have minimal requirements for entry are usually unable to achieve 
their economic goals of better compensation and less competition. For 
the other selected occupations, the more heavily regulated occupations 
have been licensed for a longer time and have attained more rigorous 
entry requirements, which have led to higher earnings and more voice 
in the economic conditions of the tasks. 
A common thread throughout the volume included showing the 
growth of regulation and its variations over time across a wide vari-
ety of occupations. Each chapter depicted the infl uence of increased 
regulation on the wages of the occupations and, where the data were 
available, its employment effects. The research also showed several 
unique aspects, including outcomes for consumers in the case of regu-
lation of mortgage brokers and outcomes for children whose preschool 
teachers and their assistants were licensed. Another unique aspect of 
the analysis is the examination of occupations such as those of den-
tists and hygienists, who battle with regulators over who gets to do the 
regulated work. A further innovation is the examination of how regula-
tions may infl uence the number of injuries and deaths of plumbers and 
electricians, two occupations that have among the highest work-related 
injuries. Overall, there is a common theme throughout the volume, yet 
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each chapter delves into the unique aspects of a particular occupation, 
how it is regulated, and the economic consequences of the correspond-
ing regulations.
OVERARCHING FINDINGS
This section summarizes the key fi ndings for each of the occupa-
tions studied in this volume, starting with the least regulated and pro-
gressing to the most regulated ones. Initially, this section examines the 
role of regulation in infl uencing the wages and employment for interior 
designers (the subject of Chapter 2), who are licensed in three states and 
the District of Columbia. For occupations at this initial stage of regula-
tion, where certifi cation rather than licensing dominates, there is con-
fl icting evidence as to whether regulation raises wages or does much to 
improve quality. National data from the American Community Survey 
(ACS) from 2000 to 2009 show that regulation and the licensing of inte-
rior designers had a small and insignifi cant infl uence on overall wage 
determination. An examination of the employment growth of interior 
designers during the same time period shows that regulation had a small 
infl uence on employment growth, once state economic characteristics 
were taken into account. Furthermore, the economic factors available 
for our analysis were not important in determining whether a law was 
passed. Perhaps the organizational or political skills of the leaders of 
the profession were the more important factors in determining whether 
interior designers were licensed. 
In Chapter 3, the occupation of mortgage broker was examined. The 
evaluation of the occupation introduces and summarizes a compilation 
of mortgage broker licensing requirements from the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia for the period 1996–2006. The data are used to 
analyze whether mortgage broker licensing or any of its components 
have signifi cant relationships with labor or service market outcomes. 
Investigation of the index constructed to measure the diffi culty of enter-
ing the profession shows that regulations in general do not signifi cantly 
affect labor market or consumer market outcomes. 
One regulation common in many states—that mortgage brokers 
maintain a surety bond or a minimum net worth—has a signifi cant and 
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fairly consistent statistical association with higher wages, fewer bro-
kers, fewer subprime mortgages, higher foreclosure rates on subprime 
mortgages, and a higher percentage of mortgages carrying high inter-
est rates. This result is often viewed as a counterintuitive fi nding by 
those who suggest that occupational regulation either does not matter 
or can have positive infl uences on labor markets and consumer fi nancial 
well-being. 
The analysis of preschool education regulation takes on an industry 
that is in both the public and private sectors. The regulation of child 
care services is at an early stage of development in terms of both the 
number of states that require it and the standards to be licensed. In addi-
tion, enforcement is lax. The estimates presented in Chapter 4 fail to 
fi nd any evidence that the wages of child care workers are affected by 
government regulation. This fi nding is not surprising, since the require-
ments are both relatively new and at low levels. However, there is some, 
albeit not conclusive, evidence of the cost effects of regulation on child 
care enrollment. Unfortunately, no reliable price data were available in 
the surveys examined to evaluate this issue in more detail. One poten-
tial benefi t of increased regulation is an increase in the educational 
attainment quality of child care, which was measured by child develop-
ment and early childhood academic achievement scores. Data from the 
Early Childhood Longitudinal Study–Birth and Kindergarten cohorts 
(ECLS-B and ECLS-K) as well as the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), three major government databases, show some effect of 
center-based regulation, but no effect of occupational regulation on any 
improvement in early childhood academic achievement scores—that 
is, math and reading scores—due to occupational regulations. At these 
levels of regulation and in this industry, the regulation of child care is 
unlikely to show much infl uence. If regulation does little to change costs 
through wages or change enrollment patterns or educational attainment, 
there are few reasons to enact the low levels of licensing that were mea-
sured and used in this segment of the book. This is especially the case 
if these regulations result in governmental monitoring or in fees that 
do not seem to generate many benefi ts to either workers or children. 
Furthermore, the estimates show that occupational regulations have no 
measurable infl uence on national test scores. The additional costs may 
be more regulatory agencies, with few observable benefi ts. 
Kleiner2013.indb   208 9/18/2013   10:11:25 AM
Lessons from Studies on the Stages of Occupational Regulation   209
Chapter 5 presented an analysis and a discussion of the role of regu-
lation for two blue-collar occupations in the construction industry—
namely, plumbers and electricians. The central fi ndings of the chapter 
show that certain occupational licensing requirements, such as mini-
mum age, education, and exam requirements, raise the wages of elec-
tricians by about 6 to 8 percent. However, the results for plumbers are 
murky and not consistent. Beyond that, the estimates suggest a modest 
trade-off between wages and work-related injuries for electricians, a 
result that is consistent with economic theory that dates back to Adam 
Smith’s work from the late 1700s, which states that employers needed 
to compensate workers for unpleasant or dangerous tasks (Smith 1937). 
Local licensing of electricians is associated with approximately a 12 
percent wage premium beyond state regulations, suggesting a further 
infl uence of local regulations on the occupation. Neither the estimates 
for electricians nor those for plumbers show much evidence of a sys-
tematic infl uence of occupational licensing on the injury rates, severity 
of injuries, or death rates. Overall, regulation is shown to have a sig-
nifi cant impact on wages for electricians but no discernible effect on 
increasing safety in this occupation.
Chapter 6 examined the potential confl ict between two universally 
licensed occupations—namely, dental hygienists and dentists. The dis-
cussion and analysis initially explored the evolution of state regulation 
for both occupations and the battle lines that have evolved between the 
two fi elds. Next, the chapter showed the anatomy of state regulations 
for dental hygienists over time. The empirical section examined the 
infl uence of state regulations on hygienists’ earnings and specifi cally on 
the ability of hygienists to be self-employed. This change in regulations 
is shown to be associated with an earnings increase of approximately 
10 percent. Furthermore, when hygienists are able to work without the 
supervision of a dentist, there is an associated increase in the state-
level employment growth of hygienists, but a decrease in the employ-
ment growth and earnings for dentists. Estimated economic costs were 
developed that showed the potential overall losses to society of these 
legislative and internal administrative battles for control of regulatory 
decisions on markets. 
In order to succinctly summarize the fi ndings presented in this 
book, Table 7.1 gives the level of occupational regulation of each of the 
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occupations examined. Next, the table shows the results for the labor 
market, and if applicable the effects for consumers or other outcome 
measures. The overarching results show that as an occupation increases 
its coverage and the time it has been regulated, it enhances its ability 
to raise wages and reduce employment growth. This is because occu-
pational licensing boards, which are usually controlled by members of 
the occupation, can limit supply and capture jobs for the licensed occu-
pation. Also, as with previous studies of the infl uence of occupational 
regulation, there appears to be little to no infl uence on outcomes as 
measured by consumer welfare or the safety of workers on the job. 
Regulation of Other Occupations
Since the publication of my previous book, Licensing Occupations: 
Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition? (Kleiner 2006), other 
researchers have implemented studies for a number of occupations. 
This section will report on many of them. With the growth of licensing 
to almost 30 percent of the U.S. workforce, the number of occupations 
that have become licensed and the requirements for both initial entry 
and migration from other states have increased (Kleiner and Krueger 
2010; U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Defense 
2012; Bielick et al. 2013). For the most part, the examination of these 
occupations has been limited to those that are universally licensed. For 
example, studies of the labor market effects have been implemented on 
engineers, barbers, lawyers, real estate agents, nurses and doctors, and 
teachers. The results suggest that the impact on training and labor sup-
ply of occupational licensing may be fairly small (Klee 2010). Conse-
quently, any workforce development benefi ts of occupational licensing 
may be small in comparison to the overall costs in other areas. Fewer 
studies have examined occupations that are licensed in some states and 
not in others. For example, massage therapists and radiologic technolo-
gists are licensed in some states and show variations in regulations on 
a state-by-state basis. 
The policy issue of the restriction of geographic mobility because 
of licensing has been a long-standing topic of interest to academics 
and policymakers, because it raises wages and also can infl uence labor 
supply in states (Kleiner, Gay, and Greene 1982). More recently, top 
policymakers have noted that restrictions of geographic mobility can 
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Occupation
Level of occupational 
regulation Labor market effects               Other
Interior designers Low None to modest wage and 
employment effects
Efforts at the state level to become 
universally licensed
Mortgage brokers Low to moderate Modest wage and 
employment effects
Recent moves to gain universal licensing; 
more regulation has murky effects on 
consumers 
Preschool instructors and 
related assistants
Moderate Modest to no wage effects Movement to universal licensing; little 
evidence of major infl uence on academic 
performance
Electricians and plumbers High Moderate wage effects Movement to make regulations more 
stringent; little evidence of any infl uence 
on worker safety
Dentists and dental 
hygienists
Universal Moderate to high wage 
effects
Relaxed regulations result in gains for 
hygienists at the expense of dentists
Table 7.1  Summary of Key Findings in the Volume
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have a particularly severe impact on military families (U.S. Department 
of the Treasury and U.S. Department of Defense 2012). The same set of 
restrictions can also limit individuals from moving to accept jobs and 
can contribute to higher structural unemployment levels. To the extent 
that mobility is restricted across states through occupational licensing, 
access is reduced and labor market outcomes are potentially affected. 
Furthermore, as the stages of regulation advance, the ability of regula-
tors to limit geographic mobility is likely to grow.
Universally Licensed Occupations
Included in the list of universally licensed occupations that have 
been analyzed in some detail are lawyers, teachers, and nurses. These 
occupations are at the highest stage of occupational regulation. A body 
of evidence is developing on the impact of occupational licensing simi-
lar to the work on the infl uence of unions on relative wages that was 
pioneered by H. Gregg Lewis at the University of Chicago over several 
decades (Lewis 1986). For example, the infl uence of tougher licens-
ing statutes on lawyers—an occupation that is among the most visible 
universally licensed occupations—occurs upon entry. Mario Pagliero 
shows that the diffi culty of the law exam or the passage rate signifi -
cantly affects the number of new lawyers that enter a state. Further-
more, the ability for state bar exams to set tougher standards (and hence 
affect outcomes) infl uences the number of potential new entrants into 
the legal profession. As was found in earlier analysis by Maurizi, attor-
neys respond to labor market fl uctuations by varying the bar exam pass 
rate (Maurizi 1974; Kleiner 1990; Pagliero 2010). 
Another universally licensed occupation that has recently received 
attention is that of public school teachers. Some studies on the licensing 
of teachers have examined the infl uence of licensing on wages, whereas 
others have focused on the educational attainment of students (Kleiner 
and Petree 1988; Angrist and Guryan 2003; Kleiner 2011; Larsen 2012). 
Overall, in the public sector, licensing generally shows modest effects 
on the wages of teachers and no infl uence on average student achieve-
ment (Goldhaber and Brewer 2000). Larsen examines the distributional 
effects across wealthy and lower-income school districts. He fi nds no 
infl uence of tougher licensing for lower-income school districts, but 
some positive effects of tougher regulation from higher test scores for 
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higher-income school districts. At least for public school teachers, the 
infl uence of more rigorous licensing results in somewhat higher wages 
and little effect on quality, both of which tend to favor more wealthy 
districts. 
Nurses make up a universally licensed occupation that has had to 
work under the supervision of physicians. Nurses became regulated 
much later than physicians. By 1923, all 48 states had certifi cation leg-
islation that required practitioners to meet certain qualifi cations in order 
to use the title of nurse (Comer 2007). New York enacted the fi rst man-
datory licensure legislation for nurses in 1947. Marks and Law (2012) 
ask whether, during the transition from certifi cation, which the last state 
had adopted in 1923, to licensing, which occurred largely after 1950, 
there were any wage and employment effects for the occupation. To 
examine the issue, they use individual-level census data on registered 
and practical nurses in the United States from 1950 to 1970. As part of 
their analysis, they take advantage of a quasi experiment made possible 
by the fact that, by the beginning of the sample period, all states already 
had certifi cation in place and some states already required a license. 
During the subsequent decade, several states switched from certifi ca-
tion to a mandatory licensing regime, while others did not. Accord-
ingly, Marks and Law infer the effect of licensure in a difference-in-
differences framework that uses states that did not change their regula-
tory regime as a control. They fi nd that the shift from certifi cation to 
mandatory licensing had no effect on the wages or the participation rate 
of practical and registered nurses. Since they only examine the period 
immediately after the switch, it may be that it takes some time for the 
full effect of the transition to take place. Moreover, the grandfather-
ing in of the incumbent practitioners may also have played a role in 
the lack of a fi nding of wage effects in the transition to more rigorous 
regulations. 
A within-state analysis of a universally licensed occupation was 
implemented by Powell and Vorotnikov (2012). In their study within 
Massachusetts, they examined the effects of a continuing educa-
tion requirement that was added to real estate licensing laws in 1999. 
According to the authors, the Massachusetts Association of Realtors 
lobbied for the change, stating that it would enhance the quality of ser-
vice for the public. Powell and Vorotnikov’s estimates do not fi nd any 
improvement in the quality of service as measured by complaints to 
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the real estate licensing board. However, the adoption of continuing 
education requirements reduced the number of licensed active agents 
by between 39 and 58 percent and increased the incomes of those who 
remained by between 11 and 17 percent. These estimates are in line 
with other results of the infl uence of tougher licensing laws in other 
occupations (Kleiner and Todd 2007).
Among the longest-standing generally licensed occupations in all 
states is that of barbers (only the state of Alabama does not fund its 
licensing board, though the legislation to repeal licensing did not pass). 
Licensing of barbers began in the late 1800s, starting with the state of 
Minnesota in 1897 and then spreading to other states with the assis-
tance of the barbers union. Although estimates of the positive impact of 
licensing on barbers’ wages vary, the most current estimates suggest an 
impact on wages of between 11 and 22 percent (Kleiner 2006; Timmons 
and Thornton 2010). 
Finally, a unique case is the regulated and universally licensed occu-
pation of engineers. The regulation of the occupation is unique because 
only a small percentage, usually estimated at less than 20 percent, of 
the members of the occupation are licensed by states. Hur, Kleiner, and 
Wang (2013) present a comprehensive analysis of the role of occupa-
tional licensing on the labor market for civil, electrical, and industrial 
engineers. These three branches of engineering account for the larg-
est number of engineers covered by occupational licensing statutes in 
the United States. The empirical section shows that licensing for these 
occupations grew more rigorous from 1995 to 2009. The estimates from 
the statistical models of the engineering labor market fi nd that the more 
regulated engineers earn slightly higher wages but have modestly lower 
employment growth. 
Although the regulation of engineers may provide a consistent set 
of guidelines for entering the occupation and potential economic rents 
for engineers, it may also reduce the variation in their numbers within 
and across states. Although the standards are clear, regulation may 
reduce innovation coming from engineers with new and different kinds 
of training that do not fi t easily into the traditional ways that licensing 
requires tasks to be completed. In addition, it has the potential to result 
in higher wages for engineers and slower employment growth in the 
occupation. A possible consequence of the growth of regulation of the 
occupation may be to reduce access to engineers by their customers, as 
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well as to slow down the ability of builders and manufacturers to use 
their vital services in the U.S. economy. 
The infl uence of universally licensed occupations serves to drive up 
wages and reduce the new entrants into the occupation. Their effect is 
similar to the closed shop provisions that were outlawed under the Taft-
Hartley Act (1947), which amended the National Labor Relations Act; 
these provisions had allowed only union members to apply for jobs. In 
other words, licensing limits employment opportunities. As has been 
shown in the union wage literature, the impact of “monopoly unions” 
is to raise wages and reduce employment (Lewis 1986). In the case of 
unions, these outcomes can be a direct infl uence of natural monopo-
lies in the product market or private sector negotiation strategies that 
lead to market advantages for unions. On the other hand, occupational 
licensing can create government-sanctioned monopolies that may be 
granted for health and safety reasons, and that can also result in control 
over the labor market by the occupation. A goal of the policy plan-
ner is to maximize the health and safety component and minimize the 
monopoly aspect of regulation (Freeman and Medoff 1985). Whereas 
unions can restrict the supply of labor for a specifi c fi rm, licensing in 
the long run can limit the number of practitioners in an economy and 
thereby reduce the supply of practitioners, especially as the stages of 
regulation advance. 
Partially Licensed Occupations
More recently, occupations that are licensed in some states and not 
in others have been analyzed. As an example, the economic effects of 
the regulation of massage therapists have been examined (Thornton 
and Timmons 2013). Governmental regulation of massage therapists 
has grown, but regulation also varies across states. As of 2010, of the 48 
contiguous states—the states for which the authors could obtain data—
36 require massage therapists to be licensed, fi ve require certifi cation, 
and only seven still have no form of state regulation of the profession. 
In some of these seven states, however, regulation exists at the local 
government level. States that license massage therapists mandate cer-
tain education requirements such as passing an examination, fulfi lling 
a minimum number of continuing education credits, and the payment 
of licensing fees. Thornton and Timmons fi nd that licensing massage 
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therapists raises their hourly earnings by almost 16 percent and reduces 
the ratio of massage therapists per capita by state. 
Timmons and Thornton (2008) also examine the occupation of 
radiologic technologists, another occupation that is licensed in some 
states. They evaluate the infl uence that state licensing has on radiologic 
technologists’ wages with a unique data set that allows them to control 
for place of work and job specialization. The authors’ estimates fi nd that 
radiologic technologists working in states with licensing statutes earn 
from 3.3 to 6.9 percent more than radiologic technologists working in 
states without licensing. Their estimates provide further support for the 
effects of occupational licensing on the wages of practitioners.
Although the evidence is more limited as to the infl uence of licens-
ing where only some states regulate the occupation, the evidence cited 
in this book suggests that licensing laws in a state raise the wages of 
the regulated practitioners relative to those in unregulated states. Not 
surprisingly, the estimates vary depending on the service market condi-
tions for the occupations. Although the empirical evidence is not nearly 
as strong as in the case of universal licensing, the effects for occupations 
that are partially licensed suggest that conditions in the service market 
are critical in determination of any monopoly effects, and that there are 
occupation-specifi c conditions that largely dominate the economic out-
comes. As occupations are able to cross the threshold to higher stages 
of regulation, they are more likely to be able to gain economic benefi ts.
INFLUENCE ON THE QUALITY OF THE SERVICE
Several recent studies have focused on the quality effects of occu-
pational licensing. The subjects of these studies cover everything from 
fl oral arrangements to educational attainment to well-baby exams. In 
the fi rst example, Carpenter (2011) conducted a fi eld experiment on 
the infl uence of the licensing of fl orists on the quality of fl oral arrange-
ments. “Floral experts” in Louisiana assessed the quality of fl oral 
arrangements and found that licensed fl orists in that state did not pro-
duce better-quality fl oral arrangements than their counterparts in Texas, 
where fl orists are not licensed. However, the fl ower arrangements in 
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Louisiana, regulated by the state, cost more for the same product and 
service than in Texas.
A study by Larsen (2012), discussed earlier in this chapter, obtains 
empirical results for public education that support the basic theoret-
ical analysis of the Shapiro model, which says that licensing assists 
those who prefer higher-quality services and who usually have higher 
incomes, more than those who prefer lower-quality services and who 
on average have lower incomes. That is, students in lower-income but 
highly licensed school districts do not do better on test scores, but stu-
dents in wealthier districts that are regulated obtain higher scores on the 
standardized tests that are used as outcome measures.
A fi nal study by Kleiner et al. (2012) examines the role of relaxing 
occupational licensing requirements on both wage determination and 
the price of medical services. The researchers investigate how these 
regulations may affect wages and the cost of providing certain types 
of medical services using two methods. First, they use data from the 
2002–2007 ACS to study how changes in state licensing regulations 
have infl uenced the wages of nurse practitioners and physicians. Sec-
ond, analyzing a large database of private health insurance claims for 
“well-child” exams, they estimate the effect of the regulation changes 
on the prices of medical services included in the exam that insur-
ance companies actually pay for. They fi nd that the wages of nurses 
are increased by legally allowing nurse practitioners to do more tasks, 
and that prices of the service examined can be reduced by relaxing the 
licensing requirements. No evidence of a decline in quality of services 
was found using mortality or malpractice insurance rates.
WHEN DO REGULATIONS REALLY BITE?
Since many of the results in this book show that for occupations that 
are at early stages of regulation, such as interior designers and preschool 
teachers, regulation has either no or, at best, modest effects on wage 
determination, then at what stage does regulation matter? This section 
will show when infl uences of occupational regulation may affect wage 
determination. In my previous book, Licensing Occupations: Ensuring 
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Quality or Restricting Competition? (Kleiner 2006), I presented evi-
dence that occupations that have been regulated for long time periods, 
such as those of dentists and lawyers, also have signifi cant returns over 
occupations that are not regulated. In addition, Timmons and Thornton 
(2010) fi nd large economic gains for lesser-educated occupations such 
as barbers that have been licensed for decades. The basic case study 
evidence in the United States suggests that licensing raises wages over 
time. Additional analysis of interior designers, discussed in Chapter 2, 
shows that there is a positive and signifi cant effect of duration since 
the passage of more restrictive licensing laws on wage determination 
(Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2012).
Further economy-wide evidence of the infl uence of the longevity of 
licensure laws on wage determination is provided by a recent report for 
the British government that examines the role of occupational licensing 
on wage determination in the United Kingdom (Bryson et al. 2012). In 
general, the authors fi nd that the overall wage effects of licensing in the 
UK are similar to those in the United States, but that for those occupa-
tions that were recently regulated, the impacts were minor. However, 
as shown in Table 7.2, the longer the occupations were able to reduce 
competition and limit the supply of practitioners, the more the infl u-
ence of regulation increased. For example, the infl uence of licensing 
increased only slightly for those occupations that were licensed in the 
1990s relative to ones that were regulated within the past 10 years, by 
a statistically insignifi cant 4 percent. However, occupations that were 
licensed prior to 1990, dating back to before 1950, were associated with 
wage increases from 17 percent to almost 30 percent relative to ones 
that were licensed during the past 10 years. Although it would be inter-
esting to examine whether similar results hold for the United States, 
these results for Britain suggest that at initial stages of regulation, wage 
effects are minimal. Similarly, a quasi random assignment study in the 
Netherlands of those who got into medical school and became doctors, 
relative to those who passed the exam for medical school but lost the 
state-run lottery for admission and did not become doctors, shows a 
lifetime earnings effect of more than 20 percent. The researchers fi nd 
that the infl uence of regulation grows over the lifetime of the physicians 
(Ketel et al. 2012). As licensing becomes more established and more 
individuals within the occupation are subject to the entry and continu-
ing education aspects of regulations, then the wage effects are more 
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likely to be pronounced. If these results hold when applied to the United 
States, then many of the occupations studied in this book will see even 
greater wage growth than they have experienced to date, and the costs 
of using their services will likely rise the longer they are licensed and 
the more the stages of regulation advance. 
ARE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS COMPLEMENTS OR 
SUBSTITUTES FOR UNIONIZATION?
Recent evidence demonstrates that despite relatively favorable eco-
nomic and political conditions during the 1990s, trade union member-
ship and infl uence in the United States continued to remain low (Hirsch 
2012). At the same time, different forms of occupational regulation such 
Table 7.2  Regression Estimates for Wage Determination among British 
Workers in Licensed Occupations, by Length of Time Licensed 
in the UK
Occupations with 
universal licensing
Year became licenseda ln(wage/hour)
Before 1950 0.261***
[4.88]
1950–1979 0.297***
[5.24]
1980–1989 0.169***
[2.64]
1990–1999 0.042
[0.83]
R-squared 0.41
Observations 10,466
NOTE: t statistics in brackets. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 0.05 
level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level. The model includes standard human capital and 
other entry requirements.
a The reference group consists of those occupations that were licensed between 2000 
and 2010.
SOURCE: Bryson et al. (2012).
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as registration, certifi cation, and licensing are growing dramatically. 
Economists have long recognized the economic effects of occupational 
regulation and have commonly compared them to those of unionization 
(Kleiner and Krueger 2010).
Based on this analysis, the argument has been made that although 
both of those labor market institutions can be understood as mecha-
nisms by which supply restrictions can be achieved, their relative 
success in rent extraction differs (Koumenta, Humphris, and Kleiner 
2011). Although the wage effects of union membership and licensing 
attainment are similar in the United States, the market conditions within 
which these labor market institutions operate are more favorable for 
the growth of licensing than of unions (e.g., low employer dependency, 
coverage for the employee’s work life). For example, employers gen-
erally are not dependent on a licensed workforce, and are not gener-
ally opposed if some members of their workforce have a license. In 
addition, once an individual becomes licensed, that employee is more 
likely to maintain that status throughout his or her work life. Koumenta, 
Humphris, and Kleiner suggest that because of the fall in societal col-
lectivism, registration, certifi cation, and licensing are “products” more 
employees want, and that employee membership is associated with 
a variety of desirable private goods with little scope for free riding 
(Olson 1965). Licensing is organized around “professional identities” 
and is often associated with professionalization and up-skilling, which 
makes it attractive to low-skilled occupational groups. Finally, state 
and employer attitudes toward licensing are much more favorable than 
toward unions. For example, the state receives more revenue relative 
to the cost of monitoring, and licensing is a potential source of hidden 
taxes, since the state can raise the cost of licensing permits with little 
public backlash. 
For fi rms, licensing creates the perception of higher-quality services 
without the potential constraints that unions impose on the workplace. 
Furthermore, licensed engineers or accountants, although they may have 
high hourly earnings or costs, still make up a small percentage of the 
overall costs of labor to the fi rm, resulting in much less employer oppo-
sition to licensing than to unionization, where employers must pay a 
negotiated wage to all employees. For many occupations such as teach-
ers and nurses, licensing and unionization are clearly complements. 
Moreover, being both licensed and in a union raises the wage premium 
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to 22 percent, from about 15 percent for only being licensed (Kleiner and 
Krueger 2010). However, being covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment results in higher wage gains than being covered by a licensing law 
(Gittleman and Kleiner 2013). But here again, being covered by both 
collective bargaining and a licensing law, according to Gittleman and 
Kleiner, results in the largest wage gains. Nevertheless, against a back-
drop of declining union infl uence and membership, occupational regu-
lation largely serves as a labor market substitute rather than as a com-
plement to unionization in a more service-oriented economy. Certainly, 
unions in certain occupations can use licensing to provide elements of 
a closed shop, where the individuals who are hired must be licensed in 
order to work there. Where these conditions exist, unions have been 
shown to raise wages. The same can be said for those who attain occu-
pational licensing. 
POLICY PERSPECTIVES
Although occupational licensing has been growing, several pro-
posals have been made to slow the growth of occupational licensing 
in favor of certifi cation. For example, in Minnesota, in both 2011 and 
2012, the legislature passed a bill out of the Minnesota Senate Com-
merce and Consumer Protection Committee that explicitly favors certi-
fi cation over licensing. The bill states that “no government shall require 
an occupational license, certifi cation, registration, or other occupational 
regulation that imposes a substantial burden on the person unless the 
government demonstrates that it has a compelling interest in protecting 
against present and recognizable harm to the public health and safety, 
and [that] the regulation is the least restrictive means to furthering that 
compelling government interest.”1 In addition, the proposed bill states 
that “an individual who brings an action or asserts a defense under this 
section has the initial burden of proof that the statute or administrative 
rule or a government practice related to the statute or rule substantially 
burdens the individual’s right to engage in an occupation not prohibited 
by law. If the individual meets the burden of proof . . . the government 
must then demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the gov-
ernment has a compelling interest in protecting against present and rec-
Kleiner2013.indb   221 9/18/2013   10:11:29 AM
222   Kleiner
ognizable harm to the public health and safety, and [that] the regulation 
is the least restrictive means for furthering that compelling governmen-
tal interest.” Legislation covering similar issues has been introduced in 
the Utah Legislature (Goldstein 2012). This proposed Minnesota stat-
ute is an example of model legislation on occupational licensing and is 
currently being proposed by the Institute for Justice (IJ), a libertarian 
public interest law fi rm that has handled numerous cases for individuals 
who have challenged occupational licensing laws in the courts because 
they have not been allowed to work as a consequence of such laws. 
Appendix D presents the IJ model legislation that the proposed Min-
nesota statute largely follows. 
 The proposed Minnesota statute goes a long way toward favoring 
a policy of the least possible regulation of occupations by the govern-
ment, and it allows the courts to determine whether an individual has 
been harmed, with the largest burden of proof being on the state to show 
that there are compelling health and safety issues for the members of 
the occupation to be licensed. In other words, the burden of proof falls 
on the state or local government to show that there are actual dangers 
to health and safety. One alleged drawback of the proposed licensing 
regulation in Minnesota would be the increased litigation costs if indi-
viduals who thought that they could do the work, and should be able 
to do the work, engaged the state in a signifi cant number of lawsuits. 
The legal costs could be balanced by the reduction in economic rents 
to the members of the licensed occupations and the increased aggregate 
output for the services of the new members of the licensed occupations. 
One illustration of the extent to which the research on occupational 
licensing has infl uenced policy comes from Iowa. In 2013, Governor 
Terry Branstad vetoed an act that would have licensed four occupations 
in the health sector. In his veto message to the Speaker of the Iowa 
House of Representatives, he noted the following: “Licenses serve to 
increase costs on licensees, increase consumer costs and options, and 
reduce opportunities for new workers. One of my goals is to grow jobs 
by eliminating impediments to economic growth imposed by burden-
some administrative rules and regulations.”2 Further down his message 
to the Speaker, Branstad noted the following policy alternative: “Given 
that the certifi cation process for substance abuse and addictive disorder 
counseling and prevention professionals is well-functioning and serves 
the interests of protecting health and public safety, there is no need to 
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add an additional mandated layer of regulation and four new licenses.”3 
In his view, certifi cation provided a more cost-effective method of 
regulation.
Calls to reduce occupational licensing barriers to interstate mobil-
ity have come from the executive branch of the federal government, 
including the U.S. Department of the Treasury and U.S. Department 
of Defense (2012). These policy recommendations have been made 
because the families of military personnel have had a diffi cult time 
moving across states and pursuing their careers, because of variations 
in state licensing laws. The Department of Defense views this effect 
as a hardship on military families. At a minimum, the ability to recog-
nize other states’ licenses, similar to the recognition of driver’s licenses 
across states, would serve to help military families as well as greatly 
assist the economy in general by reducing structural unemployment 
due to state regulation barriers. It would also allow licensed workers 
to maximize their incomes and productivity by enabling them to move 
across state lines without institutional constraints. These legislative 
efforts to reduce regulatory barriers across states may have increasing 
support from state or national policymakers.
PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Since the publication of my earlier volume on occupational licens-
ing in 2006, the quality and quantity of research on occupational regu-
lation have signifi cantly increased (Kleiner 2006). Some of that work 
has been cited in this chapter. Nevertheless, many key questions remain 
unanswered. For example, can we identify whether or when the main 
monopoly effects of occupational licensing occur? Are there important 
“voice effects” of licensing for the members of the occupation, simi-
lar to those identifi ed in the union literature?4 To what extent are there 
estimated benefi ts of higher quality for consumers? Is innovation in ser-
vices or products reduced as a consequence of occupational licensing? 
To what extent are the personnel policies that apply to the fi rm 
applicable within licensed occupations (Lazear and Shaw 2007)? Are 
these benefi ts mainly for higher-income consumers, and are there distri-
butional aspects of the allocation of the quality effects of occupational 
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licensing? Do states raise licensing fees to supplement or substitute 
for other forms of taxation? How often do licensing boards revoke the 
occupational licenses of incompetent or unscrupulous individuals? 
At least two nations in the European Union—Germany and 
Poland—are moving in a different direction in comparison to the United 
States and Britain. These two nations have entertained proposals to sig-
nifi cantly reduce regulation in their occupational labor markets (Miller 
2004; Sendrowicz 2012). In other European countries, such as Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, an occupation that is usually 
licensed in the United States (e.g., that of attorneys) is instead certifi ed 
(Pagliero and Timmons 2012). 
In Israel, physicians who came from the former Soviet Union and 
faced an easier barrier to becoming licensed had substantially higher 
earnings than physicians from the former Soviet Union who faced a 
much stiffer barrier. The degree of diffi culty in getting licensed was 
based on experience. Specifi cally, those with less than 20 years of 
experience had to take a diffi cult general medical knowledge licensing 
exam to become licensed in Israel. This exam had a fairly low pass rate. 
Consequently, many of these former Soviet physicians did not become 
practicing doctors in Israel and entered entirely different professions 
(Kugler and Sauer 2005). Conversely, the physicians with more than 
20 years of experience in the Soviet Union were granted an exemp-
tion to the exam and issued a temporary general practitioner license for 
six months. During this period, they were allowed to practice medicine 
under the observation of native physicians. At the end of the six months, 
it was nearly certain that the immigrant physicians on the observation 
track would receive a permanent license.
Do the stages of regulation patterns outlined in this book apply to 
other certifi ed or licensed occupations? Are there alternative methods 
that could be applied to the data analyzed in this volume that may result 
in different statistical or analytical outcomes? Australia is now reeval-
uating its occupational licensing policies in the context of workforce 
development to examine whether licensing enhances human capital 
growth (Cooney 2013). Can licensing infl uence greater human capital 
growth in a nation?
How are wages determined or how is quality assessed in geographic 
areas or political jurisdictions that are often free of state and local gov-
ernment licensing, such as on Native American tribal lands (Harrison 
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et al. 2012)? Are there lessons to be learned in the United States from 
cross-national comparisons? What are the impacts on licensed and 
seemingly related unlicensed individuals in the occupation, as well 
as on consumers? What are the additional costs to the fi rm of hiring 
licensed workers (e.g., CPAs or engineers) relative to unlicensed work-
ers over the course of their employment with the fi rm? 
This type of analysis has already been implemented in the aca-
demic labor management literature (Lee and Mas 2009). In addition, 
the dynamics of the organizations involved in the licensing process, 
from unions to licensing boards, need more detailed examination. In 
less developed nations, such as in Southeast Asia or Africa, would the 
effect of occupational licensing for either consumers or licensed prac-
titioners be greater than for consumers or practitioners in more devel-
oped nations in North America or Europe? 
Although a number of studies examining the price effects of occu-
pational licensing were completed in the 1970s and 1980s, few updates 
or further examinations of the infl uence of regulation on prices have 
occurred since that time (Bond et al. 1980; Cox and Foster 1990). Given 
the growth of health care costs in particular, what would prices be with 
less regulation? 
An attempt to answer any of the questions just mentioned requires 
that more and better data be developed. Although detailed regulatory 
information for occupations is diffi cult to gather because it involves 
a detailed examination of local, state, and federal statutes, this work 
is necessary for a proper examination of the infl uence of licensing on 
labor market institutions. Governmental or private nonprofi t organiza-
tions could serve as depositories of this type of information. Ideally, 
this would include administrative hearing information, decisions by 
administrative boards, and key state court decisions on the regulation 
of occupations. Moreover, data should be maintained by the states and 
made available to researchers and policy analysts on the number and 
characteristics of licensed individuals. This information should also be 
stored and made centrally available for basic research and replication. 
The major governmental statistical agencies, such as the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the Census 
Bureau, should keep administrative fi les of data on occupational regu-
lation from both individuals and the states. Examples of questions for 
such data have been developed and tested as part of the Princeton Data 
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Improvement Initiative (PDII 2008). For example, Kleiner and Krueger 
(2013) would like to have the following questions included in national 
government surveys such as the Current Population Survey (CPS), the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the National 
Longitudinal Survey (Box 7.1).
Including these questions in national government surveys would 
enhance the ability of citizens and their state and national governments 
to determine the labor market and service market consequences of vari-
ous forms of government regulation (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). Recent 
efforts toward getting some of the data on federal government surveys 
have been successful, because the SIPP plans to ask similar questions 
during the 2013 wave of surveys (Boivin 2012). During 2012, states 
such as Minnesota, New Hampshire, Utah, and Arizona were actively 
considering legislation that would place more of the burden for justify-
ing licensing statutes on governmental entities rather than on the indi-
viduals who were seeking employment. If these states are successful in 
requiring governmental entities to justify regulations, then more survey 
Box 7.1  Sample Questions from the Princeton Data Improvement 
Initiative for a National Government Survey on 
Occupational Regulation
Do you have a license or certifi cation that is required by a federal, state, 
or local government agency to do your job? 
YES ....................................................................................................... 1 
NO ...................................................................................  2 (Go to Q25)
IN PROCESS/WORKING ON IT..........................................................3 
Would someone who does not have a license or certifi cate be legally 
allowed to do your job? 
YES ....................................................................................................... 1 
NO ......................................................................................................... 2 
Is everyone who does your job eventually required to have a license or 
certifi cation by a federal, state, or local government agency? 
YES ....................................................................................................... 1 
NO ..........................................................................................................2 
SOURCE: Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII).
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and administrative information will be required on occupational regula-
tion and its effect on consumers. The governmental agencies most able 
to supply the information are those statistical agencies at the federal 
level. 
The chapter opened with a quotation from the 1952 Council of 
State Governments report stating that “the essential task of democratic 
society is to establish a proper balance between freedom and order.” In 
the case of occupational licensing, the evaluation, policymaking, and 
implementation of this institution of licensing embodies the tension 
between these two laudable goals of order and freedom. Since licens-
ing infl uences many more individuals in the United States than unions 
or the minimum wage, its evaluation should be important for social 
science researchers, policymakers, and citizens (Kleiner and Krueger 
2013). Furthermore, occupational licensing infl uences the labor mar-
ket for both licensed and unlicensed practitioners. It also affects the 
ability of consumers to obtain important services. Moreover, it deter-
mines the distribution of those services, both among the well-off and 
for those in or near poverty. Finally, it helps determine the structure of 
markets where service market monopolies are provided by government. 
As the politics of occupational licensing ebb and fl ow with economic 
and political trends, it is important to shine the light of data and analysis 
on the subject to determine both the equity and the effi ciency aspects 
through the various stages of the evolution of occupational licensing. 
Notes
1. For a detailed explanation of the statute, see Minnesota H.F. No. 2002, as intro-
duced in the 87th Legislative Session (2011–2012), posted on the state Web site 
February 1, 2012 (Minnesota State Legislature 2012). 
2. Terry E. Branstad to Kraig Paulsen, 26 April 2013, Offi ce of the Governor of Iowa, 
Des Moines, Iowa. https://governor.iowa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/4-26
-13-Veto-Message-for-HF-569.pdf.
3. Ibid.
4. The term “collective voice effects,” as described in Freeman and Medoff (1985), 
refers to the ability of workers to infl uence the terms and conditions at work. Simi-
larly, the professions can set standards and pay, as well as determine who can work 
within licensed jobs.
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Appendix A
Details of the Characteristics 
of Preschool Center-Based 
and Family-Based Regulation 
Variables and Index Composition
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Appendix Table A.1  Center-Based Regulation Variables and Index Composition
Variable name Center-based regulation variable description Index (besides overall)
ageadcdum 1 Min. age for assistant teacher at center = 1 if  > 16; 0 otherwise Development, staff 
ageddcdum 2 Minimum age for director at center = 1 if  > 18; 0 otherwise Development, staff 
agetdcdum 3 Minimum age for teacher at center = 1 if  > 18; 0 otherwise Development, staff 
cdhrsadcdum 4 Min. hours of child development coursework required for aides in center = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff 
cdhrsddcdum 5 Min. hrs. of child devel. coursework required for director of center = 1 if  ≥ 180 Development, staff 
cdhrstdcdum 6 Min. hours of child develop. coursework req. for assis. teacher at center = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff 
edadcdum 7 Educ. req. for aide in center in years = 1 if  > 8; 0 otherwise Development, staff, educ
edddcdum 8 Educ. req. for director of center in years = 1 if  ≥ 14 Development, staff, educ
edtdcdum 9 Educ. req. for teacher at center in years = 1 if  > 12 Development, staff, educ
expadcdum 10 Childcare employment experience req. for aide in center in yrs. = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff 
expddcdum 11 Childcare employment experience required for dir. of center in years = 1 if  ≥ 2 Development, staff 
exptdcdum 12 Childcare employment experience req. for teacher at center in years = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff 
inftdcdum 13 Amount of indoor space req. per child at facil. (sq. ft.) = 1 if  ≥ 35 Environment
ongohadcdum 14 Amt. of annual ongoing training req. for aides in center in hrs. = 1 if  > 15 Development, staff 
ongohddcdum 15 Annual ongoing training required for director of center in hrs. = 1 if  > 8 Development, staff 
ongohtdcdum 16 Ongoing annual training req. for asst. teacher at center in hrs. = 1 if  > 15 Development, staff 
outftdcdum 17 Amt. of outdoor space required per child at facil. (sq. ft.) = 1 if  > 75 Environment
rat0dcdum 18 Max. child/caregiver for children age 0–11 months = 1 if < 4 Development, ratio
rat1dcdum 19 Max. child/caregiver for children age 12–23 months = 1 if  < 5 Development, ratio
rat2dcdum 20 Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 24–35 months = 1 if  < 8 Development, ratio
rat3dcdum 21 Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 36–47 months = 1 if  < 12 Development, ratio
rat4dcdum 22 Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 48–59 months = 1 if  < 12 Development, ratio
rat5dcdum 23 Max. child/caregiver ratio for children age 60+ months = 1 if  < 15 Development, ratio
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size0dcdum 24 Max. group size for age 0–11 months in day care center = 1 if  < 12 Development
size1dcdum 25 Max. group size for age 12–23 months in day care center = 1 if  < 14 Development
size2dcdum 26 Max. group size for age 24–35 months in day care center = 1 if  < 20 Development
size3dcdum 27 Max. group size for age 36–47 months in day care center = 1 if  < 30 Development
size4dcdum 28 Max. group size for age 48–59 months in day care center = 1 if  < 30 Development
size5dcdum 29 Max. group size for age 60 + months in day care center = 1 if  < 32 Development
aiddc 30 Is fi rst-aid certif. required for one or more staff members at day care center? Health, staff
crimdc 31 Is a criminal background check required for any employees at day care center? Health, staff
curricdc 32 Do regs. require a developmental program for day care centers? Development
equipdc 33 Do regs. require developmentally appropriate equip. in day care centers? Environment
fi nedc 34 Are fi nes imposed on day care centers that defy regs. and requirements? Oversight
healdc 35 Is a health evaluation required for any employees at day care center? Health
immundc 36 Are children who attend day care centers required to be immunized? Health
insurdc 37 Is day care center facility required to carry liability insurance? Health
ongoadc 38 Is annual ongoing training required for aides in day care center? Development, staff 
ongoddc 39 Is annual ongoing training required for director of day care center? Development, staff 
ongotdc 40 Is annual ongoing training required for teacher in day care center? Development, staff 
pickupdc 41 Do regs. indicate that centers may release children only to parents? Health
preadc 42 Is prev. experience or training required of aide at day care center? Development, staff 
preddc 43 Is prev. experience or training required of director at day care center? Development, staff 
pretdc 44 Is prev. experience or training required of teacher at day care center? Development, staff 
punishdc 45 Is corporal punish. prohibited for all ages of children at day care center? Health
sickdc 46 Do regs. require sick children to be excluded from child care center? Health
visitdc 47 Do regs. allow parents free access to kids and facilities in day care center? Oversight
revokedc 48 Does agency have authority to revoke day care center license? Oversight
SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011).
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Appendix Table A.2  Family-Based Regulation Variables and Index Composition
Variable name Family-based regulation variable Index (besides overall)
agedfhdum 1 Min. age for a family daycare provider = 1 if  > 18 Development, staff
cdhrsdfhdum 2 Min. hrs. of child devel. training required for family care provider = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff
eddfhdum 3 Educ. req. for family day care provider in years = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff, educ
inftfhdum 4 Amt. of indoor space req. per child at family facility in (sq. ft.) = 1 if  > 25 Environment
ongohdfhdum 5 Amt. of annual ongoing training req. for family provider in hrs. = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff
outftfhdum 6 Amt. of outdoor space req. per child at family facility in (sq. ft.) = 1 if  > 0 Environment
rat0fhdum 7 Max. child/caregiver for children age 0–11 months in family based = 1 if  < 3 Development, ratio
rat1fhdum 8 Max. child/caregiver for children age 12–23 months in family based = 1 if  < 4 Development, ratio
rat2fhdum 9 Max. child/caregiver for children age 24–35 months in family based = 1 if  < 6 Development, ratio
rat3fhdum 10 Max. child/caregiver for children age 36–47 months in family based = 1 if  < 6 Development, ratio
rat4fhdum 11 Max. child/caregiver for children age 48–59 months in family based = 1 if < 6 Development, ratio
rat5fhdum 12 Max. child/caregiver for children age 60 + months in family based = 1 if  < 6 Development, ratio
size0fhdum 13 Max. number of children age 0–11 months allowed in family home = 1 if  < 4 Development
size1fhdum 14 Max. number of children age 12–23 months allowed in family home = 1 if  < 4 Development
size2fhdum 15 Max. number of children age 24–35 months allowed in family home = 1 if  < 6 Development
size3fhdum 16 Max. number of children age 36–47 months allowed in family home = 1 if  < 6 Development
size4fhdum 17 Max. number of children age 48–59 months allowed in family home = 1 if  < 6 Development
size5fhdum 18 Max. number of children age 60 + months allowed in family home = 1 if < 6 Development
sizetfhdum 19 Max. number of children allowed in family home = 1 if < 6 Development
aidfh 20 Is fi rst-aid certif. required for family day care provider? Health, staff
crimfh 21 Is a criminal background check required for a family day care provider? Health, staff
curricfh 22 Do regs. require a developmental program for family homes? Development
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equipfh 23 Do regs. require developmentally appropriate equip. in family homes? Environment
expdfhdum 24 Childcare employment exper. req. for family day care provider in yrs. = 1 if  > 0 Development, staff
fencefh 25 Do regs. indicate outdoor play area must be fenced in, family homes? Health, environment
fi nefh 26 Are fi nes imposed on family homes that defy regs. and requirements? Oversight
fi refh 27 Do regs. require fi re-health equip. in family homes? Health
foodfh 28 Do regs. indicate nutritional requirements for meals and snacks, family homes? Health
healfh 29 Is a health evaluation required for a family day care provider? Health
immunfh 30 Are children who attend family homes required to be immunized? Health
insurfh 31 Is family home facility required to carry liability insurance? Oversight
ongodfh 32 Is annual ongoing training required for family day care provider? Development, staff
predfh 33 Is training or orientation offered or required for family home providers? Development, staff
punishfh 34 Is corporal punish. prohibited for all ages of children, family homes? Health
revokefh 35 Does agency have authority to revoke family home license? Oversight
sickfh 36 Do regs. require sick children be excluded from family homes? Health
tranfh 37 Do regs. include spec. instructions for transporting children in family homes? Health
unannfh 38 Is agency authorized to inspect family home without prior notice? Oversight
visitfh 39 Do regs. allow parents free access to kids and facilities in family homes? Oversight
SOURCE: Hotz and Xiao (2011).
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Appendix B
Adoption of Occupational 
Regulations by State 
Statute for Electricians
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Appendix Table B.1  Adoption of Occupational Regulations in State Statute, by State, for Electricians, 1992–2007
State Year
Type of 
licensing
General 
requirement Apprenticeship
Written
exam
Performance 
exam
Continuous 
education
Alaska 1992 S 0 1 0 0 0
Alabama 1992 S 0 1 1 1 0
Arizona 1992 S 1 1 1 1 1
Arkansas 1992 S 0 1a 1 0 0
California 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Colorado 1992 S 0 1a 1 0 0
Connecticut 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Delaware 1992 L
2000 S 0 1 1 0 1
District of 
Columbia
1992 S 0 0 0 0 0
1999 S 0 1 1 0 0
Florida 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Georgia 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Hawaii 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Idaho 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
1999 S 1 1 1 0 0
Illinois 1992 L
Indiana 1992 N
Iowa 1992 L
2007 S 0 1 1 0 0
Kansas 1992 L
Kentucky 1992 L
2001 S 0 1a 0 0 0
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Louisiana 1992 N
2004 S 0 0 1 0 0
Maine 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
Maryland 1992 S 1 1a 1 0 0
Massachusetts 1992 N
2007 S 1 1 1 0 1
Michigan 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Minnesota 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
Mississippi 1992 S 0 0 1 0 0
Missouri 1992 L
Montana 1992 S 0 1a 1 0 0
Nebraska 1992 S 0 1 0 0 0
Nevada 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
New Hampshire 1992 S 0 1a 1 0 0
New Jersey 1992 S 0 0 0 0 0
2003 S 1 1 1 0 0
New Mexico 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
New York 1992 L
North Carolina 1992 S 1 1a 0 0 0
North Dakota 1992 S 0 1a 1 0 0
Ohio 1992 S 1 1 1 0 0
Oklahoma 1992 S 1 0 1 0 0
2002 S 1 1a 1 0 0
Oregon 1992 S 0 1 0 0 0
Pennsylvania 1992 L
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State Year
Type of 
licensing
General 
requirement Apprenticeship
Written
exam
Performance 
exam
Continuous 
education
Rhode Island 1992 S 0 0 1 0 0
1998 S 1 1a 1 0 0
South Carolina 1992 S 0 0 1 0 0
South Dakota 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
Tennessee 1992 N
2000 S 0 0 1 0 0
Texas 1992 L
2003 S 0 1 1 0 0
Utah 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
2000 S 0 1a 1 0 0
Vermont 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
Virginia 1992 S 0 0 1 0 0
1995 S 1 1a 1 0 0
Washington 1992 S 0 1 1 0 1
1999 S 0 1 1 0 0
West Virginia 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
1994 S 1 1a 1 0 0
Wisconsin 1992 S 0 1 1 0 0
Wyoming 1992 S 0 1a 1 0 0
1994 S 1 1a 1 0 1
NOTE: S, L, C, and N in the column under heading “Type of licensing” refer to State, Local, Certifi cation, and No license requirement, 
respectively; defi nitions of specifi c components and their values are shown in Table 5.1.
a In the “Apprenticeship” column, a indicates that higher occupation-specifi c experiences than apprenticeship (e.g., journeyman) are re-
quired.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of statutes.
Appendix Table B.1  (continued)
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Appendix Table B.2 Characteristics of the Data in the Analysis
Panel A: Key descriptions of the SOII and CFOI
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI)
Sampling • 39 states • 50 states + DC 
• Nonfatal injuries and illnesses for private industry 
only 
• Includes private and federal, state, and local 
government agencies
• Excludes the self-employed, farms with fewer than 
11 employees, private households, and federal 
government agencies
• Data on deaths compiled from death certifi cates, 
OSHA reports, workers’ compensation reports, 
medical examiner reports, newspaper articles, other 
sources 
Important changes • Includes employees in state and local government 
agencies for national estimates only 
• Change in the standard occupational classifi cation 
(SOC) system and the standard industry codes (SIC) 
system in 2003
• Change in the standard occupational classifi cation 
(SOC) system and the standard industry codes (SIC) 
system in 2003
• No longer reports on injuries separate from illness 
starting with the 2002 data
Panel B: Sample selection for electricians: industry and occupation codes 
1992–2002 2003–2007
Industry codes 1500~1799 under 1987 SIC 23 (23600~23899) under 2003 NAICS
Occupation codes for 
electricians
555 Supervisors of electricians and power transmission 
installers
47-2111 Electricians;  
47-3013 Helpers of electricians
575 Electricians
576 Electricians’ apprentices 
577 Electrical power-line installers and repairers 49-9051 Electrical power-line installers and repairers
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Appendix C 
Data Developed from the American 
Community Survey (ACS)
To generate the sample of dentists and dental hygienists, we started by 
dropping individuals who belong to the categories “Working without pay in 
family business or farm” and “Unemployed.” Thus, the sample includes in-
dividuals who belong to the classes of 1) private wage and salary workers, 2) 
government workers (who may work in any local, state, or federal governmen-
tal unit), and 3) self-employed, both in their own not-incorporated business and 
in their own incorporated business. 
Next, individuals whose education is “below associate” for dentists and 
individuals whose education is “below 12th grade without diploma” for dental 
hygienists were dropped.  Also dropped were individuals whose age is greater 
than 65 and whose years of experience (= age − years of schooling − 6) are 
below zero and individuals whose usual working hours in the past 12 months 
were less than 20 hours or more than 60 hours. 
Hourly earnings were determined by computing annual hours worked (i.e., 
from the ACS question, the usual working hours times the number of weeks for 
the past 12 months). Then we computed annual earnings by adding the wage 
and salary income (i.e., wagp) and the income from self-employment (i.e., 
semp), and then dividing the annual earnings by annual hours worked. 
In computing the hourly earnings, however, the ACS has two potential 
measurement problems: 1) the presence of outliers and 2) the top-coding (or 
censoring) of both incomes (i.e., wagp and semp), particularly for dentists. 
First, a few individuals report implausibly high earnings relative to their hours 
of work, which would affect the estimated mean and variance of hourly earn-
ings.  There was a deletion of observations for the professionals whose hourly 
earnings were in the top 0.5 percent for each occupation. As a result, the high-
est hourly earnings were in the range of two times the top-coded hourly earn-
ings. Next, we computed top-coded hourly earnings (we also top-coded hourly 
wagp and semp), assuming that the top-coded individuals worked for 40 hours 
and 52 weeks in a given year. For individuals who had wagp (semp) only, we 
assigned the top-coded hourly wagp (semp) as their hourly earnings. For indi-
viduals who had both wagp and semp and for whom the sum of hourly wagp 
and hourly semp was greater than the higher of the top-coded hourly wagp and 
241
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Appendix Table C.1  Sample Selection from the ACS
Dental 
hygienists Dentists
Initial observations 7,510 8,942
Selection rule 1: Unemployed or working without pay in 
family business or farm 
−20 −11
Selection rule 2: Educational attainment −48 −28
Drop sample: Below associate for dentist; 
sample below 12th grade w/o diploma for 
dental hygienist
Selection rule 3: Age equal to or over 65 −142 −1,017
Selection rule 4: Experience = Age − years of schooling − 6 −8 −36
Selection rule 5: Less than 20 hours and more than 60 hours −1,303 −534
Selection rule 6: Drop individuals whose hourly earnings 
belong to the top 0.5%
−30 −37
Selection rule 7: Hourly earnings less than the federal 
minimum of $5.15 during 2001–2007
−73 −59
Total observations 5,886 7,220
the top-coded hourly semp, we assigned the higher of the top-coded hourly 
wagp and the top-coded hourly semp as their hourly earnings. 
To deal with the top-codings, we followed the method used in much of 
the literature: we adjusted the top-coded incomes by a factor (typically, 1.33 
or 1.40) that approximates the mean for those above the censoring point (Card 
and DiNardo 2002). In this paper, we present empirical results using hourly 
earnings adjusted by a factor of 1.40.
For individuals who reported implausibly low earnings, we deleted ob-
servations with measured hourly wages below the federal minimum wage of 
$5.15 during 2001–2007. 
SOURCE: American Community Survey (ACS).
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Appendix Table C.2  Models of State Median Hourly Earnings Gap between Hygienists and Dentists
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DHPPI 0.001
(0.008)
Tasks permitted (summated) −0.054
(0.043)
Tasks permitted (Rasch) −0.053
(0.057)
Independence from dentists (summated) −0.067****
(0.010)
Independence from dentists (Rasch) −0.049****
(0.006)
Self-employment allowed −0.534****
(0.073)
Employment growth ratio 0.003 0.007 0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
State median household income (/1,000) −0.070*** −0.066*** −0.069*** −0.065*** −0.065*** −0.065***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Rate of uninsured −0.034 −0.029 −0.032 −0.024 −0.024 −0.024
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant 5.227**** 5.301**** 5.240**** 4.795**** 4.346*** 4.833****
(1.307) (1.322) (1.312) (1.330) (1.362) (1.324)
State fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year fi xed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y
R−squared 0.354 0.357 0.356 0.361 0.362 0.362
N 322 322 322 322 322 322
NOTE: Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in parentheses. * signifi cant at the 0.10 level; ** signifi cant at the 
0.05 level; *** signifi cant at the 0.01 level; **** signifi cant at the 0.001 level.
SOURCE: Author’s compilation of licensing statutes; ACS.
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Appendix D 
Statutory Right to an Occupation
Model Legislation
Table of Contents
100.01 Purpose
100.02 Defi nitions
100.03 Right to engage in a lawful occupation
100.04 Federal law’s use of state occupational regulations
100.01 PURPOSE
This chapter’s purpose is to (a) ensure that an individual may pursue a law-
ful occupation free from unnecessary regulations and (b) protect against the 
misuse of occupational regulations to reduce competition and increase prices 
to consumers.
100.02 DEFINITIONS
Subdivision 1. Scope. For the purposes of this chapter, the words defi ned in 
this section have the following meanings.
Subd. 2. Business license. “Business license” means a permit, registration, 
certifi cation, franchise, or other approval required by law for a sole proprietor-
ship, partnership, or corporate entity to do business.
Subd. 3. Certifi cation. “Certifi cation” is a voluntary program in which the 
government grants nontransferable recognition to an individual who meets 
personal qualifi cations established by a legislative body. Upon approval, the 
individual may use “certifi ed” as a designated title. A noncertifi ed individual 
may also perform the lawful occupation for compensation but may not use the 
title “certifi ed.” “Certifi cation” is not intended to be synonymous with an “oc-
cupational license” in this chapter or to prohibit the use of private certifi cation.
Subd. 4. Court. “Court” means any court, administrative tribunal, or other 
government agency acting in a judicial or quasijudicial capacity.
245
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Subd. 5. Government. “Government” means the government of this state or 
any of its political subdivisions.
Subd. 6. Lawful occupation. “Lawful occupation” means a course of conduct, 
pursuit, or profession that includes the sale of goods or services that are not 
themselves illegal to sell, irrespective of whether the individual selling them is 
subject to an occupational regulation. 
Subd. 7. Least restrictive occupational regulation. “Least restrictive occu-
pational regulation” means, from least to most restrictive, (a) a provision for 
private civil action to remedy consumer harm, (b) inspection, (c) bonding or 
insurance, (d) registration, (e) certifi cation, or (f) occupational license. 
Subd. 8. Occupational license. “Occupational license” is a nontransferable 
authorization in law for an individual to perform a lawful occupation for com-
pensation based on meeting personal qualifi cations established by a legisla-
tive body. It is illegal for an individual who does not possess an occupational 
license to perform the occupation for compensation. Occupational licensing is 
the most restrictive form of occupational regulation.
Subd. 9. Occupational regulation. “Occupational regulation” means a statute, 
ordinance, rule, practice, policy, or other law requiring an individual to possess 
certain personal qualifi cations to work in a lawful occupation. It excludes a 
business license, facility license, building permit, land use regulation, or other 
commercial regulations except to the extent those laws regulate an individual’s 
personal qualifi cations to perform a lawful occupation. 
Subd. 10. Personal qualifi cations. “Personal qualifi cations” are criteria es-
tablished by a legislative body related to an individual’s personal background, 
including completion of an approved educational program, satisfactory perfor-
mance on an examination, work experience, moral standing, and completion 
of continuing education.
Subd. 11. Registration. “Registration” means a requirement established by 
a legislative body in which an individual gives notice to the government that 
may include the individual’s name and address, the individual’s agent for ser-
vice of process, the location of the activity to be performed, and a description 
of the service the individual provides. “Registration” does not include personal 
qualifi cations but may require a bond or insurance. Upon approval, the indi-
vidual may use “registered” as a designated title. A nonregistered individual 
may not perform the occupation for compensation or use “registered” as a 
designated title. “Registration” is not transferable. It is not intended to be syn-
onymous with an “occupational license” in this chapter or to prohibit the use 
of private registration.
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Subd. 12. Substantial burden. “Substantial burden” means a legal or other 
regulatory obstacle that imposes signifi cant diffi culty or cost on an individual 
seeking to enter into or continue in a lawful occupation. A substantial burden 
is a burden that is more than incidental.
100.03 RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN A LAWFUL OCCUPATION
Subdivision 1. Statutory right. An individual has a right to engage in a lawful 
occupation free from any substantial burden unless the government demon-
strates (a) it has a compelling interest in protecting against present and recog-
nizable harm to the public health or safety, and (b) the occupational regulation 
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling interest.
Subd. 2. Defense and relief. 
(a) An individual may assert as a defense the right to engage in a lawful 
occupation in any judicial or administrative proceeding to enforce an 
occupational regulation that violates subdivision 1.
(b) An individual may bring an action for declaratory judgment or injunc-
tive or other equitable relief for a violation of subdivision 1.
(c) An individual may assert as a defense or bring an action against the 
enforceability of an occupational regulation, pursuant to subsections (a) 
and (b), which is:
(1) in law at the effective date of this chapter; or
(2) enacted, adopted, or amended after the effective date of this chapter 
and does not include in the state statute an explicit exemption from 
this chapter.
(d) An individual who asserts a defense or brings an action under this sec-
tion has the initial burden of proof that an occupational regulation sub-
stantially burdens the individual’s right to engage in a lawful occupa-
tion.
(e) If the individual meets the burden of proof under subsection (d), the 
government must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that 
the government has a compelling interest in protecting against present 
and recognizable harm to the public health or safety, and that the oc-
cupational regulation is the least restrictive means for furthering that 
compelling interest.
Subd. 3. Judicial determination. A court shall liberally construe this chapter 
to protect the right established in subdivision 1. A court shall make its own 
fi ndings of fact and conclusions of law. It shall not grant any presumption to 
D
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legislative or administrative determinations of harm to the public health or 
safety, or that the regulation is the least restrictive means of furthering a com-
pelling governmental interest.
100.04 FEDERAL LAW’S USE OF STATE OCCUPATIONAL 
REGULATIONS
To the extent necessary to meet federal law, the statutory right established in 
section 100.03, subdivision 1, does not apply to an individual who is required 
by federal law to meet a state occupational regulation. 
Note
I thank Lee McGrath, of the Minnesota chapter of the Institute for Justice, for providing 
this model legislation (McGrath 2012). 
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Data Sources Used in This Volume
The sources of many of the data used in this volume are given, along with the 
years of the surveys and their frequency. In addition, units of observation for 
the data are presented, along with the sources’ unique characteristics that make 
them useful for analyzing the infl uence of various stages of occupational regu-
lation in the United States.
American Community Survey (ACS)
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, as provided 
by the Minnesota Population Center (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series), 
University of Minnesota.
Survey years: Every year.
Unit surveyed: Individuals, by household.
Number of units in survey: The full implementation of the ACS, which began 
in 2005, sampled approximately 2.9 million housing unit addresses annually. 
The 2011 ACS sampled approximately 3.3 million housing unit addresses. 
This corresponds to a 3.54 million annual level beginning in June 2011.
Unique characteristics: The survey provides broad social, economic, housing, 
and demographic profi les. For example, it includes age, gender, race, family 
relationships, income and benefi ts, health insurance, education, veteran status, 
disabilities, where you work and how you get there, and where you live and 
how much you pay for some essentials.  
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI)
Conducted by: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). CFOI is a federal-state co-
operative program that has been implemented in all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia since 1992. To compile counts that are as complete as possible, 
the census uses multiple sources to identify, verify, and profi le fatal worker 
injuries. Information about each workplace fatal injury—occupation and other 
worker characteristics, equipment involved, and circumstances of the event—
249
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is obtained by cross-referencing the source records, such as death certifi cates, 
workers’ compensation reports, and federal and state agency administrative 
reports. To ensure that fatal injuries are work-related, cases are substantiated 
with two or more independent source documents, or a source document and a 
follow-up questionnaire.
Survey years: 1992 through 2010.
Units surveyed: Firms and states. About 200,000 business establishments are 
surveyed annually.
Number of units in survey: A work relationship exists if an event or exposure 
results in the fatal injury or illness of a person under the following three cir-
cumstances: 1) on the employer’s premises and the person was there to work, 
2) off the employer’s premises and the person was there to work, or 3) the 
event or exposure was related to the person’s work or status as an employee. 
The employer’s premises include buildings, grounds, parking lots, and other 
facilities and property used in the conduct of business. Work is defi ned as du-
ties, activities, or tasks that produce a product or result; that are done in ex-
change for money, goods, services, profi t, or benefi t; and that are legal activi-
ties in the United States. 
Unique characteristics: The database has contractor starts and ownership, and 
recently it added information by occupation and state. The data also have in-
formation on the age of the individual, birthplace, gender, day of the incident, 
and what happened during the incident. 
Census of the Population 
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, as provided 
by the Minnesota Population Center (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series), 
University of Minnesota.
Survey years: Every 10 years, dating to the founding of the United States.
Unit surveyed: Individuals, by household.
Number of units in survey: Between 5 and 100 percent of the population, de-
pending on the question.
Unique characteristics: Provides large samples of individuals’ labor force sta-
tus (employed, wages, earnings), demographic characteristics, industry and 
occupation, national origin, and area of residence. 
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Current Population Survey (CPS)
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Bureau, for the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Survey years: Monthly since 1943.
Unit surveyed: Individuals 16 years or older, by household.
Number of units in survey: Currently approximately 120,000 individuals that 
make up 60,000 households.
Unique characteristics: Each CPS survey includes data on demographic char-
acteristics, labor force status, industry, region, state, and occupation.
Department of Labor Listing of Licensed Occupations 
Conducted by: Department of Labor’s Employment and Training Administra-
tion in conjunction with state labor market information agencies.
Survey years: Various years, including 2000. 
Units surveyed: State agencies responsible for occupational regulation.
Unique characteristics: Census of state-licensed occupations in the United 
States, as provided to the U.S. Department of Labor in 2000 by state agencies 
responsible for labor market information and licensing occupations. 
Early Childhood Longitudinal Program from Birth, ECLS-B
Conducted by: National Center for Education Statistics. The Early Childhood 
Longitudinal Study Birth Cohort (ECLS-B) was designed to supply policy-
makers, researchers, child care providers, teachers, and parents with detailed 
information about children’s early life experiences. Data collected for the 
ECLS-B focus on children’s health, development, care, and education during 
the formative years from birth through kindergarten entry.
Survey years: Children were followed from birth through kindergarten entry. 
Information about these children was collected when they were approximately 
nine months old (2001–2002), two years old (2003–2004), and four years old/
preschool age (2005–2006).
Units surveyed: Children and their parents, and another module was gathered 
from teachers on the children’s cognitive ability.
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Unique characteristics: A nationally representative sample of approximately 
14,000 children born in the United States in 2001. The children participating 
in the study came from diverse socioeconomic and racial/ethnic backgrounds, 
with oversamples of Chinese children, other Asian and Pacifi c Islander chil-
dren, American Indian and Alaska Native children, twins, and children born 
with low and very low birth weight.
Early Childhood Longitudinal Program, Kindergarten Class of 1998–1999 
(ECLS-K)
Conducted by: National Center for Education Statistics. It focuses on children’s 
early school experiences, beginning with kindergarten and following children 
through middle school. The ECLS-K data provide descriptive information on 
children’s status at entry to school, their transition into school, and their pro-
gression through eighth grade. The longitudinal nature of the ECLS-K data 
enables researchers to study how a wide variety of family, school, community, 
and individual factors are associated with school performance.  
Survey years: 1998–1999, 1999–2000, 2002, 2004, and 2007. 
Units surveyed: To collect information from children, trained assessors vis-
ited the children in their schools. The direct child assessment, which was un-
timed and conducted one-on-one with each child, collected information about 
children’s reading and mathematics skills and knowledge in each round of 
data collection, their general knowledge (i.e., science and social studies) in 
kindergarten and fi rst grade, and their science knowledge in third, fi fth, and 
eighth grades. In addition, the assessment included measurements of height 
and weight and, in fall kindergarten only, children’s psychomotor skills (e.g., 
ability to hop, skip, jump, manipulate blocks, and draw fi gures). In the third, 
fi fth, and eighth grades, children completed questionnaires on various topics 
including their perceptions of their social and academic competence and skills, 
their school experiences and activities, and their diet.
To collect information from parents, a trained interviewer phoned the parent at 
his or her home and conducted a 45–50 minute interview. Computer-assisted 
interviewing methods were used to record the parent’s answers. If the child’s 
family did not have a telephone, the interview was conducted in person. The 
sample now includes 18,300 kindergartners and their families, teachers, school 
administrators, and before- and after-school care providers.
Unique characteristics: No large national study that was focused on education 
had followed a cohort of children from kindergarten entry to middle school 
Kleiner2013.indb   252 9/18/2013   10:11:37 AM
Appendix E   253
until the ECLS-K. The ECLS-K was designed to provide comprehensive and 
reliable data that could be used to describe and to better understand children’s 
development and experiences in the elementary and middle school grades, 
as well as how children’s early experiences relate to their later development, 
learning, and experiences in school. The multifaceted data collected across the 
years allow researchers and policymakers to study how various child, home, 
classroom, school, and community factors at various points in children’s lives 
relate to cognitive, social, emotional, and physical development.
National Longitudinal Surveys 
Conducted by: The National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) are a set of two sur-
veys sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics and conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the 
University of Chicago, with assistance from the Center for Human Resource 
Research (CHRR) at Ohio State University, and the fi eldwork is conducted by 
the census.
Survey years: Occasionally since 1965.
Units surveyed: The current survey consists of a nationally representative sam-
ple of approximately 9,000 participants and their households. 
Unique characteristics: The NLS are a set of surveys designed to gather infor-
mation at multiple points in time on the labor market activities and other sig-
nifi cant life events of several groups of men and women. There are fi ve cohorts 
that make up the National Longitudinal Surveys NLSY97 and NLSY79: 1) 
children, 2) mature women, 3) young women, 4) older men, and 5) young men. 
An extensive two-part questionnaire was administered to each respondent; this 
questionnaire listed and gathered demographic information on members of the 
household and on the respondent’s immediate family members living else-
where. Youths are interviewed on an annual basis. Questions are asked about 
current and former occupations.
Option One 
Conducted by: Data come from Option One, a lending company that obtains 
almost all its loans from brokers. 
Survey year: 2005.
Units surveyed: Broker-dependent mortgage originators of several million 
loans.
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Unique characteristics: Detailed data on mortgage originators in the United 
States that includes borrower’s income and racial/ethnic identity, the loan 
amount, and several economic and demographic properties of the census tract 
where the property is located (the distribution of credit scores, unemployment 
rate, median age of applicants, median age of housing stock, percentage of 
minority population, median income, and the percentage of owner-occupied 
and vacant housing units).
Princeton Data Improvement Initiative (PDII)
Conducted by: Westat conducted a national random-digit-dial (RDD) survey 
on behalf of Princeton University.
Survey year: 2008.
Units surveyed: In order to be eligible for the study, persons had to be adults 
in the labor force—for this project the labor force was defi ned as persons who 
are either a) currently working at a job for pay or profi t or b) currently looking 
for work and have worked at a job in the past. Households in which no adults 
are currently in the labor force were not eligible for the study. If a household 
contained more than one adult in the labor force, one was randomly selected by 
the CATI program for participation in the extended interview. When the person 
chosen for the extended interview was someone other than the screener respon-
dent, age and workforce status were confi rmed with that person before con-
tinuing with the extended interview. There were 2,513 completed interviews.
Unique characteristics: Major topics covered in the survey included worker 
perceptions of occupational licensing, adult lifetime work experience, and the 
potential for their jobs to be offshored. On occupational licensing, there was 
a module to assess the accuracy of self-reported occupational licensing and 
certifi cation. The key questions were as follows:
Q11. Do you have a license or certifi cation that is required by a federal, state, 
or local government agency to do your job? 
YES ................................................................................................................. 1 
NO .............................................................................................. 2 (Go to Q25)
IN PROCESS/WORKING ON IT.................................................................... 3 
Q11a. Would someone who does not have a license or certifi cate be legally 
allowed to do your job? 
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YES ................................................................................................................. 1 
NO ................................................................................................................... 2 
Q12. Is everyone who does your job eventually required to have a license or 
certifi cation by a federal, state, or local government agency? 
YES ................................................................................................................. 1 
NO ................................................................................................................... 2 
Those who answered affi rmatively to Q11 were asked additional questions 
about the agency (federal, state, or local) that required their license or certifi -
cate, and about the requirements they needed to satisfy, such as achieving a 
high school or college degree, passing a test, demonstrating certain skills, or 
completing an internship or apprenticeship. 
Survey of Licensing Statutes
Conducted by: Center for Labor Policy, University of Minnesota, Jing Cai, 
Yaffa Epstein, Heidi Liu, and Cynthia Pahl. 
Survey years: Various years between 1980 and 2010.
Units surveyed: State statutes for interior designers, mortgage brokers, pre-
school teachers and their assistants, plumbers and electricians, and dentists and 
dental hygienists. 
Unique characteristics: Statutory data and changes in laws on age, citizen-
ship, residency, good moral character, special education, graduate education 
requirements, experience, exam requirements, bachelor’s degree requirement, 
and reciprocity requirements with other states or countries. 
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII) 
Conducted by: U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics for es-
tablishments with 10 or more workers.
Survey years: Data are provided annually on the rate and number of work-
related injuries, illnesses, and fatal injuries, and how these statistics vary by 
incident, industry, geography, occupation, and other characteristics.
Units surveyed: These are surveys of establishments annually. This survey 
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is made possible through the cooperation of participating state agencies and 
nearly 200,000 business establishments that provide information on workplace 
injuries and illnesses to the BLS. State agencies collect and verify most of the 
data provided. BLS fi eld offi ces collect and verify data from nonparticipating 
states.
Unique characteristics: The SOII collects data on nonfatal injuries and ill-
nesses for each calendar year from a sample of employers. Just before the start 
of the year, the BLS sends notifi cation (and record-keeping information) to the 
sampled employers. In the following January, the BLS sends these employers 
requests for the injury and illness information for the year just ended, along 
with instructions on how to report it to the BLS. These reports form the basis of 
the annual estimates published in the following October and November, after 
the data are collected.
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